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Turkey and the West — *Bruce R. Kuniholm*
Desert Storm and Conventional Forces — *Carl E. Vuono*
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

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Peter W. Rodman

MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY AFTER THE GULF WAR

The war in the Persian Gulf unleashed powerful—and contradictory—forces in the Middle East. The fundamental premise of American policy was that defeating Saddam Hussein would discredit radicalism, strengthen moderates and enhance regional stability. On the other hand, the war, as long as it lasted, was bound to sow the seeds of future resentments and turbulence. There was a new sentiment in the Middle East that more democratic forms of government were needed; yet a new impetus was also given to Islamic forces in almost every country in the region. Will the United States be in a position, now that the war is over, to shape the trends in a period of enormous fluidity? Or will it be riding a tornado? There is pressure to redouble efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. But will the conditions for a successful effort be propitious, or not?

II

During the first gulf war—the eight-year struggle between Iraq and Iran—Iraq was driven by necessity into an alignment with the Arab moderates, America's friends. This move helped make possible Egypt's reentry into the Arab fold; it also assured Syria's isolation, preventing Syria from capitalizing on the American debacle in Lebanon. Situated between radical Syria and Iran, Iraq seemed to have a durable reason for this more constructive orientation.

When that war ended in the summer of 1988, that regional state of affairs flew apart with remarkable speed.

One crucial development was the surprising weakness of both Syria and Iran. At various times in the past, it had been Syria's President Hafez al-Assad and Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who had their pictures on weekly newsmagazine

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covers as the most dangerous men in the world. Over time, however, Syria had been deflated by the cumulative effect of its economic weakness, its Lebanon quagmire, its humiliation by the Soviets (who rejected Syria's bid for strategic parity with Israel) and even the Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories, which punctured Assad's claims to be a major player in the Palestinian game.

Iran, after 1988, seemed preoccupied more with recovering its internal equilibrium than with helping sustain the regional one. Khomeini was dead, and the moderates so eagerly sought after by the White House in the mid-1980s finally seemed to have the upper hand. Yet their outreach to the West was stymied by their unwillingness or inability to end the hostage drama in Lebanon. The result, from Saddam's vantage point, was a defanged Iran unable to link up decisively with the outside world.

Saddam must have looked around one day and realized he was free of the regional constraints that had compelled his previous course. His aggressive military buildup, plus Iraq's emergence as a powerhouse oil producer (second only to Saudi Arabia in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), put him in a position to bid for regional dominance.

In early 1990, therefore, the Iraqi leader made a strategic shift. He abandoned a foreign policy that had made him, for a decade, a strategic partner of America's closest friends in the Arab world and thus a plausible strategic interlocutor with the United States.

There was a telling moment in early 1990 when the Iraqis seemed to have second thoughts about the return of the Arab League to Cairo, a campaign they had been leading until then on Egypt's behalf. After Egyptian prodding the Iraqis relented, but clearly they were coming to view Egypt less as a needed ally than as a traditional and likely future rival.

Saddam's posture toward the United States shifted even more dramatically. He was shocked by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resultant preeminence of the United States as the key outside power in the Middle East. His response was not a new deference toward Washington, or even a continuation of the association that the war had engendered; it was rather an outburst of anti-Americanism that was the clearest possible signal of his strategic reversal. In a major (and revealing) speech to the Arab Cooperation Council summit in Amman on February 24, 1990, Saddam portrayed the end of

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the Cold War as a disaster for the Arabs: Soviet Jewish immigrants were flooding Israel; the Arabs would have to do without their traditional Soviet backing; American preeminence was a strategic windfall for Israel. A new counterweight was needed to block American ambitions, he argued. Europe and Japan would emerge as major powers in five years' time, but meanwhile the only hope for the Arabs was to pull together and counterbalance America themselves (presumably under Iraqi leadership).

Saddam singled out the oil weapon as crucial leverage, hailing the 1973 Arab oil embargo. Then in May he called for a new embargo against the United States to force a change in its Middle East policy. This was of a piece with what later produced his invasion of Kuwait—his fury at the overproduction of oil by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which held prices down and denied Iraq the revenue needed to sustain its economic and military surge.

Saddam's anti-Americanism was not a passing whim. In his February 1990 speech he denounced the U.S. naval presence in the gulf, even though it was far diminished from its wartime peak (and had been there largely to protect Iraq's own lifeline to the outside world). He focused blame on the United States for changes in Soviet policy harmful to the Arabs. Later he reacted bitterly to a Voice of America editorial broadcast that listed Iraq among countries not yet democratic. He chafed at the U.S.-British police operations that blocked his illegal acquisition of nuclear triggering devices and tubing for a "supergun." His threat in early April to use chemical weapons against Israel if attacked is well known, but he is also on record as saying in May that if his missiles could hit Washington, he would try that too, "as necessary."

Sometimes paranoids can have real enemies, or real fears. But anti-Americanism is also a weapon of convenience for radicals. The evidence seems stronger that, by his own choice and for his own reasons, Saddam Hussein made himself a strategic adversary of the United States. The "American threat" was a foil, or an excuse, for regional ambitions he now saw himself in a position to fulfill.

The United States and its Arab friends were undeniably slow to react to this transformation. They clung too long to the hope that it was not as decisive as it appeared and that some convergence of interest might remain. But the United States responded brilliantly and courageously to the August 2 inva-

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sion of Kuwait. It quickly grasped the strategic reality that now required it to step in as the counterweight to Iraq's assault on the regional balance. By a historic blunder, Saddam had brought about precisely the American entry into the region that he had portrayed as his worst nightmare. And the United States saw correctly that only the crushing defeat of Saddam would minimize the strategic threat he posed.

III

The United States has now set itself the task of helping shape a new regional balance out of the debris of the second Gulf War—hoping to prevent a third. Every country in the region has felt the effects, internally and externally. New alignments are forming. It is out of this fluidity that the United States might, or might not, be able to create a new order in the Middle East.

In Saudi Arabia the shock of the invasion of Kuwait brought an unaccustomed clarity and decisiveness to Saudi policy. Yet the invitation to American forces exacerbated strains within the kingdom, including pressures from Islamic clerics who charged the royal family with betraying the land of the Two Holy Mosques to the infidels. Simultaneously and contradictorily, it tempted a disaffected intelligentsia to press harder for liberal reforms. Saudi leaders pinned their hopes on an early decisive victory over Saddam Hussein to restore the kingdom's security and make possible the early withdrawal of foreign troops; they feared any outcome, diplomatic or military, that left them with the Iraqi threat intact and a continuing dependence on foreign forces. They claimed not to fear the tumultuous consequences of a war, or else they feared it less than a prolongation of the crisis. Having committed themselves, they saw no alternative to victory.

In the short run, the achievement of that victory has boosted Saudi self-confidence. Yet the crisis has also been a shock to the delicate internal balance of the Saudi system. It is in the longer run that the premise of American policy will be tested—namely, the conviction that the defeat of Saddam Hussein will sustain the courage of moderates. Before the war, Saudi leaders talked confidently of a "new thinking" in their policy that would emerge after victory. They promised a more assertive Saudi role, in partnership with Egypt, in promoting the peace process and taming the Syrians. They implied an

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end to the policy of paying protection money to radical forces, particularly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). They said they were prepared for full peace and normalization of relations with Israel, if the Palestinian problem could be solved. They implied a warmer and more open relationship with the United States, though, as noted, they hoped its military presence could return to something like its previous over-the-horizon discreetness. They promised bolder internal reform, facing down the clerics with the confidence that would come from vindication in their winning gamble against the Iraqi leader.

With victory, the initial boost given to Saudi self-confidence may have these welcome and lasting effects. But it will also run up against the unresolved dilemmas of the kingdom's internal situation.

Egypt's role is more clearly strengthened by the coalition's success against Saddam. The confrontation had more solid support in Egypt than elsewhere in the Arab world, given its traditional rivalry with and popular mistrust of Iraq. Egypt gained the forgiveness of its military debt to the United States, financial assistance and the promise of firmer postwar political backing from the Saudis, and the co-opting (at least temporarily) of the Syrians. Victory vindicated its pro-American and moderate stance and thrust it forward as a regional power.

Syria has also benefited from the crisis, however, breaking out of its long isolation in the Arab world, seizing the moment to consolidate its brutal hold on Lebanon, winning a rapprochement with the United States and new subsidies from the Saudis and other gulf countries as a reward for its commitment of forces to the anti-Saddam cause. Having assured its gulf benefactors of its dedication to peaceful economic development, Syria has nonetheless applied its new windfall to forming and equipping a new armored division and shopping for new surface-to-surface missiles from China, North Korea and the Soviet Union.

The Syrian regime is still weak in many respects. Caution has long been one of Assad's hallmarks. But he may yet have his eye on filling any vacuum that might appear in Arab politics after Saddam's defeat. The hope of Saudia Arabia, the gulf countries and Egypt that they can tame Syria in the new environment may be overly optimistic.

Jordan's support for Saddam was a shock to its friends. Its standing in the United States and the Arab world may never

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fully recover. The deeper problem, however, is not Jordan's foreign policy but the survival of the Hashemite monarchy.

Jordan formally joined the international sanctions against Iraq, enough to inflict a devastating blow on its own economy, but the king's political—and military—support for Saddam clouded the prospects for future economic aid from his traditional benefactors. The Muslim Brotherhood, after its stunning success in the 1989 parliamentary elections, now has five representatives in the Jordanian cabinet. The king's moves looked like one Faustian bargain after another, appeasing radical forces that he feared, at the cost of mortgaging his future.

Hussein survived the war, at least. His hopes for political recovery in the region depend on whether his erstwhile partners are prepared to forgive and forget. The truth is that none of them want to see the Jordanian monarchy replaced by its more retrograde opponents. The PLO is even more discredited in the gulf by its embrace of Saddam—while the king has gained ground among Palestinians for the same policy. The ironic result is that the Saudis, Egyptians, Americans, Israelis, Syrians and Palestinians are all likely to rediscover a stake in a role for Jordan in the region and even in the peace process.

Israel, reeling from the financial burden of the flood of Soviet immigrants, was buffeted by continual American pressures on the Palestinian issue before the crisis. It was shunned by the United States through most of the crisis period before the war began, and it can count on American and international pressures to assault it again in the war's aftermath. Israel fears, indeed, that the "strategic cooperation" it has long enjoyed with the United States is about to be replaced by a new intimacy in America's relations with the Arabs for whom Americans have expended their blood and treasure.

Israel also seems ill prepared for these pressures. The only creative proposals put forward on the Palestinian issue by Likud leaders in the previous dozen years originally came from others—autonomy had been Moshe Dayan's idea in 1978; elections had been Yitzhak Rabin's plan in 1989. Without the leavening influence of such coalition partners, the Likud-dominated cabinet that replaced the National Unity Government in early 1990 will need to struggle for the conceptual wherewithal to maneuver through the political minefield ahead, let alone open up new prospects for a Palestinian solution. Some officials in the Israeli government

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are attempting to formulate new ideas; others are digging in behind old positions; a hard-line extremist has joined the cabinet. There is always the temptation to try to stall the Americans for a year, then count on the 1992 U.S. presidential election season to relieve the pressures, seeking to outwait an administration that is still mistrusted.

The Bush administration will still pay some price for its inartful handling of the Israeli connection—its failure to establish early on the relationship of confidence that is the precondition for American influence. The relationship has grown closer in the crucible of war, however, and Israel will be seen to have paid its dues by its restraint and solicitude for the president's coalition diplomacy. Whether this newfound mutual confidence will survive the bitterly contentious issues of the peace process remains to be seen.

Iran, like Syria, sought to exploit the crisis to break out of its isolation. It gained a windfall from Saddam's sudden renunciation of the territorial claims that were the focal point of his bloody eight-year war. The Soviets have wooed Iran with major arms deals.

Tehran essentially played a double game. It sought to do to Washington and Baghdad what some suggested sardonically that America do during the Iran-Iraq War: to try to arrange it so both sides lose. It formally aligned itself with sanctions, yet it allowed foodstuffs into Iraq and sheltered Iraq's air force. Tehran, like Moscow, offered ambiguous peace proposals during the war.

Iranian policy under Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani may someday provide the opening that President Bush signaled his hopes for in his inaugural address. Certainly Iran seems less the regional menace these days. But the administration is right to avoid obsequious overtures to a regime whose ideological thrust remains hostile and whose position is less pivotal than many think. Iran is now rid of its Iraqi rival, but at the cost of strengthening its other main enemy, the United States. Iran's peace proposals (like Moscow's) gained only momentary attention, not lasting influence.

Turkey is the new player in the modern Middle East. The closing of its Iraqi oil pipeline was vital to the sanctions effort, just as its permission for U.S. military flights from Turkish bases was a crucial contribution to the war. Turkey stands to gain from the war, if its courageous loyalty to the Western cause is reciprocated by new respect and aid from its European

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and Atlantic partners. The danger of disappointment and disillusionment is high. Turkey's chances of membership in either the European Community or the Western European Union remain dim; aid and trade concessions from the United States may not meet expectations either.

Thus, Turkey's emergence as a bulwark against radicalism may turn out a riskier enterprise than first appeared—thrusting Turkey into the cauldron of the politics of the Muslim world when it faces an Islamic recrudescence at home, likely humiliation by the Europeans, wooing by the Soviets and possibly inadequate American efforts to keep the bilateral and NATO links strong.

It is out of this varied crew of players that the Bush administration must attempt to organize a new regional balance. This brief review of the roster, however, is enough to suggest the precariousness of the project. An effort to thrust forward the regional states cannot suffice; their weaknesses do not offset but compound each other. The Arab contingent, certainly, cannot be counted upon to hold together forever once its immediate cause is removed; it is riven by too many rivalries, suspicions and contradictions.

No one should underestimate what a regional security system will therefore require of the United States. The absence of counterweights to Iraq in the region is precisely what precipitated the crisis and drew America so dramatically into the balance. If Saddam had not been decisively defeated, the United States would have faced the worst of all worlds—an objective need for its large-scale, long-term military presence but also a climate of Iraqi intimidation and diminished U.S. credibility that would have made this prospect exceedingly uncomfortable. That is why it was essential that Saddam be decisively defeated and discredited. In such a condition the U.S. role is stronger, but the need for a large and permanent military presence is less. Even so, Iran and Syria can be counted upon to step up political pressure against *any* residual American presence, using it as a weapon against U.S. allies that Washington had just sacrificed so much to defend.

For all the uncertainties, an equilibrium of sorts is likely to return to the region now that Iraq's disproportionate power has been reduced. Syria and Iran are not in a position to bid for hegemony: Syria has neither the oil wealth nor the Soviet backing it would need for military dominance; Iran lacks the political cohesion and sophisticated military power that Iraq

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had. Turkey's new role will be an important constraint on its radical neighbors. All this renders moot the overblown fears that a dangerous vacuum would be created by defeating the aggressor. But the United States will need to provide a concept of that equilibrium. It will not escape its own responsibility to remain politically and militarily engaged, in one form or another, as a pivotal factor in the balance.

IV

It was inevitable that the Palestinian problem would re-emerge in the wake of the gulf conflict, despite the administration's best efforts to deny the linkage between the two issues.

For Saddam Hussein, waving the Palestinian flag was an obvious diversionary tactic, to try to arouse the Arab masses and embarrass some of America's coalition partners. It was a standing temptation to would-be mediators to offer concessions, in the form of commitments to address the Palestinian problem, that would confirm him as a hero in the Arab world. Beyond the tactical, the Iraqi leader also had a strategic goal. His February 1990 speech in Amman, with its exhortations against Israel, showed that exploiting the Palestinian issue was as much a part of his long-term regional strategy as were anti-Americanism and the oil weapon.

The United States was therefore correct to resist linkage. Its objective had to be to discredit Saddam in the Arab world, not vindicate him. The administration effectively held the line against compromises based on linkage—including mischievous initiatives by the French—even after the January 9 Geneva meeting between Secretary of State James A. Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz gave it the appearance of a make-or-break issue.

On the other hand, the pressures on Washington took their toll. In his address to the U.N. General Assembly on October 1, President Bush spoke vaguely but tantalizingly of "opportunities" that might arise, after Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, to settle other Middle Eastern conflicts including the Arab-Israeli one. After the Security Council condemned Israel in October for a violent clash on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, a follow-on resolution calling for an international conference on the Middle East was resisted by the United States and watered down before it was passed (as Resolution 681) on December 20; the insecurity that the

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administration showed on the matter, however, may only have encouraged Saddam to persist. (The government-run *Baghdad Observer* hailed the resolution as an Iraqi victory.)

The upshot is that the United States entered the war committed to sequential linkage, promising to address the issue after the crisis was over. Decisive defeat has certainly eased the problem of making Saddam a hero—yet even with his removal from power, there would be residual danger that the administration will have proved the dangerous lesson that violence is the way to force movement in American policy. To correct this impression, the United States will need to make clear that its basic commitment to fairness will not be compromised, and that it is not going to take, in response to Saddam Hussein, steps it was not prepared to take anyway.

The Palestinian issue, however, will not go away. Iraq's aggression confirms the Israelis' point that the Palestinian problem is hardly the only or the biggest source of conflict in the Middle East. Yet events also confirm the issue's potency. Moderate Arab governments still fear it as a factor complicating their relations with the United States and as a weapon in the hands of radical opponents, internal and external. If some movement had been taking place in the Arab-Israeli peace process under American auspices at the time, Saddam would not have made such headway with the issue in the Arab world, among the Europeans or at the United Nations, nor would Washington have been harassed so incessantly with the proposal of an international conference.

Thus, the imperatives of the Palestinian issue assert themselves. It will be an unavoidable testing ground for the new regional relationships the administration will be trying to form in the postwar period.

V

An international conference on Palestinian and other Middle East problems was indeed prominent in many linkage proposals. U.N. Security Council Resolution 681 of December 20 makes no explicit reference to a conference but cites in its preamble an accompanying statement made by the president of the Security Council. Referring to a consensus of council members, it states that "an international conference, at an appropriate time, properly structured, should facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict." While the presidential statement went

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on to stress the lack of unanimity as to timing, the resolution gave the concept of a conference, for the first time, Security Council imprimatur.

An international conference on the Middle East is an idea whose "appropriate time" may never come. It rests on the (correct) theory that the world community has an unusual common stake in a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. On the question of how a multilateral conference is actually likely to promote a negotiated solution, however, the theory has always been studiously vague.

For a long time, a key argument for it was that Soviet help was crucial to the diplomacy and that a conference was the price necessary to induce the Soviets to deliver Syria and their other clients. The United States was often accused of overreaching in trying to exclude the Soviet Union from the Middle East. In truth, objective circumstances limited the Soviets' diplomatic role: the parties in the region (even their own clients) trusted them even less than Washington did.

Under Gorbachev, the Soviets have seemed more conscious of their long-run stake in regional stability and in ties with the West. It is useful to keep before them a positive incentive to maintain the constructive course represented, for example, by their growing ties with Israel and their backing for the key Security Council resolutions in the gulf. This is presumably what lay behind the joint statement of January 29 between Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, welcoming a Soviet role in "mutual efforts" for peace. But such a gesture did not dissuade the Soviets from essentially unfriendly activities during the Gulf War, such as propaganda in the Arab world at U.S. expense and dubious mediation efforts that would have saved Saddam from defeat (serving Soviet interests and not the coalition's). The United States therefore needs to make it bluntly clear that such disruptive policies are not acceptable. Unless some costs are imposed, the wrong signal is sent—especially unwise in view of the ominous trend of the Soviet internal evolution.

In any case, even with benign Kremlin motives, another flaw remains in the Soviet case that was apparent many years ago—namely that they were never in a position to deliver the Syrians and Palestinians and are in even less of a position to do so now.

The PLO, too, has long wanted a conference as a foothold for itself into the diplomacy. The United States insisted that the PLO first had to renounce terrorism, accept U.N. Security

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Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the existence of Israel—the basic premises of the peace process—before any PLO role was conceivable. When the PLO met these terms in December 1988 the United States opened its own direct dialogue with the PLO, which proved a more important gain for the PLO than any conference. A conference, indeed, dropped far down on the PLO's list of priorities after that point.

Syria has pushed for a conference as well, partly to humor its Soviet patrons and partly to ensure that its own interests are not ignored. Today the Syrians owe less to the Soviets, and it remains to be seen whether, as in the disengagement negotiations of 1974, their interests can be addressed directly by American-sponsored diplomacy without the distortions and distractions of a conference.

A more basic argument for a conference has been the need for a "comprehensive" solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. "Separate deals" and "partial solutions" are much disparaged in the Arab world. A conference embracing all parties and all issues would seem to be the living embodiment of comprehensiveness.

This argument is based on a misunderstanding of how Arab-Israeli negotiations work. No one can doubt the need for a comprehensive outcome of the process, resolving the issues of the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights and Jerusalem. But the procedure for negotiations need not, and indeed cannot, embrace all issues at once. It is no accident that the four successful negotiations of the 1970s that produced Israeli withdrawals from Egyptian and Syrian territory proceeded in step-by-step fashion—biting off soluble issues whose solution made follow-on steps easier, not holding up the attainable while waiting for the unattainable. This strategy is the only one that has worked.

An international conference was once held on the Middle East—in Geneva in 1973, following the October war. It is often cited as a model to follow. Indeed it should be a model, but for reasons not widely understood.

The 1973 Geneva conference resulted from Security Council Resolution 338, which ended the October war and called for Arab-Israeli negotiations under "appropriate auspices." By a private U.S.-Soviet understanding, this meant a conference presided over by the two superpowers. By the time it met in December, however, American discussions with Egypt, Syria and Israel had made clear their desire to move ahead with

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negotiations on disengagement—under U.S. auspices. In a sense, the conference was "precooked" because of the prior conceptual accord on the negotiations that were to follow: these key parties had the maximum incentive to close the conference down after a day and a half in order to get on with the real business, which turned out to be Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy and the disengagement agreements.

Today the parties are nowhere near that degree of conceptual consensus on the subject matter of a realistic negotiation. Without it, a conference would produce nothing except a dramatic new deadlock that would set the diplomacy back. (No one should imagine that the failure of such an event would be harmless.) If ever such a degree of "precooking" could be achieved, then a conference might well help, as in 1973, to launch a real negotiation while giving others a form of participation. This is what lies behind the language—borrowed, indeed, from American policy statements—about the usefulness of a conference if "properly structured," at an "appropriate time," to "facilitate" a solution. But the United States would be foolish to agree to a conference before such conditions are fulfilled.

Thus, the most telling argument against a conference is that it is a fraud on the Palestinians. As commonly conceived, it is mainly a vehicle for various parties to promote themselves, even at the cost of any serious diplomatic progress. The PLO would seek at a conference to block Jordan or moderate Palestinians from moving on their own with Israel. Syria would want to block the PLO from moving independently. Iraq, a new aspirant, probably has it in mind to impede Syrian moves. Syria and Iraq would likely be united in blocking a major role for Egypt. The Soviets and Europeans have historically wanted a conference in order to dilute American domination of the diplomacy. Many, indeed, will see it as a means for mobilizing pressures on Washington.

The common perception that the United States objects to a conference because of Israeli objections thus misses the point. A device that will undermine prospects for a solution and that is likely—even designed—to reduce American freedom of action in the Middle East cannot be in the strategic interest of the United States. The misguided diplomatic activism of the Europeans before January 15, particularly the French, only increases the American incentive to avoid such a procedure.

The United States has occasionally hinted at a conference in

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order to frighten the Israelis, but the threat to commit strategic suicide is not credible. The more considered policy of the United States is, properly, to resist the idea except in the narrowly defined circumstances that would serve its own diplomatic strategy.

VI

The question then arises, what strategy ought the United States pursue if it wishes to preempt mischievous proposals by others? Three approaches have been suggested: an improvement of state-to-state relations, especially between Syria and Israel; a functional negotiation on regional arms control or water problems; and new efforts on the Palestinian problem.

Remarkably enough, both Syria and Israel have indicated in recent months that a dialogue between them is not excluded. Syria's regional weakness, its desire to elbow aside the PLO, its dependence on Saudi largesse and its interest in breaking out of its isolation give it an incentive to become a major player again through a role in the peace process. The Israelis see improved state relations as a step toward recognition and as a device to circumvent or deflect the pressures on the thorny Palestinian issue. The United States, too, recalling the collapse of its 1989 negotiation on elections in the occupied territories, may see this topic as more promising today than the Palestinian problem.

When all is said and done, however, Syrian-Israeli negotiations will not get very far unless the Israelis are willing to contemplate a second increment of territorial withdrawal on the Golan Heights. Such a move has been part of the Israeli Labor Party's program for more than 15 years, but Likud has never yet accepted it. Without some tantalizing territorial prospect along these lines, Syria can have no interest whatever in helping Israel break out of *its* isolation. Even with such a territorial prospect, Syria is likely to seek some parallel move on the Palestinian front, if only to avoid the charges of betrayal that it hurled at Anwar al-Sadat in the 1970s. And the United States has little interest in promoting Syria as the spokesman or broker for the Palestinians; much better that the moderates (such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia) get the credit for being the catalyst for a Palestinian solution.

The dimension of state relations is important, though in a broader sense. The United States is entitled to ask more of its gulf allies, on whose behalf it has just made an extraordinary

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exertion. In parallel with whatever moral pressures are put on Israel, America's Arab friends must be asked to express themselves clearly on living in peace with the Jewish state; their willingness to contemplate full peace and normalization with Israel as part of a settlement should be expressed openly, not only privately. They should be willing to take new steps in the political, economic or security fields, perhaps in step with diplomatic progress. This commitment, too, should be spelled out in advance, to contribute to the climate of confidence that will encourage Israelis to face up to their hard decisions on relinquishing control over the Palestinians' political future.

A functional negotiation over arms control or water has also been suggested as a back door into the political issues, building confidence by solving some practical problems. Experience with the water problem in the last forty years, however, is far from encouraging. While informal restraints exist, the parties' rational economic interest in greater cooperation has never been able to withstand the passions of the political conflict.

The menacing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, however, dramatized in Iraq's bid for military dominance, compels attention. Even Israel, long resistant to restraints on its independence of action, now speaks approvingly of regional arms control. The Soviets and Europeans, as important suppliers, see another opening to play a role in postwar regional diplomacy. The United States, seeing the obstacles blocking a Palestinian negotiation, may see this (like state relations) as another issue more amenable to progress.

The regional arms race, however, may be one of the most complex issues of all. Israel has proposed a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, but insists on mutual inspection by the parties and rejects reliance on an international agency or intermediary. In contrast, the Arabs insist on the Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency as the vehicles for international restraints on the Israeli nuclear program without the backdoor recognition that mutual inspection would afford. The Arabs arm themselves to counterbalance the Israelis, but also the Iranians and other Arabs; the Israelis seek to counterbalance the collective force of all states in the region. In the words of *The Economist*: "Arms control in East-versus-West Europe was complicated enough; in the Middle East half-a-dozen arms races overlap with and reinforce each other."

The various motives for interest in arms control may thus

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turn out to be not convergent but contradictory. A grand conclave on these issues is likely to be a fiasco. The most promising route is probably to tighten controls on transfer of (at least) unconventional military technology by the supplier countries. European and American laws should be toughened; the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime should be strengthened; the Soviets and Chinese must be pressed to cooperate; U.S. intelligence assets should be mobilized to monitor—and disrupt—illicit transactions. If the East-West experience is any guide, more ambitious regional negotiations may be impossible to unlink from the political sources of tension.

In short, while state relations and arms restraint should be part of the diplomatic dialogue, neither can carry the main weight. This brings us back to the Palestinian problem.

As Secretary Baker discovered on his March trip, the desirability of movement on the Palestinian problem has never automatically coincided with its feasibility. The American dilemma is that events put inescapable pressure on the United States to move, and move quickly, before it can be sure that new conditions make success possible.

There are a variety of obstacles: on the Israeli side, for example, a lack of flexibility on the modalities of elections, which is the surrogate for a basic fear of losing control of the territories; on the Arab side, the new complexity of finding a Palestinian partner, which is a surrogate for the long-standing fear of Arab moderates to take responsibility for compromise. The PLO, which had shown flexibility in its 1989 discussions with the United States, made continuation of that dialogue impossible by its refusal to dissociate itself from terrorism and then by its cheerleading for Saddam Hussein. Nor was the PLO ever America's prime candidate for this role, given its rarely broken pattern of pro-Sovietism, extremism and political ineptitude. Meanwhile, the Islamic fundamentalists—the Hamas movement—gain ground at the grass roots in the occupied territories, at the expense of both the PLO and traditional moderates.

The Egyptians and Saudis, strengthened as they are by the outcome of this crisis, need to band together as promised and step into the vacuum, not to represent the Palestinians but to help find interlocutors. As noted, Jordan should not be excluded as a key party. Intriguingly, Hamas leaders say they too

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would support a Jordanian role (confident of their own strength both in the territories and in Jordan).

The idea of elections in the territories is not dead either. In fact it remains the only promising concept. It is an appropriate interim step, offering risks and benefits to both sides, which if it succeeded would create the psychological basis for more fundamental decisions in the next stage. Likud has legitimized the idea of elections, for all its fear of the implications. Palestinians have been much too slow, or timid, to gamble on what remains an extraordinary opening. Whatever conditions the Israelis may try to impose, the election of an indigenous Palestinian leadership in the territories would be a transforming event—creating a new political force, whose legitimacy would break, irretrievably, the stranglehold of Israeli control. The Israeli right-wing's fears have paradoxically not translated into the political will on the Palestinian side to seize the opportunity.

VII

One of the ironies of the Middle East is that wars and cataclysms have often been the prelude to political progress. Fluidity often means opportunity. A moment of rapidly surging events is a time when one's instincts may call for caution, yet it is often the only time when one can shape the flow of those events.

But this is not a moment for illusions either. Even the decisive defeat of Iraq will not eliminate all sources of regional radicalism. Resentments will linger. America's moderate Arab friends, whatever their bravado, are bound to be profoundly shaken by the upheaval and wary of Islamic trends. Pressures for more democratic decision-making will mount, but will further shake moderate governments whose domestic enemies do not always promise either democracy or regional peace. Israelis too will be unnerved by the blows inflicted on them and reminded, if they needed reminding, that most sources of danger in the region sooner or later focus on them.

The premise of American policy is that these short-run effects will give way to a long-run effect that offers hope. The United States and its partners have been impressively successful. The moderate camp of those who stood with the United States should indeed find new courage, their sense of security enhanced. The American role in the Middle East is at its zenith; a thug who played the anti-American card was made

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into a sorry example. Soviet mischief was frustrated. The oil weapon against the West will probably be considerably weakened. These are conditions that may make progress possible.

Had there been a more ambiguous outcome to the conflict, the diplomatic prospects would have been more treacherous. The United States would then have had little influence over events, no matter how brilliant its ideas were. The most crucial determinant of peace prospects, in other words, is not the ingenuity of America's proposals but how decisively it won the war. This was the most important reason for scuttling the Soviet attempts to save Saddam toward the war's end.

Even with success achieved, the United States will need answers to some crucial questions before plunging ahead with a new initiative: a new solution is needed to the complex problem of Palestinian representation. There must be concrete indications of "new thinking" from both Arabs and Israelis. There must be an agreed concept for the negotiation that the United States is trying to promote—an understanding on its scope and subject matter. Otherwise the administration risks falling flat.

Simultaneously it must continue to seek a concept of regional security. Saudi-Egyptian partnership must be bolstered. But whatever role those in the region can play, they will want to know what role the United States is prepared to play. America will be the linchpin. Victory in war should reduce the need for a large-scale U.S. military presence—but America must remain a military factor. It cannot walk away, leaving in jeopardy the regional security that its servicemen and women have paid so dearly to win.

Others who have sacrificed will claim a share in the diplomacy. The United States needs to give them a sense of participation, in the spirit of the multilateralism with which President Bush so skillfully built the coalition in the first place. But the United States, having made the disproportionate exertion and sacrifice, need not put the hard-won opening for peace at risk to diplomatic schemes it knows to be valueless.

The United States will, as Sadat used to say, hold most of the cards. And it should act that way.

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Ze'ev Schiff

ISRAEL AFTER THE WAR

Now that the Gulf War is over, Israel will have to take a hard look at its security doctrine and ask itself a number of key questions about its future security. The 39 missiles fired at Israel brought with them a sense of trauma compounded by humiliation over the fact that the country would have to absorb these strikes in its heartland without hitting back. This was the first time since the 1948 war of independence that Arabs had succeeded in striking at Israel's civilian homefront.

The country's inhabitants, young and old, were forced to don gas masks; infants were placed in special incubator-like devices to protect them against chemical weapons. Many Israelis, especially those who had survived the Holocaust, were haunted by gruesome associations. And despite the American effort to demolish the missile launchers, the attacks did not stop, though they did abate somewhat. Even a superpower, it seems, did not find it easy to neutralize the missile threat quickly.

Though the Scuds did not pose an existential threat to the country, the civilian population remained vulnerable. And all the while, because of political constraints, Israel had to make do with passive resistance instead of actively defending itself.

II

Israelis cannot avoid asking what could have happened if the war had taken a different course.

If Saddam Hussein had directed his forces westward, toward Israel, rather than southward into Kuwait? If he had sent a few dozen divisions into western Iraq and deployed some of them along the Jordanian border? His agents could have fabricated incidents on the Israeli-Jordanian frontier to provoke the Israelis into retaliating against Jordan. He could have explained the movement of his forces into western Iraq by citing the need to aid Jordan.

Militant public opinion would have forced King Hussein to allow the stationing of Iraqi forces on Jordanian soil, as he had

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in 1967. Israel would have taken this move as the crossing of a "red line," but its ability to respond would have been limited. The army would have had to declare a massive call-up of reserves but would not have been able to keep them mobilized for long, as the Israeli economy would soon have been devastated. Thus the government would have had to face the question of whether to launch a preemptive strike; even had it refrained from doing so, Saddam Hussein would probably have found a way of provoking Israel into war.

It is reasonable to assume, moreover, that such a war would have been joined by Syria, forcing Israel to deal with a broad eastern front on which it would face the armies of Iraq, Syria and Jordan. The Iraqis would have stationed most of their missile launchers in western Iraq, some close to the Jordanian border or even hidden within Jordan proper. Reducing the range to Israel would have enabled the Iraqis to increase the amount of explosives in their warheads, thus causing greater damage.

It is highly doubtful whether in a scenario of this sort the U.N. Security Council would have supported Israel, or that the United States would have mobilized an international military coalition to come to Israel's aid. The American air force would not have flown sorties to protect Israel, and American satellites would not have supplied Jerusalem with advance warning of the missiles launched from Iraq.

It is also questionable whether the Israeli air force, proficient as it is, would have been able to neutralize fully the threat of the Iraqi ground-to-ground missiles while simultaneously having to deal with the air forces of Syria, Jordan and, of course, Iraq, whose planes would not have fled to Iran.

Thus Israel would soon have found itself caught up in a nightmare scenario. The missiles would have paralyzed civilian life and the economy. Israel's citizens throughout the country—and especially along the coast, where most of the vital targets are located—would have been forced to live in air-raid shelters. An Israeli offensive would have entailed enormous losses—more than in any previous war—coupled with civilian casualties behind the front lines.

Finally, a war of this kind would have culminated either in an Israeli victory—though not a total victory because of the size of the forces, the distances involved and a price so staggering that Israel would probably not be able to recover

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from it—or in a possibility that many may regard as extreme but cannot be discounted: an Israeli defeat.

In such a war, Israel would presumably feel pressed to use the atomic weapons reportedly in its arsenal. These would extricate the country from defeat if they were used in time—meaning before the Arab armies entered its territory. They might be used later, in the final stages of the fighting, to punish the Arab states for violating Israeli territory. And of course there is the possibility that the United States would have bailed Israel out of the war in the last minutes.

Most Israelis doubt that an international coalition headed by the United States would have arrived to save them, as it did Kuwait. In any case, there would be little point in receiving such aid if it came as late as it did for Kuwait. And even if it did arrive promptly, Israel would be reduced to a psychological cripple from the standpoint of its morale.

Without saying so outright, many Israelis, including senior army officers, know that Iraq's latest war could well have followed this harrowing scenario. Saddam Hussein's mistake was to turn on Kuwait first, evidently in a desire to stock his coffers in preparation for the next war—against Israel. These officers therefore speak of the way the war actually unfolded as almost a miracle for Israel. But many Israelis have already begun to ask: How long can this country rely on miracles?

The scenario noted here may be particularly grim, but it cannot be shrugged off when drawing the lessons of the Gulf War and assessing the dangers to Israel and the region, absent a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.

III

Until the outbreak of war, Washington did everything possible to keep Jerusalem at arm's length so that no one could possibly entertain the slightest suspicion that Israel had any connection with the anti-Iraq coalition. President Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker even avoided speaking to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir on the phone. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens almost forced himself on Defense Secretary Dick Cheney by going to the Pentagon uninvited, under the auspices of a Washington research institute.

Jerusalem was less concerned by the meeting between President Bush and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad than by America's refusal to discuss, even secretly, the various military

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options available to Israel in the event that it were attacked by Iraq and had to respond immediately. The cooperation between the two countries' intelligence agencies was minimal at this stage, and there were no consultations on operational matters—to the point where doubts arose in Israel about the significance and seriousness of the strategic cooperation between the two countries.

These doubts were further compounded by friction with the administration over Israel's lobbying efforts in Congress to block a huge arms deal with Saudi Arabia. Congress had allocated $700 million for arms and equipment to Israel, and in consultations with the administration it was decided that the armaments would include a battery of Patriot missiles (against aircraft, not the updated model for use against missiles). With the exception of the Patriots, however, none of this hardware reached Israel, even after the Gulf War broke out.

But the man who ultimately determined Israel's position in the war was Saddam Hussein. From the moment the first Iraqi missiles fell on Israel's cities he created a strategic problem that Washington could not ignore. The possibility that Israel would intervene in the war and draw Jordan in its wake became a real and present danger. There was a good chance that Saddam Hussein would succeed not only in widening the conflict but in transforming it into an Arab-Israeli war. For that reason, Washington had to quickly persuade Jerusalem to reverse its long-standing custom and refrain from responding to the strikes against its population centers.

The United States was also forced to direct more of its combat resources than it had originally planned toward destroying the Iraqi missile launchers. From a military standpoint, it might have been preferable to leave action against those launchers until a later stage of the war. But because of possible strategic complications, field commanders were ordered to schedule thousands of sorties against the missiles. Planes flew over launching areas in western Iraq almost 24 hours a day. The extent of advance warning of launched missiles, detected by American satellites, was increased, enabling Israeli citizens to gain a number of precious minutes to take cover.

After the first missile barrages, six batteries of improved Patriot missiles, together with American soldiers to operate them, were rushed to Israel. Jerusalem had to disregard its traditional aversion to foreign soldiers fighting its wars; all

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Israel asked was the tools to defend itself on its own. (Late in the war a contingent of Dutch soldiers also landed in Israel, together with another battery of Patriot missiles.) A standoff war conducted with missiles was enough to make Jerusalem revise this basic principle.

Although cooperation between Israel and the United States improved in terms of sharing intelligence, it remained severely limited in the operational sphere, even after Israel had come under attack by Iraqi missiles. From this standpoint Israel remained an outsider—though attention was paid to its advice on how to attack the missiles in western Iraq.

Jerusalem was well prepared to reveal its operational plans to Washington—and to its astonishment some secret details were leaked to the media in the United States. But none of this changed Washington's determination to prevent Jerusalem from responding to the missile attacks. The allied effort to knock out the missile launchers did reduce the number of attacks on Israel. But more to the point, Israel found itself unable to manifest its military might and was reduced to depending on the United States even in a sphere in which its forces might have found better operational solutions.

The Israelis were struck by the fact that the American effort against the Iraqi missile launchers was confined to air attacks, even after the ground war was in progress (except for a raid before the end of the war in which SA-2 ground-to-air missiles were destroyed). They thought it strange that the Americans were not using combat helicopters and commando units in their "search-and-destroy" operations against the launchers. A more ambitious ground action, mounted by airborne troops moving in from Saudi Arabia, could also have created a buffer between Jordan and Iraq, thereby reducing the pressure on Jordan while ensuring that Israel would not have any reason to intervene in the war.

Again and again the Israelis implied that if they took responsibility for destroying the missile launchers in western Iraq, they would do a better job. Without question Israeli pilots have more operational experience than their American counterparts. Many of them had undergone years of training in hitting missile launchers and other small targets.

It is also likely that the Israeli air force would have ordered its pilots to attack from a lower altitude to increase the chances of better hits, even if that meant incurring higher casualties. An Israeli pilot would certainly be prepared to take greater

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risks, knowing that he was defending his own family wearing gas masks in a shelter. But unleashing the Israeli air force would certainly have drawn Jordanian planes into the war, especially as it would have been impossible for Israel to mount a broad operation in western Iraq without entering Jordanian airspace. And if Jordan had challenged the Israeli planes, it might have lost its air force in the process.

Moreover, though it stands to reason that the Israeli air force would have scored better results against the Iraqi launchers, its commanders admitted there was no guarantee that even after a massive aerial operation the Iraqis would not be able to send off more missiles from launchers that had escaped its strikes. Only a ground operation could completely neutralize the missile threat, but Washington was adamantly opposed to that idea.

The effort to demolish the launchers raised serious questions about intelligence reports regarding Iraq's missile systems and military capability as a whole. At the start of the war Iraq had some thirty mobile missile launchers. But the daily communiqués issued in Riyadh by the spokesman of the Central Command created the impression that the Iraqis had considerably more launchers. Repeated American statements that Iraq's military might should not be underestimated and that it would take a grueling war to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait also raised eyebrows in the Israeli General Staff.

IV

For years there had been serious disagreements between the Israelis, who repeatedly stressed the dangers posed by the Iraqi war machine, and American intelligence experts, who counseled Israel to take that threat somewhat less seriously. These debates generally took place whenever Israel offered its assessment of the military situation in the Middle East and presented the force ratio that it would require to deter its enemies, or defend itself should deterrence fail.

The United States suggested not only that Israel had overestimated Iraq's potential but that if a war broke out Israel could readily defeat any military coalition that might join in league on its eastern front. Washington also argued that Jerusalem was exaggerating its reports of the Iraqi atomic threat.

A few days before the invasion of Kuwait, Defense Minister Arens requested a meeting with Defense Secretary Cheney.

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Arens was accompanied to Washington by Israel's chief of military intelligence, General Amnon Shahak, and they brought new information about Iraqi activities in Europe showing that Baghdad was making a special effort to step up its development of atomic weapons. The Israelis returned from that meeting with the uneasy feeling that the Americans had taken their warning too lightly.

The American outlook changed radically once the United States itself had to face the Iraqi military machine. Suddenly contempt for the Iraqi army gave way to profound wariness. The new forecast was that it would take a substantial force—far larger and stronger than Israel's army—to defeat Iraq. Israel's conclusion from this volte-face was that it would be necessary to treat future American and other intelligence assessments of threats to its security with appropriate suspicion.

That Israeli intelligence had a far better grasp of the Iraqi threat than its American counterpart does not exempt it from the need, in the aftermath of this war, to grapple with some tough questions about its status and performance. Since Israel has a militia-like army based on its reserves, intelligence is granted an especially favored status so that it can provide ample warning of any threat emerging from an Arab state. Obviously this role will take on even greater importance if Israel should relinquish the occupied territories as part of a political settlement.

Although the Israelis proved to be right in their argument with American intelligence, they too were insufficiently informed about what was going on in Iraq, especially in comparison with their knowledge of events in Syria and Jordan.

Israeli intelligence was not surprised here, as it had been in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It knew that key information about Iraq was lacking. Distance, the difficulties of operating in a totalitarian state and the limited resources that the government had allocated to this task all affected the amount of information that could be assembled. Attention was focused primarily on the frontline confrontation states, but it suddenly emerged that Israel could face a difficult challenge from more distant Arab lands.

That some of these countries had equipped themselves with nonconventional weapons and simple means of delivery was enough to transform them into more of a peril to Israel than the frontline states. Instead of sending expeditionary forces

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against Israel, as it had done in earlier wars, a country like Iraq could now take part in an armed conflict from afar by means of its missiles. Since distance alone was a major obstacle to obtaining intelligence, one of Israel's conclusions will undoubtedly be to step up development of its own military satellite capability.

Another lesson of the war will surely be that a peace treaty with one Arab state bordering directly on Israel, such as Egypt, is not enough to balance out the grave threat from Arab states farther away, so that any potential settlement must embrace all the major states in the Middle East.

V

Considerable property damage was sustained by residential areas in Israel's cities, but the actual number of casualties from the 39 missiles was low. It is wrong, however, to judge the effect of the attacks by this yardstick alone.

The real criterion for assessing their impact is the role they would have played had Israel stood alone in battle. It took only a few missiles to inflict heavy damage on the country's economy; much of Israel's business activity came to a halt. Many residents were quick to flee the greater Tel Aviv area. Even the flow of immigration to Israel, which had risen to thousands of people per week just before the war, dwindled drastically. If the Americans failed to eliminate the missile threat altogether, Israel would nonetheless have found it considerably more difficult to cope with this problem on its own. Its population would have had to retire into shelters for hours, perhaps even days at a stretch.

The Israelis had long known that Iraq had these missiles in its arsenal, as do other Arab states, such as Syria. But it is one thing to know that a peril exists and quite another to experience it firsthand.

Before the war a number of Israeli generals argued that the missiles posed so limited a threat that the country should not waste money preparing to defend itself against them. Their chief concern was that due to pressure from a terrorized public, the air force would be forced to reorder its priorities. Instead of concentrating first on achieving air superiority (deemed absolutely essential to win a war), it would have to search out the missile launchers menacing Israel's population centers (a threat the military defined as negligible and certainly tolerable).

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Given that they are armed with conventional warheads, missiles of the type fired on Israel cannot decide a war. But in large quantities they can have a damaging cumulative effect. Even missiles designed more to sow terror than destroy vital targets can have a strategic impact if enough of them (say 100 or 200) rain down on population centers at unpredictable intervals. Certainly this is true if such strikes are combined with a ground assault.

As soon as the Iraqi missiles began landing on Israel, it became obvious that the country's long-standing security doctrine—requiring that as soon as a war breaks out, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) must shift the fighting onto the enemy's territory—had become outdated. Because these attacks were perpetrated by a distant Arab state and by means not of ground forces but of missiles overflying another Arab country, the Israeli army simply could not implement this doctrine. Its hands were tied even in terms of employing planes and missiles, for Washington was insisting that Jerusalem exercise complete restraint.

Israel, moreover, understood that it was in its own best interest not to do anything that might prompt a premature ceasefire when the United States was, after all, demolishing the war machine of one of its most powerful enemies. This was, in fact, not the first time that Israel had been forced to abstain from taking an action dictated by pure military logic. On October 6, 1973, when the armies of Egypt and Syria carried out their concerted attack, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan chose to reject the chief of staff's advice to mount a preemptive air strike, lest Washington think that Israel had started the war.

In looking toward the future, Israel cannot ignore the fact that more sophisticated missiles will be far more accurate and can be directed at strategic targets such as airfields and other vital facilities, while the less accurate and cheaper missiles can be used against population centers. Thus those calling for a greater investment in antimissile defense will probably carry the day, especially as the Arabs will at some point be able to arm their missiles with nonconventional warheads.

Israel will undoubtedly be sinking more money into the development of the Arrow antiballistic missile. But since the development of such sophisticated weapons systems is very costly, and the cost of purchasing them is similarly high, Israel's defense expenditures will soar as a result of the need to

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protect itself against ground-to-ground missiles. Even if Washington aids in funding the development of an antiballistic missile, Jerusalem will have to spend sizable amounts of its own both to develop the Arrow and to purchase other missiles. Nor will that be the end of the matter.

One of the lessons of the Gulf War will undoubtedly be the necessity to invest more in civil defense and in building shelters to protect the population against chemical, biological and atomic warfare. The emphasis up to now has been to invest primarily in offensive means—the army's "teeth"—and relatively little in defensive ones. Israel will find itself hard pressed to do both. In fact it is doubtful whether the economy will be able to bear these costs, and even generous military aid from the United States will not suffice to cover Israel's future security needs.

The missile attacks on Israel also revived the old debate about the importance of the occupied territories, particularly the West Bank, for Israel's defense. Palestinian leader Feisal al-Husseini was quick to declare that Israel's vulnerability to attack from afar is proof that the territories do not enhance its security. The question is of course whether this claim is valid.

It is worth noting that the risks stemming from Israel's geographical position may well have been the prime factor dictating the country's security doctrine. Were it not for this particular determinant, for example, it would certainly be easier to reach a compromise in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Until 1967 Israel found itself in something of a geographical trap: the narrow coastal strip, where over 75 percent of its population resides (meaning most of its reserve soldiers) and where much of the state's strategic targets are found, was commanded by the nearby mountainous region, the West Bank. Almost all of the country's airfields, for example, were within range of artillery stationed over the border.

As a result Israel's strategic planning was based upon two principles: first, to ensure that in the event of a war the fighting would quickly be transferred onto the enemy's territory; second, to resort to preemptive strikes, and even a preemptive war, should it become clear that the enemy was about to launch an attack.

The outcome of the 1967 Six-Day War changed this situation, at least on the face of it. The appendage of the occupied territories gave Israel the sense that it had acquired both time—for sufficient warning against an air assault—and a

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security zone that would help delay an Arab armored assault, especially in the event of a surprise attack. This strategic depth bolstered the belief that it would be possible to absorb a first strike, rather than rush into a preemptive war against an enemy massing for an assault. However, the missile firings during the Gulf War showed that Israel's existing strategic depth does not provide protection against all types of attack.

The asymmetry between Israel and the Arab states, which enjoy ample strategic depth, carries over to missile warfare as well. The distance between Israel and western Iraq, for example, where the missiles were launched against greater Tel Aviv, is less than 600 kilometers, while the distance between Israel and Baghdad is about 1,000 kilometers. While Iraq can cover most of Israel's territory with its present arsenal of missiles, Israel would not be able to cover even a small portion of Iraq if it had similar missiles at its disposal.

VI

Thus once again Israel has discovered that the addition of territory does not necessarily increase its deterrent capability. Yet this does not mean that territory no longer has importance for its defense. A missile attack on call-up centers and reserve-unit stores is precisely what can slow down the mobilization of reserves, making it all the more important to keep the enemy's armored columns well away from the vital facilities along Israel's coast.

Unfortunately even this portrayal of the occupied territories as a useful buffer is not entirely satisfactory. It might be more convincing if the areas in question were unpopulated. But the West Bank and Gaza Strip are teeming with Palestinians who are in themselves a security problem (to say nothing of a moral and political problem) for Israel because they are so adamantly and actively opposed to living under Israeli rule.

The conclusion to be drawn from these circumstances is a complex one. The importance of territory (in this case the West Bank) for Israel's defense cannot be dismissed, but territory does not always enhance security. Under certain conditions, like those existing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the risks posed by additional territory are greater than the benefits they accord. The debate in Israel today is not just about military questions per se but about the future character of Israeli society in the absence of peace. And the answers to these questions must be found in a compromise with the

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Palestinians and the Arab states that spells out Israel's minimum security conditions for a peace settlement.

Yet the greatest concern Israel has felt as a result of this war is related to its deterrent capability. Although its political leaders and senior military officers have repeatedly declared that the army's deterrent posture has not been prejudiced, the public harbors deep doubts about these assurances.

The issue of deterrence has always been at the heart of Israel's military thinking and has often been the motive behind military operations, as well as the factor determining their scope and force. This doctrine holds that Israel must develop maximum deterrent capability and that if such capability is not effective on its own, the army can always be activated at full force. The aim is to firmly establish among the Arab leaders and military commanders the knowledge that there are some things Israel cannot tolerate without reacting, and that its response will be all the more punishing if the Arabs cross certain "red lines."

More than once Israel has mounted particularly bold retaliatory strikes to shock the Arabs and discourage them from taking certain steps. The bolder these actions were, the stronger the feeling that deterrence would be fully effective. Occasionally Israel's forcefulness bespoke its vulnerability more than its strength. The weaker and more imperiled Israel felt, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, the more drastic its actions tended to be.

As a rule the doctrine of deterrence worked. But once in eight years or so, the usual military actions did not suffice, and Israel found itself involved in a more extensive war. Following these clashes the country's deterrent posture was usually strong again, but with time it inevitably eroded. This mechanism worked especially well against the Arab armies but less successfully in regard to the Palestinians engaged in terror operations, because they had less to lose.

Moreover, even when the effectiveness of Israel's deterrent posture was low or on the wane, the Arab states were careful never to strike at the country's population centers. That was clearly one of Israel's "red lines," and the Arabs knew that in the case of an attack on its cities, Israel's response was likely to be the most drastic of all. The common belief that Israel has atomic weapons certainly played a prominent role in dissuading the Arab military from mounting a massive attack on its

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population centers. That is why Israelis were so astonished when the first Iraqi missiles landed on Haifa and Tel Aviv.

If, prior to the invasion of Kuwait, I had been asked to assess how Israel would respond to a missile attack on its cities, I would have replied without hesitation that the immediate reaction would be a vigorous one that would probably cause the deaths of countless citizens. Moreover that certainly would have been my answer after Israel's prime minister and minister of defense repeatedly issued stern warnings to Saddam Hussein not to pick a fight with Israel. The conventional wisdom was that Israel might even resort to nonconventional weapons if Iraq engaged in chemical warfare.

Needless to say, things turned out quite differently. Israel realized that good operational plans and a readiness to act were not enough; the political circumstances must also be auspicious. In the case of the Gulf War they forced Israel to exercise restraint, limiting itself to civil defense when it was under attack. This was a policy that Israel had never pursued before, and even the Arabs were surprised by Jerusalem's conduct.

Israel must now assume that a similar situation can recur. It has learned that, notwithstanding its desire to respond forcefully to an attack, it does not live in a vacuum, even if the aggressor is a despot like Saddam Hussein.

The greater its dependence on the United States, the greater the limitations on its freedom of conduct. What the United States allowed itself in wartime—including the destruction of two atomic reactors and the dropping of thousands of cluster bombs on Iraq—is not applicable to a small country like Israel, even if the reasons for adopting such measures are more justified. Certainly in this case Israel had good reason to take the United States' firm advice not to move against the missile launchers in western Iraq. Jerusalem's decision was informed by the knowledge that Saddam Hussein wanted to extend the conflict and transform it into an Israeli-Arab war by having Israel attack Jordan on its way to striking Iraq.

There was also an understandable fear that Israeli military intervention would lead to a premature ceasefire precisely when the preferred Israeli interest was the destruction of the Iraqi war machine, which the United States and its allies were achieving far more effectively than Israel ever could. The general assumption in Israel was that at the start of the ground war Jerusalem would find an opportunity to land a blow of its

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own on Iraq. But by then the missile attacks had abated considerably, and there were few quality targets left in Iraq. The ground war, moreover, ended remarkably quickly.

VII

Has Israel's deterrent capability been damaged as a result? The fact of the matter is that Saddam Hussein was not deterred even by the might of the United States. He erred in his assessment that Washington would resign itself to his invasion of Kuwait. Following pure military logic, he should have been apprehensive from the moment that such a large military force was mobilized against him.

Israel was only a minor front in the war that awaited him, and there is little reason to expect that Saddam Hussein would be disheartened by the might of the IDF when he was not fazed by the United States and its allies. The fact that Saddam did not use chemical weapons against Israel even when he was under great stress from the attacking forces shows that he understood there are some things Israel simply could not tolerate, even if Washington was opposed to any Israeli response.

The fear in Israel that the army's deterrent capability has been diminished stems more from a sense of humiliation, over being subject to attack and not responding, than from cold analysis of the situation. Saddam Hussein may not have been cowed by the United States, but the latter treated him to a thorough drubbing, whereas Israel was forced to remain passive while dozens of missiles were launched at its cities.

Humiliation is one thing, however, and deterrence another. For Israel's enemies witnessed not only the missile attacks but also the immediate U.S. aid to Israel in the form of batteries of Patriot missiles, the services of its satellites warning of missile launchings and the heavy bombing of the Iraqi launching sites throughout the war. Following America's lead, both Germany and the Netherlands announced that they were sending Patriot missiles to Israel. Thus Israel's enemies saw that it did not stand alone when faced with a grave military threat, and that, too, is an aspect of deterrence.

Only time will tell whether Israel's deterrence has actually been affected by its restraint in the face of the missiles raining down on its population. The true answer to this question should be sought not in Israel, whose frame of mind as a nation under siege may have skewed its outlook on this point,

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but among its potential enemies and in the face of the Middle East after the Gulf War.

Will the allied military victory be translated into political gains, helping to end the Israeli-Arab conflict, or will this triumph also go down in history as just another episode on the battlefield? And in the event of failure, will Israel's enemies conclude that if the IDF was passive once it will remain passive again in the event that its population centers are hit? Israel must naturally take into account the possibility that a new Saddam may arise in the Middle East and will similarly fail to calculate the harm that may befall his people if he should instigate a war.

If the effort to arrive at broad-based political settlements in the Middle East—which must include arms-control arrangements—should fail, it will no longer be possible to speak of conventional deterrence. For this will have been the last major war in the Middle East to be fought with conventional weapons.

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Bruce R. Kuniholm

TURKEY AND THE WEST

Turkey, a long-standing U.S. ally and staunch member of NATO, has played a pivotal, if at times delicate, role in the defense of Europe and the Middle East. Its value as a Western ally has hinged on its geographic reach: it spans two continents and two theaters of Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union.

In the first years after World War II, as the only Islamic country with a secular democratic government, Turkey was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet designs in the Middle East. Along with Iran, it provided a massive land barrier to Moscow's ambitions in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Later, as the threat of Soviet expansionism seemed to fix on Europe, and U.S. policy shifted from containment in the Middle East (under the Truman Doctrine) to containment in Europe (under the Marshall Plan and NATO), Turkey's main strategic role was increasingly seen in a European context: as potentially bottling up the Soviet navy in the Black Sea, tying up Warsaw Pact forces along NATO's southern flank, and serving as a staging ground for a counterthrust against the Soviet Union.

Underpinning Turkey's early role in the NATO alliance was the principle of reciprocity: Turkey would play an important part in the defense of the West, and make its facilities available, while the West would provide Turkey with a deterrent against Soviet attack, as well as military and economic assistance. Today Turkey's relations with its allies continue to be informed by the notion of reciprocity and are colored by shifting security concerns. The only difference from recent years is that, with the Soviet threat sharply diminished and Ankara having assumed an important role in the allied coalition against Iraq, Turkey's strategic significance is once again being assessed chiefly in its Middle Eastern context.

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II

Turkey's Western-oriented leader, President Turgut Özal, has taken up the challenge of Ankara's role in the post-Cold War world, perhaps sooner than most observers would have guessed. In the process, he has precipitated a vigorous debate within Turkey over his role as president and the extent of his authority. Özal moved with alacrity to commit the country as a staging ground for U.S. and coalition air forces against Iraq. It was a politically calculated move that went beyond immediate national security concerns. Indeed, Turkey has never been willing to commit itself wholeheartedly to a Western military endeavor without some form of quid pro quo. In the current context, Özal is hoping for a substantial return on his country's investment in the war effort, from both the United States and Europe.

The expected payoff from Washington is increased military aid and a revision of the seven-to-ten ratio in U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey. The informal ratio, while never adopted by the executive branch, has served in recent years as a reference point for congressional approval of military assistance to those countries. Also expected is greater access to U.S. markets for Turkish foodstuffs and textiles. From Europe—and here Ankara is expecting Washington's support—Özal clearly expects military and economic assistance and wants a softening of resistance from the European Community to its application for membership in the 12-nation economic bloc. Indeed, before the gulf crisis erupted, no foreign policy issue had been more important to Özal than securing EC membership.

The determined effort by Ankara to bolster the allied coalition's interests in the gulf involved substantial risk. In the first instance, it involved exposing the country to attack. In the past the real question in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation was not the willingness of Turks to defend themselves, but the extent to which Turkey would have subjected itself to counterattack by supporting offensive actions against communist forces in eastern Europe. A similar scenario obtained, albeit from the south, where vast numbers of Iraqi forces—equipped with long-range missiles—were deployed following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August.

Another major risk stems from within. The Özal government's commitment to the anti-Iraq coalition was not well

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received inside Turkey. The decision, and the manner in which it was reached, triggered the resignation of the chief of the Turkish general staff on December 3. The Turkish media railed against the country's involvement in the war; as would be expected, opposition parties clamored both for an end to what they perceived as the nation's overenthusiastic role in support of the allied coalition and a halt to what they characterize as Özal's "one-man rule." Terrorism, which plagued the country in the 1970s, is once again on the rise. At least eight incidents were reported after the outbreak of the war, including the fatal shootings of the senior security adviser to Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut and of a U.S. civilian attached to a NATO base inside the country.

For a nation struggling to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the West, while maintaining a poor human rights record and suffering from a substandard economy, the assumption of a strategic role in the gulf is a tightrope walk to security and prosperity. Özal, perhaps recognizing that U.S.-Turkish ties have tended to falter during periods of U.S.-Soviet détente, seized the opportunity to commit Turkey to the coalition's cause against a new and real threat. Recognizing that his country is at a crossroads, Özal has made the first in a series of tough choices that will confront Turkey in the years ahead. For now, his limited popularity at home is being put to a serious test.

III

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, introduced a new regional dimension to the balance of power in the Middle East and constituted the most serious threat to vital U.S. and Western oil interests in the Persian Gulf since the Iranian Revolution. The crisis underscored once again the geopolitical value to the United States of the U.S.-Turkish alliance and corroborated estimates both within the Turkish government and the U.S. Department of Defense of Turkey's continuing importance.

Turkey's contribution to the anti-Iraq coalition included: effective closure of the Iraqi pipeline to the Mediterranean (through which Iraq exported 54 percent of its oil, or approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil a day); extension until December 1991 of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, which gives the United States access to military bases in Turkey; deployment of over 100,000 troops along the

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Iraqi border, which forced Iraq to deploy substantial troops to the north and raised the prospect of at least a two-front war; and use of NATO airbases within striking range of military targets in northern and central Iraq.

But such a commitment obviously did not come without substantial costs. Turkish financial losses from the war are difficult to calculate, but include lost trade with Iraq and Kuwait, lost tourism revenues, lost fees from transit trade, suspension on repayment of Iraqi debts, lost fees for transit of Iraqi oil through the Turkish pipeline, suspended construction contracts, lost remittances from Turkish workers in Iraq and Kuwait, and increased oil prices. To compensate for these losses and to reward Turkey's quick response to the crisis, President Bush, along with the EC, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has sought to put together a multibillion-dollar assistance package to the so-called frontline states.

In return for Ankara's military assistance, U.S. officials have explored the possibility of supplying the Turks with extensive military equipment as a quid pro quo. The Southern Region Amendment assistance program, which has allowed for transfer of slightly outmoded American weapons, has helped contribute to a substantial U.S. arms package. The American aid, in conjunction with a German arms package, includes: 600 M-60 tanks, 400 Leopard tanks, 700 armored personnel carriers, 40 Phantom fighters, as well as a complement of Cobra helicopters, missile destroyers and Roland surface-to-air missiles. Such a comprehensive package of advanced arms, however, will not arrive overnight. As a stopgap measure intended to serve as a symbolic deterrent, NATO deployed 42 somewhat outdated combat jets from Germany, Italy and Belgium at Turkey's request. Batteries of U.S. Patriot missiles were also sent to Turkey on an emergency basis. No Iraqi Scud missile attacks against Turkey were reported.

On the economic aid front, President Bush also has pledged to review Turkey's textile quotas with a view toward increasing its access to the U.S. textile and apparel market. According to a Turkish government spokesman, textile quotas (Turkey currently has approximately one percent of the U.S. textile market) will be raised by as much as 50 percent. Other assistance packages, however, have been slow to materialize. Turkey lost over $2 billion in revenue over the first three months of the crisis, and, as estimates of its losses in succeeding months rose to $9 billion, the ruling Motherland Party was

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

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severely criticized by leaders of the rival Social Democratic Populist Party and the True Path Party for having given too much for too little.

In their judgment, the threat to Turkey was not adequately compensated by the benefits, even if they were substantial. In addition to an estimated $8 billion in arms from the United States and Germany, Turkey is scheduled to receive a total of $2.2 billion in oil, grants and loans from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, France and the EC. Kuwait's newly restored government has said it is reviewing possible construction contracts with Turkish companies for the rebuilding of the emirate's devastated infrastructure. Moreover, the annual U.S. security assistance package was raised from $553.4 million ($500 million of which was an outright grant) to $635.4 million, and the high proportion of grant assistance to Turkey (as distinguished from concessional loans to Greece) essentially cancelled any semblance of the seven-to-ten ratio.

While acknowledging the value of striking a balance in assistance to Greece and Turkey, the Bush administration has never believed that the mechanistic application of the seven-to-ten ratio was the way to achieve it. The Reagan administration took the same view. The military balance, Washington argued, is determined by factors far more complex than levels of assistance. The Gulf War and President Özal's determined support for the allied coalition's effort seemed to bolster their argument, even if Özal's support for U.S. policies has troubled his own domestic critics.

IV

Before the Cold War began to wind down, Turkey played a number of critical strategic roles for NATO. Turkey helped to deter a Soviet attack on NATO's central front because its forces could threaten Warsaw Pact forces in the Balkans and the Transcaucasus. If deterrence failed, this potential threat from Turkey would have impeded Soviet capacity to reinforce the central front. Installations in Turkey made it possible to detect, intercept and limit the projection of Soviet airpower into the eastern Mediterranean. At sea, Turkish control of the Bosporus blocked the projection of Soviet naval power into the Aegean. The importance of the waterway is emphasized by the fact that in recent years the Soviets have made over 18,000 ship transits a year through the straits, through which pass 60 percent of their exports and 50 percent of their imports. As

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for contingencies outside the European theater, Turkey's land mass and its bases deterred Soviet ambitions in the Persian Gulf. In their absence, Soviet support for and accessibility to such countries as Syria and Iraq would have been much more pervasive and potentially threatening to U.S. interests in the region and would have created serious problems for Israel.

Finally, as NATO's only Muslim country, Turkey also provided a cultural bridge between Europe and the Middle East. If the United States eventually reestablishes ties with Iran, those ties will have been facilitated by the relationship it shares with intermediaries, such as Turkey. In recent months, for example, Turkey has revived the idea of building strong economic ties with both Iran and Pakistan.

Turkey's relationship with NATO, of course, is not one-sided, and many Turks recognize the necessity of having a strong NATO deterrent force on their soil. It was repeatedly brought home to them by Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia in 1948, Hungary and Poland in 1956, Czechoslovakia again in 1968 and, most recently, in Afghanistan in 1979. In spite of these reminders, however, and in part because of a legacy of distrust engendered by differences over contentious issues such as Cyprus, the status of the Aegean, the Armenian question and alleged human rights abuses, the Turks have occasionally recognized the desirability of exploring alternative means for assuring their security. They have been willing to examine a more neutral stance between East and West. But three major developments—the decline of the Soviet Union, the emergence of a resurgent EC and the advent of a long-term threat posed by Iraq—have led President Özal to check what, in different circumstances, might have been a drift toward neutrality or nonalignment.

Aggression by its southern neighbor and trading partner, on the other hand, raised a sensitive issue for Turkey: the use of its territory and (potentially) its armed forces in a Western military engagement outside NATO's boundaries. In the past, Turkey has appeared increasingly reluctant to allow the United States use of its territory as a staging ground in non-NATO contingencies. During the war in Lebanon in 1958, for example, the United States had used Turkish bases to support its intervention. Following the Cyprus crisis of 1964, however, when the United States called into question its obligations under NATO to protect Turkey from a Soviet attack, the Turks became more guarded about the use of Turkish

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facilities for non-NATO scenarios. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the United States was allowed to use communication stations in Turkey, but was not allowed to use Turkish bases for refueling or supply activities. In the course of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the United States was not allowed to use Turkish bases for direct combat or logistical support, although it was allowed to use communication stations in Turkey during the resupply effort. The United States was also permitted to use Turkish bases for the evacuation of American citizens during the Jordanian civil war in 1970 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Such reluctance to engage in non-NATO contingencies reverberated in many official Turkish quarters after Saddam's troops rolled into Kuwait. In addition to criticisms of Özal's "one-man rule," other detractors asserted that to commit to a U.S.-led war against Saddam would give the United States the capacity to permanently damage Turkey's economic and diplomatic relations with Iraq. Over the last ten years, Iraq has accounted for as much as 18 percent of total Turkish imports and 13 percent of total Turkish exports. As Özal's critics have noted, Iraq will remain a neighbor with a large—and needy—economy.

But within Özal's inner circle, there were indications of a readiness to take a tough stand against any potential aggression from the south. The groundwork had been laid at a meeting of Turkish emissaries in Vienna in December 1989, well before the gulf crisis. Mesut Yilmaz, then foreign minister, met with 17 Turkish ambassadors to examine the effects on Turkey of developments in eastern Europe and the implications of better relations between East and West.

At that meeting, the broad outline of a future foreign policy for Turkey was devised. Turkey, the ministers concurred, would definitely remain in NATO. It would, however, establish closer ties with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. Turkey recognized that, to be accepted as a member of the EC, it would have to take greater steps toward democracy and improve its human rights record. While vigilance would still have to be maintained against the Soviet threat, the major threat to Turkey now came from the southeast: Iraq and Syria. This shift would be reflected in Turkey's new defense strategy.

The ministers noted that while Turkey's strategic importance was lessened by East-West détente, it was not eliminated. Its geographical location would dictate its continuing strategic

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importance to the alliance. And, no less important, even if Turkey were not granted full membership in the EC, it would not be totally excluded.

V

Beyond regional security concerns, threats to Turkey were perceived in economic terms and were associated with the consequences of being excluded from the EC, which will dominate a unified market of more than 300 million Europeans in the 1990s. The Turkish government's interest was declared in 1987 when it applied for admission to the EC. On December 18, 1989, the EC Commission told the Turks that their application could not be considered before 1993 at the earliest. The commission argued that enlarging the Community would weaken its capacity to pursue internal and external policies required for the success of the Single European Act of 1986, which calls for the establishment of a wholly integrated internal market by the end of 1992.

Specific concerns addressed were Turkey's size and population—it had "a greater area and would eventually have a bigger population than any Community member state"—and the fact that Turkey had a substantially lower level of development than the European average. Purchasing power in Turkey was one-third that of the EC average, while the country suffered from high inflation rates and high unemployment. More than 50 percent of the labor force in Turkey was employed in agriculture, and the Community was concerned about the access of Turkish labor to the EC labor market at a time when unemployment was a problem in the 12 associated economies.

The commission recommended a number of measures that would enable both Turkey and the EC to move toward increased interdependence and integration. While the Turks were disappointed, the postponement was not unexpected. The government, putting on its best face, emphasized the report's reaffirmation of Turkey's qualification to become a full member and its call for a customs union between Turkey and the EC by 1995. Subsequently, however, Turks were angered by Austria's apparent jump in standing to be the next member and disillusioned by the EC's favorable reception of Cyprus' application for membership.

Turkish commentators worried that developments might lead to the Europeans' rearranging themselves in a fortress

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Europe that excluded Turkey, as in the early postwar era. If there is no commitment to Turkey's entry down the road, many would take it as the denial of a right that Turkey has earned and a rejection of Turkey's commitment to Europe. Membership in the EC, on the other hand, would guarantee the continued westernization of Turkey and cement its identity in Europe. Anything less would be hypocritical and discriminatory of the country's attempt to seek its rightful place in the European community of nations.

While the Turks are hopeful about the possibility of joining the EC, and Özal continues to put the best face on the difficulties they encounter, many Europeans privately express enormous doubts about Turkey's achieving membership in the near future. They suggest that Turkey focus on intermediate steps, such as a customs union, an industrial cooperation agreement or an aid program. These steps would give Ankara time to prepare the country for membership. Others suggest the desirability of examining alternative arrangements.

Speculation in the Turkish press about alternative relationships with the EC has included discussion of a European free-trade area with a European core, a northern federation (including Norway), and a southern federation (comprising Mediterranean countries such as Turkey, Israel and Malta). In the aftermath of the changes in eastern Europe in 1989, Turks speculated that their country could play a role in an expanded EC, which would include a Benelux east (Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) and Turkey (which enjoys substantial trade with eastern Europe). They have also contemplated, in the event that they are excluded from the EC, a free-trade agreement with the United States, a Black Sea cooperative system, and a Balkan cooperative zone.

Precedents for economic integration schemes in the Middle East include the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb Council. The Turkish government, however, looks to Europe and fears the consequences of rejection—particularly if the real reason stems from cultural and religious prejudice against Turkey's Muslim heritage. They have sensed such prejudice in the West's relatively weak reaction to the treatment of Turks in Soviet Azerbaijan or in Bulgaria, as opposed to its support for Christians in the restive Soviet Socialist republics of Armenia and Lithuania. President Özal has warned that rejection would push Turkey away from Europe and encourage the spread of

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religious fundamentalism throughout the region. Islamic fundamentalists have never captured more than ten percent of the vote in Turkey in recent years, but their cause in Turkey clearly would be fueled by such rejection.

VI

In the context of their perceived rejection by Europe, the Turks have looked to their bilateral relationships. The United States, because of its interests in the Middle East, has continued to cooperate with Turkey. But, as in the early postwar period, there have been differences within the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. If the end of the Cold War led the Department of State to see the U.S.-Turkish relationship as increasingly free of its defense focus, the Department of Defense, responding to the logic of Turkey's potential role in the Persian Gulf, continued to recognize Turkey's important strategic role in the region. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reinforced the Pentagon's view. As noted, however, the bilateral relationship will not be without its troubles.

The Soviet Union, which has expressed its appreciation for Turkey's realistic and balanced attitude toward problems in Soviet Azerbaijan, is interested in upgrading relations with Turkey as much as possible, as it did in the late 1970s. Trade volume between Turkey and the Soviet Union has tripled in the last three years. In 1989 it reached $1.3 billion. In October 1990 Turkey and the Soviet Union agreed to increase the volume of trade to $4 billion. Estimates of the volume of trade by the end of the decade range as high as $12 billion. The Soviets will supply the Turks with 4.1 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 1990, expand exports to six billion cubic meters by 1992 and expect to run pipelines through the Caucasus by 1994. The amount of consumer goods Turkey will exchange for gas is substantial—70 percent of the cost will be paid back by Turkish exports of goods and services. The Soviets have a large market and could become the greatest importers of Turkish goods.

These trends, however, do not mean a peace dividend for the Turks, whose defense budget for 1990 called for more than doubling the previous year's budget to $3.4 billion—and this was before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In November 1989 then National Defense Minister Safa Giray expressed the opinion that, in an era of uncertainty, easing Turkey's defense efforts could lead to instability. Why should Turkey have such

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a large defense budget? His answer, echoed by those who have looked at Turkey's obsolete equipment, was the need for modernization. The need for a large peacetime army had become increasingly obvious: internal insecurity in the southeast (where the Kurdish separatist movement was gaining momentum) and a more general regional threat, subsequently epitomized by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. The defense budget for 1991 has been raised to $4.8 billion, or 12.5 percent of the national budget.

Prior to the gulf crisis, the Turks' main security concern was an emerging Islamic terrorist threat within the country and increased confrontations with the separatist Kurdish movement. In the last six years, Kurdish rebels in southeastern Turkey have conducted a bloody guerrilla war that, according to Ankara, has claimed the lives of 1,432 soldiers and civilians, as well as 866 members of the Marxist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). More than 300 PKK members were killed in the last year alone. The PKK reestablished itself in Iraq following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and in conjunction with bases in Syria and Iran, has supported an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 rebels in Turkey, whose population of 57 million includes approximately ten million Kurds.

The official Turkish position has been to deny the legitimacy of a separate Kurdish identity because the political implications of doing so could threaten Turkey's claim to and control over southeastern Turkey. While Turkey has treated its Kurds better than Iran or Iraq have treated theirs, and gave temporary asylum to approximately 100,000 Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War, it has not treated them well. The biggest problem, according to domestic critics, is that the government has delegated the issue to the military. Measures taken by the military to control the separatist movement include the forced removal of 30,000 Kurds who apparently refused to set up local militias in 1989. That action drew harsh criticism from abroad. In May 1990 the European Parliament (with only 71 of 518 members present) voted for a resolution condemning terrorism in Turkey and called on the government to recognize the political, cultural and social rights of the Kurds. Following Turkey's November 1990 signing of the Paris Charter, a document which gives significant weight to minority rights, the Özal government has begun to explore such changes and has recommended lifting a ban on the use of the Kurdish language.

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Turkish concern over the Kurdish problem led Ankara in 1986 to notify the United States and Iran that if Iraq were defeated by Tehran and the state were to disintegrate, it would demand the return of Mosul and the great northern oil basin of Kirkuk—a claim that dates back to Turkey's loss of the region in 1926. In the current context of a possible disintegration of Iraq, Turkish concern over the Kurdish nationality problem has again surfaced. The difficulty of incorporating even more Kurds into the Republic of Turkey would, of course, pose serious problems. It would in some ways be similar to the problem of Israel occupying even more Arab territory and coping with an additional Arab population. If Turkey has to improve its human rights record and become more democratic to win acceptance by the EC, the incorporation of more Kurds would hardly facilitate that goal. Amnesty International's annual reports repeatedly allege systematic torture and human rights violations in Turkey—violations that, many Turks feel, can be explained in part by memories of the chaos that led up to the September 1980 generals' coup and the difficulties of dealing with internal threats to security. Incorporation of Mosul would only add to such reports, reinforcing Western perceptions of a poor human rights record and precluding Turkey's admission to the EC. For these and other reasons, Turkey—along with Iran and Syria—would prefer to see Iraq keep its own borders. The territorial integrity of regional states has been one of Turkey's long-standing policies.

On the other hand, if the local Kurdish insurrection in northeastern Iraq were to become widespread, consolidate its gains and evolve into a separate Kurdish rump state, Ankara would see such a development as unacceptable. If confronted with the prospect of a nationalist, irredentist Kurdish state, many Turks would prefer to have those Kurds maintain their Kurdish identity but be under joint Iraqi and Turkish control, or under the guarantorship of Turkey, Syria and Iran. These preferences explain why, if changes are to be made in the map of the Middle East, Turkey will expect to have a seat at the table when such decisions are made.

If Turkish officials worry that the Kurdish insurgency will spread to cities throughout the southeast, they already are confronting a growing terrorist threat to secularism and democracy in some of their major cities. Some analysts have attributed the rise of terrorism by Islamic radicals to the

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promotion of Islam in the 1980s, when it was regarded as a means of undercutting the ideologies of the left. Others have focused on Turkey's continuing high inflation and unemployment and, most recently, on radical support for Saddam. Whatever the cause of Islamic terrorism, 21 prominent secularists have been assassinated in Ankara, Bursa and Istanbul in 1990 alone, and Lieutenant General Teoman Koman, undersecretary of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization, has asserted that the terrorists receive considerable support from neighboring countries.

VII

The threat posed by Saddam Hussein and internal challenges from Kurdish nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists are not the only problems the Turks worry about. In recent years they have had troubles with a number of neighbors: with Bulgaria over the Turkish ethnic minority there; with Greece over Cyprus and a range of Aegean issues, not to mention treatment of the Turkish minority in Thrace; with Syria over its support for the Damascus-based Kurdish Workers' Party and Armenian terrorist groups; and with Iran over its support for Islamic causes and the export of the revolution. Prior to the war, the Turks had experienced serious differences with Iraq over control of the Kurdish minority there, as well as over control of the rate of water flow in the Euphrates, which Turkey has begun to control with its massive $21 billion Southeastern Anatolian Project.

A country that has a serious internal insurgency, that is surrounded by potentially hostile countries and that has ambivalent allies must ultimately rely on itself. Turkey shares borders with countries that support religious and ethnic terrorist activities, that have missiles with ranges in excess of 1,000 kilometers and that do not participate in negotiations on disarmament and arms control.

For this reason, President Özal was mindful of the larger context within which Saddam Hussein's actions were to be seen. He emphasized that his stand was one of principle—it concerned the norms of international behavior and the fundamental tenets of the U.N. Charter. Özal was also mindful, however, of the very serious threat Saddam posed, and of the necessity of taking risks to effect Turkey's interests. In response to opposition critics, he stated: "I am not a gambler. I am an engineer. I know mathematics and logic, and therefore I don't think I will lose."

The risks posed by Özal's calculated policies were under-

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scored by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, who accused Turkey of aggression against Iraq and warned of unspecified "consequences" that would flow from Ankara's act of "submission" to the United States. Although no Scud missiles were fired at Turkey, reports that the missiles may have been deployed within range of southeastern Turkey sparked the evacuation of some three million Turks in the area, according to U.N. officials in Geneva. Mitigating these risks was the fact that Turkey received a NATO guarantee that it will be protected if attacked by Saddam's forces.

While granting NATO allies use of Turkish installations for operations against Iraq, Özal said he would not attack Iraq unless Turkey was attacked. He correctly calculated that Saddam, preoccupied with the ground war in the south, would not risk a second front. A Scud attack would have been sufficient to elicit a retaliatory strike, but probably would not have brought Turkey into the ground war. Throughout the war, Özal downplayed the harm that could be caused by such an attack.

To be sure, a more cautious role in the allied coalition would not have earned Turkey the same measure of respect from its allies, and it would not have given the Turks so many real and potential benefits: economic assistance from a substantial number of coalition forces; military assistance and support for the modernization of Turkish forces from its NATO allies; recognition of Turkey as a leader and potential source of stability in the region, one deserving of a seat at whatever peace conferences take place in the postwar era; and the gratitude of its allies—the most clear expression of which would be admission to the EC.

VIII

While the Turks recognize the necessity of self-reliance, they clearly will not leave NATO, even as its military role is subordinated to a more political one. To do so without a countervailing force against regional enemies—whether the Soviets or the Iraqis—would be fatuous. The Bosporus has been and continues to be one of the Soviet Union's lifelines. To leave NATO would eliminate a critical deterrent, threaten to eliminate the substantial assistance that the Turks receive and give the Greeks an unnecessary advantage in their differences with the Turks. It would also lessen the likelihood that Turkey will ever become a full member of the EC.

Within the framework of NATO, however, particularly if it is rejected by the EC, Turkey will pursue its own course. Turks

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are sensitive to the fact that NATO is now considering a postcrisis regional defense arrangement in the Persian Gulf and that, as Manfred Wörner, the general secretary of NATO, has acknowledged, Turkey's participation would be essential to such a structure. Like Iran and Afghanistan, Turkey is cognizant of its vulnerability to both East and West, sensitive to the capricious character of its relations with them and aware of the necessity of walking a delicate line between power blocs and cultures. Surrounded by countries that are undergoing massive upheavals, and which are often antagonistic toward each other, the Turks increasingly realize that cautious diplomacy leaves them out in the cold, while an activist diplomacy—consistent with their self-image as an emerging regional power—requires tough choices about their friends and enemies. This holds true whether in the Black Sea, Caspian Sea or the Persian Gulf. Such choices always involve risks because one's allies tend to determine one's enemies. Nonetheless such risks must sometimes be taken, as was the case in the Gulf War.

Iran has rejected alignment with the great powers, and Afghanistan, once it reconstitutes itself, will also do so. Özal has asserted that Turkey has an important economic and political role to play in the Middle East, not the least of which involves the so-called Middle East Peace-Water Project that would include countries from the eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.

The issue, here, is not Turkey's relationship with the Middle East, but whether that relationship will be established in concert with its European allies or without them. This is a reality that Europeans should ponder as they attempt to safeguard vital interests in the Persian Gulf with a security framework anchored in part in Turkey.

Turkey has earned the right to join the EC. The strategic reasons for its accession to NATO, moreover, still hold, although they have undergone a substantial reorientation. Just as Turkey's postwar geopolitical importance depended on its being seen in a European as well as a Middle Eastern context, so its importance in the aftermath of the Cold War—and the Persian Gulf War—will depend on its being seen in a Middle Eastern as well as a European context. But that vision will also depend on Turkey's being accepted as a full-fledged member of Europe. If it is, Kemal Atatürk's legacy as a westernizer will be safeguarded and Turkey will be an important model to those Muslim nations in the Middle East that contemplate what it means to be a secular, democratic republic.

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Carl E. Vuono

DESERT STORM AND THE FUTURE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

In the coming decades the United States confronts not only a revolution in international affairs but urgent calls to adapt its military strategy and forces. Some commentators go so far as to assert that the world is on the threshold of a new era in which military power will no longer be of central importance. Others recognize future challenges but argue that the United States can no longer shoulder the burden of military leadership in a time of enormous budget deficits at home and increasing economic competition abroad. Still others assert that America neither needs nor can afford the range of forces it maintained during the Cold War.

These perspectives, however, are dangerously shortsighted. While the risk of a major conflict with the Soviet Union has certainly ebbed to a 45-year low, Iraq's aggression against Kuwait clearly demonstrates that the international environment remains dangerous and is in many respects growing more complex. U.S. interests around the globe have inextricably entangled this nation in world affairs. If the United States is to protect these interests and ensure its security in the post-Cold War world, it must maintain military forces capable of meeting a full array of contingencies. Over the next decade the United States will continue to require capable, credible conventional forces as the central element of its national military strategy.

In an era of decreasing resources devoted to defense, the critical issue is how to properly shape U.S. conventional forces. Adjustment need not imply a wholesale restructuring of forces or doctrines. As we have seen during Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, many elements of military strategy and force design that served the nation so well throughout the Cold War will remain relevant in the era that follows.

II

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has sought to find the appropriate proportions of nuclear and

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conventional forces. U.S. strategic thought in the early years of the nuclear age was dominated by the widespread view that the sole utility of military power lay in its ability to deter conflict. This school of thought was reinforced by the perception that the only significant military threat to the United States lay in the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons were seen as an affordable way to counter the vast numerical superiority of Soviet ground forces—a superiority that the West could not hope to offset with conventional forces alone.

But this view did not long survive. It soon became evident that nuclear weapons were of only marginal value in deterring conflict in areas outside a direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation. This reality was reinforced by U.S. participation in two land wars in Asia and by numerous other crises. To be sure, the American strategic nuclear arsenal was central to the deterrence of a direct Soviet attack on the United States and contributed substantially to deterring Soviet aggression against, or intimidation of, America's NATO allies. It is clear that nuclear weapons were essential in buttressing NATO and in supporting the longest period of unbroken peace on the European continent in ten centuries.

But the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, even in Europe, was intimately tied to the presence and capability of powerful conventional forces. These forces not only demonstrated allied commitment to defend NATO territory. They would also deny the Soviets a fait accompli in the event of a massive short-warning attack, present them with the very real prospect of conventional defeat and provide a credible first step in an escalatory sequence leading to a strategic nuclear exchange. Conventional forces grew even more central to deterrence in Europe throughout the 1980s, with the adoption of a maneuver-oriented combat doctrine that integrated air and land forces, the introduction of more powerful conventional weapons and the unprecedented increase in the quality of the U.S. armed forces.

Nuclear weapons designed primarily to confront the Soviet Union were of little utility in helping the United States resolve crises outside the NATO area. Few believed that the United States would use nuclear weapons in response to non-Soviet aggression, and American actions proved them right. American restraint was not necessarily due to any lack of a military role for these weapons. Rather, it was firmly rooted in the pervasive view that nuclear weapons, in any

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form, were politically unacceptable, except as an instrument of last resort.

The United States instead relied on conventional forces to deter conflict and defend America's interests beyond its homeland and the confines of NATO. The development of a strategy of "flexible response" constituted explicit recognition of the diminished utility of nuclear weapons in countering conventional aggression and so-called low-intensity conflict, and ushered in a shift in emphasis from nuclear to conventional forces.

The relative importance of strategic nuclear weapons has recently eroded further as a result of the declining Soviet threat and the prospects of real reductions in these forces through arms control. While the much heralded end of the Cold War has also reduced the need for conventional forces to deter a Soviet attack in Europe, it has not mitigated the challenges to U.S. interests from other quarters. It is precisely this growing non-Soviet threat that demands a new emphasis on U.S. conventional forces.

As we reflect on the evolution of American strategic thought, several important lessons of the nuclear age seem apparent. First, strategic nuclear forces have been essential in, but limited to, deterring nuclear attack on the United States and certain vital overseas interests. They have done so through their potential to punish aggression by inflicting unacceptable losses in response. Second, conventional forces have also been crucial to deterring conflict between the superpowers, both by their potential to punish and by their promised ability to deny the enemy the objectives of its aggression. Third, beyond deterrence, conventional forces obviously have had far broader application than nuclear forces and are central to defending and advancing American interests in places where nuclear weapons lack utility.

This preeminence of conventional forces has been most recently and persuasively demonstrated in the Gulf War. Despite Iraq's chemical weapons, its nascent nuclear potential and the threat its aggression posed to U.S. interests, it was America's conventional forces, not its nuclear arsenal, that defined President Bush's response to the crisis and ultimately decided its outcome. Operation Desert Storm is likely not an aberration. Changes in the international and domestic environment should create an even more pronounced role for conventional forces in the future.

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III

The international security environment is undergoing significant and, in some areas, revolutionary change. Military power nonetheless remains a dominant feature of relations between states. It is instructive to remember that Saddam Hussein imposed his will on Kuwait and threatened to alter the international economic order with Iraqi divisions, not dollars. And it was with military power that the international community ultimately redressed Iraq's aggression in Operation Desert Storm. It should be apparent from this experience alone that it is premature for the United States to abandon strong military forces.

The design of U.S. forces, however, requires a clear assessment of the military challenges the nation will face. Perhaps the most difficult challenge to frame is that which will emerge from the Soviet Union. Despite better relations with the United States and unprecedented U.S.-Soviet cooperation during the early stages of the crisis in the gulf, future Soviet policy remains uncertain. The enduring strength of the Soviet military must remain an important factor in determining the size and shape of U.S. forces.

The Soviet Union will retain far into the future the ability to threaten the American homeland. Although strategic arms reduction agreements may help establish lower levels of nuclear forces on both sides, the United States will still need to maintain a credible nuclear retaliatory capability—a requirement that demands modernization. Washington cannot, however, expect its nuclear forces to be of wider use in the future than they have been in the past. Beyond deterring a nuclear attack on the United States and on certain vital interests overseas, the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal will not be central to defending or advancing American interests elsewhere in the world.

Moreover, even if all promised unilateral reductions and arms control agreements are fully implemented, Moscow will retain the world's most potent land forces. Although a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union today seems improbable, it remains the most daunting challenge U.S. forces might face. A dramatic resurgence of an authoritarian Soviet regime, determined to stem the dissolution of the union, could create a more hostile and aggressive Kremlin. Evidence now suggests that such a development lies well within the realm of possibil-

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ity. It would be foolish in any event to disregard actual and potential Soviet military power as the United States contemplates its future forces.

The historic changes now underway in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe could lead to instability and conflict. There certainly are reasons to hope that relaxation of East-West tensions will usher in a new era of peace and general prosperity in Europe. But recent events in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe demonstrate the potential for violence as the collapsing Soviet empire struggles with cataclysmic change. Unrest may stem from unfulfilled expectations and nationalist animosities, heretofore held in check by communism and the East-West rivalry. Such unrest could ignite armed conflict within and among European nations and directly jeopardize U.S. or allied interests, or invite Soviet intervention.

The threat posed by instability in Europe defies empirical evaluation. There are no quantitative indices—numbers of tanks or aircraft—against which one can measure U.S. requirements. Genuine dangers may nonetheless emerge from a Europe adrift in change. Accordingly, Washington must build its post-containment commitment to Europe with an eye to history and with the conviction that the United States can make a lasting contribution to stabilizing the continent.

Challenges in the developing world are serious as well. The military power wielded by developing nations is no longer insignificant, as the Iraqi arsenal forcefully demonstrated. Rivalries among nations, religious and ideological hatreds, and ambitions for economic and political power remain. These sources of instability are made more dangerous by the proliferation of sophisticated weapons—from modern armor to ballistic missiles—that can produce violence of unprecedented magnitude.

Tank battles in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, for example, resulted in levels of destruction rivaling those projected for a superpower conflict on the plains of Europe. These were hardly isolated cases; the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s was characterized by tank engagements, intense artillery duels, ballistic missile exchanges and chemical attacks, and the toll in human life numbered more than one million. Allied forces in Saudi Arabia confronted an Iraq armed with hundreds of Scud missiles and more than 5,000 tanks, a formidable conventional force by any standard. Indeed, the final defeat of the Republican Guard required the coalition to

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amass and employ the largest tank formations since World War II.

Nor do the nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf have a monopoly on strong military forces. A growing number of countries now have the ability to engage in sustained, mechanized land combat. The armies of Vietnam and North Korea, for example, are among the largest in the world. A dozen nations in the developing world have more than 1,000 tanks in their land forces. Ballistic and cruise missiles are spreading to many parts of the world. Chemical weapons are also entering the inventories of a growing list of nations, and the proliferation of nuclear capabilities continues to present an ominous threat.

To be sure, aggregate numbers of weapons in the developing world do not in themselves reflect the degree of threat these nations pose. The danger in the proliferation of weapons lies not in the numbers themselves, but in the capabilities those weapons give regimes with whom the United States and its allies and friends have conflicting interests. A number of such regimes exist, and as much as some might wish to ignore these trends in the developing world, they command the attention of the United States.

There is, finally, the ongoing problem of low-intensity conflict in the developing world, manifest in insurgencies, international terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. Low-intensity conflicts generally cannot be resolved through the application of military power alone; they require the integrated application of political, economic and military measures to address the causes as well as the manifestations of unrest. The importance of properly trained, structured and equipped armed forces is nevertheless a critical element of a comprehensive strategy to address these types of conflicts. Low-intensity conflict will remain in the coming years a significant challenge for the U.S. military.

The United States clearly need not, and indeed should not, insert itself in every regional squabble. But it does not have the luxury of treating warfare in the developing world with indifference. The archaic concept of "fortress America" simply retains no strategic relevance for the United States in the 1990s. Military strategists and political leaders must anticipate that U.S. forces will be called on to advance and protect American interests in regional conflicts ranging from insurgencies to full-scale conventional wars against powerful land

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armies. U.S. forces must be capable of meeting those challenges.

IV

Conventional forces provide the United States with unique capabilities across an expanding range of military requirements—from peacetime engagement, through deterrence, to the conduct of major war.

In peacetime, conventional forces are the bedrock of America's military-to-military contacts with the forces of over 130 other nations. The United States provides military training, in one form or another, to 75 percent of the world's armed forces. This training is crucial to the successful assimilation of new weapons and tactics by friendly forces. More important, U.S. military training is a unique medium for encouraging the adoption of the values of professionalism, respect for human rights and support for democratic institutions. U.S. conventional forces provide an indispensable avenue of influence and a source of positive change in many nations where political and social traditions accord the military a prominent role in the government. Conventional forces, particularly the U.S. Army, actively support nation-building in countries throughout the world, assisting in the development of infrastructure that, in turn, helps alleviate some of the root causes of instability and violence.

Conventional forces also make an important contribution to the national counternarcotics strategy. As one element of a comprehensive approach, military units are helping law enforcement agencies detect and defeat drug trafficking. Mobile U.S. training teams advise the security forces of drug producing countries, and conventional forces provide equipment, maintenance support and training to U.S. government agencies that fight trafficking, both in the United States and abroad.

Conventional forces are also among the most effective tools for enhancing political stability in the international order. U.S. ground forces in Korea and elsewhere in East Asia have provided security, and thus encouraged ancient enemies—for example, Japan, Korea and China—to manage their differences without resorting to force. Without American willingness to sustain peacekeeping forces in the Sinai, the historic peace treaty between Israel and Egypt might never have materialized.

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Perhaps nowhere is the stabilizing role of U.S. conventional forces more evident than in Europe. NATO, the most successful and enduring alliance in recent memory, created and sustained an environment of military and political cooperation among nations whose histories gave them every reason to be as suspicious of one another as they were of the Soviets. The United States contributed to the unparalleled success of the alliance by providing leadership unencumbered by the historical baggage of regional animosities or territorial ambitions.

Closely related to their role in enhancing political stability, conventional forces are equally crucial to deterring aggression in places where the United States has a sizable military presence and in other regions where it has no forward-deployed forces. Each element of conventional forces contributes substantially to deterrence. Naval forces, including Marine Corps elements, can quickly project military power in order to demonstrate U.S. concern; air power, particularly when surged into a crisis area, can rapidly bolster the credibility of U.S. involvement and increase the ability to punish aggression. Historically there has been no stronger statement of national resolve than the deployment of the American soldier. The presence of U.S. Army units on the ground—combat elements that cannot sail or fly away overnight—leaves little doubt that the full power and prestige of the United States are committed.

Finally, conventional forces have the responsibility to fight and win wars. They have the combat power necessary to determine the outcome of battle and to preserve American interests, should deterrence fail. The key to the successful employment of conventional combat power in war is to fight jointly—a lesson that stood in stark relief in Desert Storm. In only the rarest of circumstances can either sea, land or air power be effective by itself. Joint operations do not require that each element of conventional forces commit equal numbers of troops or equipment; there is no scientific formula for the proportions needed from each service. Rather, in joint operations each service contributes its unique capabilities to the mission at hand. That is the way U.S. forces fought in Iraq and Kuwait, and that is how they must fight in the future. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to assert that U.S. conventional forces will fight jointly, or they will not fight at all.

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V

Despite the many purposes that America's conventional forces have successfully fulfilled in the past, there are substantial changes that can and should be made in force structure. These changes must take into account the emerging international environment and the concomitant requirements for force training, readiness and quality. In the future, U.S. forces will have fewer divisions, fewer aircraft carriers and fewer air wings, and thus they must be shaped with care and deliberation. The hollow rhetoric of the "roles and missions" debate should be cast aside, and the genuine contributions of each element of the conventional forces examined.

As the size of U.S. conventional forces is reduced, the nation assumes greater risk in its ability to achieve its objectives, particularly if the international environment remains unstable and violent. The force structure now taking shape will be the smallest in nearly half a century. By 1995, for example, the army will have 535,000 soldiers in its active force—the smallest number since 1939. Historical comparisons illustrate the magnitude of these reductions. In 1950, after the precipitous drawdown following World War II, the army still had nearly 600,000 active-duty soldiers. In the wake of Vietnam, the active army was reduced to 800,000, and at the beginning of fiscal year 1991, only 764,000 soldiers and 18 divisions were active.

Given the burgeoning military capabilities in the developing world and the uncertain future of the Soviet Union, reductions in conventional forces beyond those already contemplated may well deny the United States the ability to defend its interests against unexpected and simultaneous challenges. At the onset of Desert Storm, the army had deployed to Saudi Arabia 17 of its active armored brigades, leaving only four such brigades in the strategic reserve for other contingencies. A smaller force structure may render decisive action in a future contingency highly problematic. Should U.S. forces be required to fight, a smaller structure will increase the time required to reconstitute the forces in preparation for a later crisis. There will simply be no rapidly available reservoir of forces and equipment from which to draw.

Yet another consequence of a much smaller force structure will be increased pressure for urgent decision-making. If the United States were to attempt to undertake an operation like

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Desert Storm with the forces contemplated for the mid-1990s, the president might have to declare partial mobilization immediately and activate reserve components on a far greater scale. The rapidly mobilized reserves would not only be required to train, deploy and fight, but they would also have to maintain the capability to satisfy other contingencies that might arise around the world. The reserve components would have to be mobilized early and on a massive scale in order to assume the strategic functions that the smaller active force could no longer cover. Such a massive call-up of reserve forces takes time, which arguably may not be available in a future crisis.

Since the early 1960s, America's national security community has debated the relative merits of a "two-and-a-half" or "one-and-a-half" war strategy to determine force structure. But the direction in which the United States is now heading, if not carefully managed, may leave it with only a "half" war capability—a one-shot military, capable of a single, medium-sized operation before extensive time-consuming reconstitution. The risks inherent in such circumstances must be clearly understood and appreciated as America shapes its conventional forces for the 1990s and beyond.

VI

Although U.S. conventional forces will be substantially smaller in the years ahead, they must retain four qualities essential to national security. These qualities are versatility, deployability, lethality and expansibility.

Versatility.

Conventional forces must be able to meet a wide array of challenges while drawing from a smaller reservoir of forces. Fewer forces and a broad range of challenges mean that each individual unit must be prepared to face a wider spectrum of missions.

Recent experience has illustrated the need for versatility. In a period of 18 months, American conventional forces met challenges spanning the entire range of military operations short of nuclear war. Conventional forces fought successfully in Panama in an operation that employed predominantly light infantry and special-operations forces, supported by a small number of armored and maritime units as well as a massive airlift. They supported disaster relief efforts in California after

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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a devastating earthquake, and performed similar tasks in the Caribbean and the southeastern United States after Hurricane Hugo. They evacuated Americans from Liberia and Somalia and provided support to the Aquino government in the Philippines during an attempted coup. Moreover, soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines continued to serve at the cutting edge of America's commitments in East Asia and Europe. They also fought forest fires in the American west and supported counternarcotics operations along the U.S. southern border and in Latin America. Finally, the armed forces undertook a no-notice deployment to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, where they conducted a highly successful military campaign of a scale unmatched since World War II.

Most of the nations hostile to U.S. interests rely on ground forces as the principal instrument of their military power. Special attention must therefore be paid to the ability of U.S. armed forces to conduct decisive campaigns on land. For the United States to have a credible ability to defeat tank-heavy forces in the developing world, as well as to respond to an unanticipated deterioration of Soviet behavior, it must have a force mix that includes substantial armored, light and special-operations forces, supported by close air support and an adequate airlift and sealift.

Versatility also demands that the United States have the capacity to concentrate power rapidly in critical areas. This requires it to retain a forward presence in Europe, Asia and other areas vital to U.S. interests. Although oriented toward threats in their particular theater, forward-deployed army forces must also be available to reinforce operations in other areas—as did about half of the forces in Europe for Desert Storm. With a smaller force structure, the United States can no longer afford to field forces whose utility is limited to Europe alone, or to any other single theater of operations, because of their design, equipment, training or political constraints.

With a diminished presence in Europe and East Asia, the centerpiece of the U.S. post-Cold War strategy will be conventional forces based in the United States—powerful forces available for power projection in contingencies worldwide. These forces must be of sufficient number so that they can contend with an adversary of substantial capabilities. They must also reflect a mix of naval, air and land forces, including armored, light and special-operations units able to be tailored into a force package appropriate to the threat. Most impor-

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tant, these contingency forces must be fully trained and ready to deploy and fight with virtually no warning time.

Arms control agreements and a general lessening of East-West tensions have significantly increased warning time in Europe, but challenges requiring U.S. military actions in the developing world may continue to materialize with virtually no warning, as happened in the Iraqi attack on Kuwait. The absence of warning time, coupled with the mounting capabilities of the armies of developing countries, means that there may be no comfortable buffer during which soldiers, units and leaders can be trained for combat.

Consequently, the idea of a "tiered" readiness system for active forces, in which some units are kept fully capable while others are maintained at lower levels of preparedness, does not stand up to future requirements the nation may well face. Under a tiered system, it is doubtful that fully trained forces would be available in sufficient number to deter or defeat an aggressor like Iraq. This would leave the president with two equally unattractive options: committing forces not adequately prepared for combat or delaying deployment until sufficient forces could be brought up to combat readiness while the crisis intensified or even passed the nation by.

Beyond the ability to act immediately in a crisis, the United States must also have the unquestioned capability to reinforce forward-deployed units or contingency forces with other units from active and reserve components. Reinforcements provide the indispensable capacity to maintain forces in a crisis area, either for protracted deterrence or for sustained combat. Given the smaller size of the overall force, it is clear that reinforcing units, too, must be ready for rapid deployment with minimal additional training.

Implicit in the requirement for versatility is an appropriate proportion of active to reserve forces—a proportion determined by national military strategy, demands of the international environment and the missions for which each component is best suited. As U.S. forces are reduced and reshaped, the proper mix of active and reserve forces will assume mounting significance, particularly in the army, with its heavy reliance on reserves.

As the prospects for a major war with the Soviet Union diminish, and as arms control agreements are implemented, an appropriate number of active and reserve units will be deactivated. The total force will be restructured to provide the

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combat and support units needed to meet anticipated worldwide contingencies. Upgrading the readiness of reserve combat units will also be a priority, while recognizing that there are inherent limitations on how ready these units can be due to training time. With a smaller total force and compressed warning times for contingencies outside the bounds of NATO, active and reserve units will have to be as versatile and ready as possible.

As operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated, reserve units with missions compatible to civilian occupations—such as supply and transportation—are of great and immediate value simply because, upon mobilization, their administrative and training requirements are relatively modest. Reserve land combat units—infantry, armor and field artillery—require substantially more training and preparations before they can be committed to combat. Combat units must perform complex tasks in synchronization with each other and with elements of air and maritime units. There are no equivalent civilian tasks that could reduce the need for actual training in order to meet rigorous battlefield requirements. This was very clear during the training of the reserve combat brigades activated for Operation Desert Storm, and this experience should be kept in mind as forces are reshaped. We should not accord capabilities or expectations to reserves that they, by their very nature, cannot achieve. At the same time, we cannot afford an active force structure with all the diverse capabilities needed to meet the range of contingencies the United States may confront. The U.S. force structure must be built on a realistic assessment of the strengths and limitations of each component so that each can make the most effective contribution to the total force.

Versatility is thus fundamental to U.S. forces for this decade and beyond. In a shrinking force structure, individual units as well as the entire conventional forces must assume expanding responsibilities. These competing pressures can be reconciled only if all units and leaders are prepared to function effectively across a wide spectrum of conflict throughout the world.

Deployability.

The second major characteristic U.S. conventional forces must retain is the ability to project appropriate combat power rapidly wherever U.S. interests are threatened. Depending on the threat, the United States may need to deploy only a small

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force, such as a carrier battlegroup or an AWACS detachment. Alternatively the threat may require the United States to mount a major joint operation—built around a contingency force of armored divisions—to contend with an adversary who possesses a significant and powerful arsenal of tanks.

Deployability contributes to both deterrence and defense, and assumes greater significance as U.S. armed forces are reduced in size and forward-deployed forces are scaled back. This is particularly true in the context of the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, in which both alliance and Soviet force levels will be decreased and the warning time for an attack increased. The ability to return forces quickly to Europe will buttress the CFE agreement by providing a demonstrated capacity to respond effectively to treaty violations or a resurgent Soviet threat. Moreover, knowledge that the United States can project combat power quickly into a threatened area will figure prominently in the strategic calculus of any potential adversary—in Europe or elsewhere—and will help discourage aggression.

Although the deployment to the Arabian peninsula was largely successful, it exceeded American sealift capacity. The United States was forced to rely on a significant number of foreign ships. The ability to project substantial land forces remains inadequate to meet the needs of the entire range of contingencies the United States may face in coming years. The United States simply does not have enough airlift or sealift to carry the forces that may be required. But the solution does not lie in "lightening" U.S. forces by stripping their combat power to meet available lift assets; it would be folly to commit American units to battle without giving them the wherewithal to fight successfully.

Deployability must instead be addressed in a comprehensive manner that looks at imaginative and affordable solutions to projecting large forces rapidly throughout the world. Deployability is not simply an issue of ships and airplanes. The United States must not only expand strategic lift, it must also pursue initiatives to enhance its ability to act as necessary in a particular crisis. Conventional forces must be designed so that they can be put together in packages tailored for rapid movement. Military access agreements should be examined to allow the United States to project forces in pre-crisis situations. Equipment design must stress mobility without sacrificing combat power. Finally the United States must consider ways to pre-

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position supplies and equipment and to enhance support infrastructure in high-risk regions.

The final point is particularly important. Desert Storm demonstrated that the ability to project significant combat power was greatly enhanced by a decade of work done to pre-position supplies and develop air bases and seaports in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region. In few areas around the world would the United States find this fortuitous combination to facilitate rapid deployment. In enhancing deployability the objective should be to have the capacity to project the major elements of a multidivision corps, with the capability for forcible entry, substantial armored forces and sufficient sustainment, anywhere in the world in one month.

Lethality.

Decision-makers must never lose sight of the principal mission of the armed forces: to fight and to win the wars of the nation. It is therefore not enough to simply project power; that power must be capable of prevailing when deployed. Lethality bolsters deterrence, ensures defense and undergirds the ability to defeat any adversary.

In order to be lethal, U.S. forces must first have an effective joint war-fighting doctrine that focuses its combat power and strengths on the battlefield. Second, America's weapons must continue to exploit their technological strengths and help compensate for the fact that smaller numbers of forces may require them to fight outnumbered. Better technology alone will never win a battle, but it does provide soldiers with an indispensable edge over potential adversaries. Third, tough, realistic training must be used to hone the war-fighting skills of soldiers, units and leaders to prepare them for the rigors of combat. Training must remain the top priority of each service. Fourth, America must continue to develop leaders of skill and imagination—leaders who understand how to fight and who inspire in their subordinates the confidence that they can win. Finally, lethality demands that U.S. ranks be filled with young Americans of spirit and ambition, with the character and abilities that will allow them to undertake and succeed in tasks both disparate and dangerous.

Lethality is, of course, a relative term: what is lethal in one set of circumstances may be largely irrelevant in another. In many operations, light infantry, marines, air or naval forces wield sufficient power to achieve national objectives. In other

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contingencies, such forces may not possess enough firepower or appropriate capabilities to deter or defeat aggression. With this in mind, forces must be tailored into packages to respond to the particular challenge at hand, ensuring that the force has sufficient lethality to achieve its objectives.

Expansibility.

Finally, conventional forces must be able to grow rapidly in response to a massive outbreak of hostilities or a resurgence of Soviet military ambitions. The training base must be designed to absorb large numbers of new recruits and to prepare them for combat on short notice. More important, the United States must continue to train and develop leaders—officers and noncommissioned officers—who are prepared to assume expanded responsibilities at higher levels of command, almost overnight.

Expansibility has particular relevance for the army—a force that in World War II was more than eight million strong will by 1997 have less than seven percent of that number. While no one anticipates a global conflict in the near future, the army's structure must be designed both to accomplish a range of time-urgent missions without mobilization and to grow rapidly, with mobilization, to a size appropriate to any challenge.

The structural key to expansibility—or force generation—lies in the design of forces earmarked for immediate contingencies, early reinforcement, follow-on reinforcement and total mobilization. In the army of tomorrow, a contingency force will be maintained in the United States that consists of active component divisions—armored, air assault, airborne and light infantry—trained and ready to deploy anywhere in the world with no prior warning or additional preparation. Should the requirement extend beyond 60 days, these contingency forces will be supported by units that are designated for early reinforcement. These are the army's "round-out" divisions—units that have two active brigades and one from the National Guard or the Army Reserve.

Follow-on reinforcing units will generate additional forces. These will be National Guard divisions activated, trained and deployed for protracted commitments. For requirements beyond the follow-on reinforcements, the army is examining the utility of "cadre" divisions—units that would have leaders assigned but would be fully manned only under conditions of national emergency. Finally, the army will be prepared to

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develop scores of additional divisions under conditions of full mobilization and general war.

While aggregate force levels will be reduced throughout the decade partly in response to budgetary pressures, this build-down must be carefully managed to ensure that the characteristics essential to national security are not sacrificed. For the army, the result will be a force of 535,000 soldiers in the active force and 550,000 in the reserves. The combat structure will be a 20-division total force, with a mix of armored, mechanized, light, airborne and air assault forces. It will be an army that, while maintaining a significant presence abroad, is principally based in the United States and oriented toward power projection throughout the world. It will be a lean army, heavily dependent on reserves and mobilization in order to execute large, protracted or simultaneous contingencies. And it will be an army of quality soldiers that has invested heavily in training, readiness and technology, prepared to fulfill the expectations of the nation.

VII

Perhaps the most persuasive demonstration of the importance of conventional forces is the American reaction to Iraq's seizure of Kuwait. Without attempting to reconstruct a comprehensive history of the crisis, it is apparent that the versatility, deployability, lethality and expansibility of American conventional forces were the keys to the U.S. response to Saddam Hussein's aggression.

President Bush outlined on August 8, 1990, four basic U.S. objectives in the crisis: unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government; safety for all American citizens; and stability throughout the region. To achieve these objectives the administration crafted a multidimensional military strategy with conventional forces as its foundation.

The president initially faced three challenges in executing this strategy. First, he had to rapidly project a capable defensive force that would deter and, if necessary, defeat an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. Second, he had to rally the international community to support economic and political sanctions against Iraq, and then make the sanctions work. And third, he had to maintain and increase the pressure on Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait.

With an Iraqi army flush from its victory in Kuwait, and

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poised to strike into the eastern province of Saudi Arabia in early August, the immediate requirement was to demonstrate that the United States was serious about its stand and committed to the defense of Saudi Arabia. To accomplish this, the United States dispatched strong naval forces to the region, began to move air power to the peninsula and, most important, deployed the 82nd Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia, with the first units arriving less than 30 hours after the initial alert. The president understood that rhetoric alone was insufficient to show the depth of the American commitment; he had to draw a line in the sand, and he did so with the bayonet of the American paratrooper.

At the same time, the president had to build a credible defensive capability to deny Iraq the ability to seize and hold Saudi territory. Air and naval power and lightly armed airborne forces were insufficient for this purpose. Over the course of the next three months, the United States thus built a substantial armored force, using marine units and army divisions from around the world. With the arrival of the first heavy American tanks in the third week of August, it was increasingly clear that Iraq could not succeed in an attack against Saudi Arabia. As the U.S. force continued to build, Saddam Hussein began to replace his offensively oriented tank divisions in Kuwait with infantry units best suited for defense.

Conventional forces were equally important in assuring the efficacy of the sanctions. Indeed, the principal difference between the porous sanctions that had proved ineffective in past crises and the virtually airtight sanctions against Iraq was the enforcement by coalition naval power and the cooperation of nations sharing land borders with Iraq. Carrier battlegroups and surface ships of many nations took up positions in the region and provided a genuine capability to ensure that the sanctions were not violated. This, in turn, encouraged nations throughout the world to adhere to the mandate of the U.N. Security Council and to support Iraq's economic isolation.

Finally, conventional forces were the instrument of choice once the United States and its coalition partners made the decision to eject an intransigent Iraq from Kuwait. In early November, the president ordered the deployment of an additional army corps of three armored divisions, three more carrier battlegroups, another marine expeditionary force and more land-based air power to the region. When added to the

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Saudi and coalition units already on the peninsula, and to the further commitments of land combat power from the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, Syria and a number of other countries, this force gave the coalition the genuine capability to drive Iraq from Kuwait—a capability employed with great effect beginning January 16. Together, the coalition was able to mount a coordinated air-land-sea campaign to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Desert Storm began with operations designed to neutralize the most dangerous Iraqi offensive and defensive capabilities, to diminish Iraq's ability to sustain its forces occupying Kuwait and to directly attack the combat capabilities of Iraq's land forces. Once these objectives were achieved, the final phase began. The last phase had two basic objectives: to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait and to deny to Saddam Hussein the ability to reinforce the theater or to pose a threat to Kuwait in the future. This second objective required the defeat of the Republican Guard divisions based in southern Iraq—divisions that were indeed Saddam Hussein's strategic center of gravity and the source of his regional power.

The successful conduct of the final phase of Operation Desert Storm was a powerful demonstration of the effectiveness of conventional forces operating jointly to achieve objectives attainable in no other way. The plan envisioned a deliberate attack into Kuwait, to fix Iraqi forces in place, while two U.S. Army corps swept around to the west of Iraqi defenses in an audacious turning movement designed to envelop and destroy the Republican Guard. Air support was a fundamental dimension of this plan, which pitted allied maneuverability against static Iraqi defenses, to terminate the war with as few U.S. and coalition casualties as possible. Seldom in organized warfare has a plan been so flawlessly executed.

On February 23, the day the land offensive began, the allied coalition faced more than 43 Iraqi divisions, thousands of tanks and several hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers in the Kuwaiti theater. This was Saddam Hussein's anchor in Kuwait, which remained fast even after 12 U.N. Security Council resolutions, six months of intense diplomacy, almost airtight economic sanctions and six weeks of continuous precision bombing. But one hundred hours after the coalition opened the land phase, the Iraqi army lay shattered and burning, organized resistance had ceased, and Kuwait was once again an independent nation.

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At the most basic level, the coalition prevented Iraq from executing its style of war. It isolated Iraqi forces from their support base, weakened them by continuous bombardment, successfully disguised the time and place of the thrust of the coalition's attack and defeated the Republican Guard. Although much more remains to be done to translate military success into political stability, the United States and the international coalition clearly won a victory of almost unprecedented dimensions. And, in the final analysis, it was a victory that rested on the capability of U.S. conventional forces.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the international counteroffensive that ultimately defeated that aggression thus underscore the future role of conventional forces. Saddam Hussein persuasively demonstrated that smaller nations in the developing world can indeed affect the international community in a profound way. He showed that such states have the capacity to conduct high-intensity conflict and to attack with little or no warning. Moreover, he demonstrated a troubling feature of international relations today: many regimes still operate from a frame of reference in which the force of arms remains a legitimate—and too often preferred—form of international discourse. If nothing else is learned from Desert Storm, it is that the sun has not set on violence and warfare, and that the conventional forces of this nation remain an indispensable element in the quiver of American power.

VIII

As the United States confronts a truly revolutionary era, the nation must have the courage to see the world as it really is: a world abundant with opportunities, but also one beset by challenges; a world in which conflict remains a way of life for many nations; and a world in which the interests of the United States remain very much at risk. In this world, military strategy must be built on the continued primacy of conventional forces—supported by a sufficient nuclear arsenal—essential to the preservation of peace and to the shaping of a future in which freedom and democracy are allowed to prosper. The nation must shape its forces to meet the challenges of a new era. The American people and the world expect, and deserve, nothing less.

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Bruce Russett
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THE U.N. IN A NEW WORLD ORDER

The new world order envisioned by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev would be founded on the rule of law and on the principle of collective security. That principle necessarily entails the possibility of military enforcement measures by the United Nations. Twice in its history the Security Council has authorized such action. The first instance was in the Korean War in 1950; the second was in the Persian Gulf in 1990. More occasions are likely to follow.

The U.N. Charter gives the Security Council the authority "to maintain or restore international peace and security," and to enforce the will of the council on a state that has broken the peace. Use of military force by the council for these purposes was foreseen by the founders of the United Nations. Indeed it was seen almost half a century ago as an essential element in the world order that the United Nations was intended to establish. Should the need arise, countries would be protected from aggression by forces provided to the Security Council by member states, serving as a U.N. army at the council's will. Military forces, however, have not been available to the council on this basis and improvisation has therefore been required. The action taken by the Security Council in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait amounted to just that—an improvisation to permit enforcement of the council's will without the specific means provided in the charter for that purpose.

Military force has much more frequently been used by the United Nations for the purpose of peacekeeping, something not foreseen in the charter at all. This improvisation was first devised in haste to facilitate an end to the 1956 hostilities in the Middle East. Since that beginning, which amply demonstrated the value of the technique, U.N. use of military and civilian personnel provided by member states for peacekeeping has

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become a well-established practice now supported by all the major powers.

The use of military force by the United Nations for both of these purposes—enforcement and peacekeeping—is surely essential to a world order in which international security is heavily dependent on the Security Council. The experience of the Gulf War and of the more distant past offers important lessons and raises trenchant questions as to how this can most effectively be done in the gulf (as action moves from military victory to the maintenance of peace in the region) and wherever else peace may be endangered.

II

Since the Suez crisis of 1956, the United Nations has developed a notable elasticity in using peacekeeping forces, to the point that it is now difficult to formulate a precise definition—or the limits—of what peacekeeping functions may be. The original role of standing between hostile forces has been expanded to encompass, among other functions, the maintenance of security or stability within a given area (as in southern Lebanon), the monitoring of elections (Namibia, Haiti), the provision of humanitarian assistance (Cyprus) and the disarmament of insurgents (Nicaragua). This flexibility greatly increases the value of peacekeeping forces as an instrument available to the Security Council in dealing with potential or existing conflicts. For example, the permanent members of the Security Council have recently developed a plan to bring peace to Cambodia that would use peacekeeping forces—both military and civilian—for broad purposes of pacification, stabilization and administration.

Three limitations on the use of peacekeeping have been consistently honored: (1) peacekeeping has been interpreted, as originally articulated by U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, as a provisional measure under the U.N. Charter, that is, as a measure undertaken without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned; (2) peacekeeping operations have been undertaken only with the consent of all the parties concerned; (3) peacekeeping forces may use arms only in self-defense. Again in accordance with the original decision by Hammarskjöld, U.S. and Soviet troops have never been included in peacekeeping forces.

In domestic conflicts the consent of all the parties is likely to remain a compelling requirement. It was clearly shown in

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non-U.N. peacekeeping undertakings, in Lebanon in 1983–84 and more recently in Liberia, that without the consent of the parties grave risks are involved and the results can be disastrous. This may not, however, be the case in interstate conflicts. When peacekeeping forces are deployed between hostile forces after a truce or ceasefire has been achieved, an essential purpose is to deter a renewal of hostilities. In this sense deterrence is already an accepted function of peacekeeping. Yet in interstate conflicts a situation could well arise in which peacekeeping forces are needed for deterrence purposes but the consent of one of the parties is not obtainable. This should not, a priori, preclude a Security Council decision to deploy them if the other characteristic limitations are maintained.

The situation in the gulf could present the council with precisely such a need, as a long-term settlement of hostilities is sought. Some sort of convincing deterrent force will be needed to prevent renewed threats against Kuwait and, conceivably, to monitor any demilitarized zones that may be established. For the near term, further military adventures are unlikely. But in the long run, neither Iraqi motives and potential for revenge nor the ambitions of one or more of its neighbors can be ignored. Whatever misgivings some parties may have about the U.S.-led gulf operation, they have excellent reasons to converge on some sort of substantial U.N. presence in the gulf in the future. The emergence of the United Nations as an important institution for promoting international security can moderate any revival of Soviet-American tensions that might stem from disagreements regarding the gulf or other regions.

U.S. and Soviet forces could be usefully included in such an operation to ensure, through its size and composition, maximum credibility. But to be acceptable to the majority of U.N. members such a force must retain an indisputable U.N. identity and must not be dominated by one member state. In other border disputes—of which many exist—a comparable need for deterrence may arise, preferably under circumstances that would permit deployment of peacekeeping forces before hostilities actually occur. Indeed, if at the request of Kuwait a peacekeeping force had been deployed on its border with Iraq in August 1990, the Gulf War might have been avoided.

It is worth emphasizing that nothing in the charter prohibits the Security Council from deploying peacekeeping forces without the consent of all the parties, or from including troop

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contingents from the permanent members of the council in such forces where the need for deterrence arises. (U.S. and Soviet military personnel already serve in U.N. military observer missions.) Such action would still fall under the definition of a provisional measure to be taken by the council "to prevent an aggravation of the situation" before deciding on enforcement action as foreseen in Articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter. The provision of troops by member states for such deterrence operations would remain voluntary, as in other peacekeeping missions, with financing determined on an ad hoc basis by the council, either through assessment of all members or through payment of the cost by the countries requesting the deployment, as could be the case in a situation like the gulf where wealthy states are involved as parties.

The command structure need be no different from other peacekeeping operations: a commander of the U.N. force is appointed by the secretary general after the peacekeeping operation has been authorized by the Security Council for a defined mission. Troop contingents provided by member states serve under their national officers—a battalion commander, for example—who in turn receives orders from the U.N. force commander. The U.N. force commander reports to the secretary general from whom he receives operational guidance. The secretary general reports to the Security Council and obtains its concurrence if any change in the mission of the peacekeeping force is contemplated.

One can question whether it will be logistically feasible for the United Nations to mount, and maintain over a period of time, peacekeeping operations of sufficient size to provide a credible deterrent. It can only be said that where the need for peacekeeping has been evident, as in Namibia, the magnitude of required support has not inhibited action.

A good number of countries might well oppose in principle the idea of deploying peacekeeping forces without the consent of all the parties concerned, fearing that it would open the way to action contrary to their own national interests. Unlike the United States and the other four permanent members of the Security Council, they would not enjoy the protection of the veto. When a similar idea was put forward some years ago, in the course of confidential consultations in the Security Council on how its effectiveness might be enhanced, there was little response. The Gulf War has served, however, to heighten interest in effective deterrence using multilateral means not

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under the domination of one or several U.N. members. There is certainly now a broad recognition that adequate means of deterrence will be essential to a peaceful world order.

III

The second broad purpose for the Security Council's use of military force falls largely under the heading of compellence, or coercion, rather than simply deterrence. In the context of the Security Council such action is best understood as enforcement action. Use of "air, sea or land forces" for enforcement is specifically foreseen in Chapter VII, Articles 39–46 of the U.N. Charter, in which all members undertake to make available to the Security Council "on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."

Since no such special agreements have been concluded, no standing multilateral force has been available to the Security Council. Therefore the Security Council authorized the use of ad hoc forces to restore international peace in Korea and the Persian Gulf. When the North Korean attacks on South Korea were formally brought to the Security Council's attention, the council's resolution of July 7, 1950—adopted in the temporary absence of the Soviet Union—called on member states to assist South Korea in resisting the North Korean aggression. It recommended "that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States." It requested further that the United States designate the commander of such forces. The same resolution authorized use of the U.N. flag.

Thus in the case of Korea the Security Council requested one member state to lead a combined effort on behalf of the United Nations to resist aggression. Notwithstanding his designation as commander of U.N. forces in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur, the commander named by the United States, never reported directly to the Security Council. (Routine, unclassified status reports were provided by the United States.) Neither the Military Staff Committee—a body composed of military representatives of the five permanent members intended to advise the council on military matters—nor the council itself had any role in directing military operations

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of the unified command. The General Assembly did, however, establish a three-nation ceasefire committee that sought a formula to end the war, and the secretary general suggested the procedure of direct talks between the military commanders that was ultimately followed and through which an armistice was achieved.

The advantages offered by this procedure were:

—Expeditious action to resist aggression. Only the United States had troops deployed in South Korea capable of taking quick military action.

—The unambiguous command structure needed for large-scale field operations.

—A practical way to meet the responsibilities of the United Nations under the charter in the absence of a multilateral force under the Security Council for which the necessary agreements with member states had not been reached.

—Validation of the concept of collective security, since states acted jointly in response to Security Council (and subsequently General Assembly) decisions.

The disadvantages of this procedure (which became more evident in the course of time) were:

—The United Nations lacked control or influence over the course of military action or the precise purposes for which it was exercised (e.g., to repel and punish aggression, to reunify the country).

—The military operation became identified with the policy of the nation leading the effort rather than with the United Nations.

—Divisive forces within the United Nations were encouraged by the dominant role of one member state pursuing goals not universally shared.

—Opportunities were afforded the aggressor to identify the struggle with one country, the United States, rather than with the international community as a whole.

All of these disadvantages were intensified in the Korean case by the bitter disagreements that prevailed at the time between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under conditions of harmony among the permanent members of the Security Council, these various disadvantages could have considerably less force.

In the Persian Gulf crisis the Security Council authorized, albeit in oblique language, the use of force for enforcement in another interstate conflict. After imposing a comprehensive

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embargo in order to bring about Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government, the council called upon "those member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council . . . to ensure strict implementation" of the provisions laid down in the resolution relating to economic sanctions. Then, in Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, the Security Council authorized "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait . . . to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area." All states were requested to provide appropriate support for "the actions undertaken."

This action, with specific reference to Chapter VII of the charter, constituted a new approach to implementation of the collective security concept. As in the earlier enforcement action in Korea, when there was no reference to Chapter VII, a basis for the council to mobilize a U.N. force for military enforcement action did not exist. Therefore the council again turned to member states to act in its behalf through such measures as might be necessary. But this time no unified command was established, and the use of the U.N. flag was not authorized.

The gulf action became possible because the permanent members of the Security Council cooperated on a matter of peace and security in the way originally foreseen when the United Nations was founded. Representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have repeatedly suggested that such action is an important element in a new world order; that is, a world in which nations will be secure because of the capacity of the United Nations to guarantee their security through collective measures. This fundamental goal of the United Nations is unquestionably brought closer through the sustained cooperation and a notably increased commonality of interests among the major powers, evident not only in the Gulf War but also in other conflicts such as Cambodia and Angola. Two questions nonetheless warrant careful examination: Is the approach that was taken to enforce the council's decisions with regard to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis necessarily a viable model for implementing collective security in the future? Is there a realistic alternative that would offer greater advantages?

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IV

With regard to the first question, it is clear that the Security Council, in deciding on action to counter the Iraqi aggression, prescribed action for all member states. While it authorized individual states to take "the necessary action," it requested "all states to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken." Thus all states were called on to assist in defending one state, Kuwait, from aggression. Actions to be taken for this purpose would seem clearly to constitute "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression" as foreseen in Article 1 of the charter.

But the procedure adopted is not without its difficulties. The Security Council has no means of controlling when, how or in what degree the collective measures are applied. In the gulf case, the states concerned were only requested "to keep the council regularly informed"; some measures taken might not have had majority support in the Security Council or the General Assembly. The state that is in command may have from the outset an interpretation of U.N. goals different from that of other Security Council members, or its aims may become more expansive in the course of the operation. The latter happened in Korea with the U.S. decision to cross the 38th parallel and try to reunify the country by force. It would have been the case in the gulf had the United States pursued military action beyond the Kuwaiti theater of operations.

If the measures taken cease to have the endorsement of the majority of the Security Council, can they still be considered collective measures taken in the council's behalf? This problem is inherent in a procedure in which action is taken on behalf of the council but without any council control over the nature, timing or extent of the action. The major danger is that the entire undertaking will be identified with the country or countries actually involved in military action rather than with the United Nations. In any case, many U.N. members will not view the military action as an appropriate application of collective security if the action appears to conflict with the Security Council's goals.

The gulf operation and the terms for ending military action against Iraq offer a case in point. None of the 12 Security Council resolutions called for eliminating Iraq's war-making capability or deposing Saddam Hussein. But the former

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clearly became a goal of some coalition members, and the latter was widely suspected. President Bush and the coalition partners felt free to give their own interpretation to the Security Council resolutions. Those members, including the Soviet Union, that interpreted the resolutions more narrowly may be reluctant next time to give such unconstrained authority to member states acting on the council's behalf. In any operation, if the Security Council has asserted no control over the military action authorized, will it be possible for it to assert control over the terms of peace?

Such questions indicate the problems that can arise when a procedure such as that developed for the Gulf War is followed. Moreover the approach adopted in the gulf case is not likely to be viable unless vital interests of one or more major military powers are at risk. For example, the United States might not be interested in deploying substantial forces, even if authorized to do so by the Security Council, to deter or repel an Egyptian attack on Libya.

V

There are alternative procedures that might in the future be followed by the Security Council, ones that would offer the prospect of effective enforcement action without the disadvantages and problems associated with according responsibility to individual member states.

One would be a variant of the procedure followed in Korea. National forces could be brought together in ad hoc fashion under a unified U.N. command, with the commander designated by whichever happened to be the major troop-contributing country. The problems that arose in the Korean case could conceivably be alleviated if the unified commander were required to consult with the Security Council, or with some form of military authority appointed by the council, on the mission of the military operation and the basic strategy to be followed in achieving it. The country supplying the major troop contingent can be expected to resist such a procedure as inhibiting unacceptably the freedom of action of the commander and subjecting its forces to perilous uncertainties. But if favorable relations among the permanent members of the Security Council persist, such a consultative, though not command, procedure might be feasible. It would have the distinct advantage of maintaining a close U.N. identification with all

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action taken and of giving the Security Council some influence, if not control, over any military action.

The other alternative is the procedure defined in Articles 42 and 43 of the U.N. Charter, according to which all members of the United Nations undertake "to make available to the Security Council on its call in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, facilities and assistance." In the Korean War, the "uniting for peace" resolution of 1950 recommended that each member maintain within its armed forces earmarked units so trained that they could promptly be made available for service "as a United Nations unit or units."

The hostile relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were long perceived as the major obstacle to implementing such provisions. If after the Gulf War the two countries remain in accord on using the United Nations, that obstacle may be lifted. The willingness of member states to commit themselves in advance to provide troops and facilities at the request of the Security Council for enforcement purposes has never been tested. It can be argued that such commitment is inherent in U.N. membership, a condition for which is acceptance of the obligations contained in the charter and ability and willingness to carry out those obligations. For such a commitment to be reliable, however, it must be embodied in agreements between the Security Council and those member states prepared to assume the obligations. Such commitments will not be undertaken lightly.

The subject was discussed in detail in 1945 in the U.S. Senate when the U.N. Charter was under consideration. John Foster Dulles, a member of the U.S. delegation to the San Francisco conference at which the charter was signed, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that an agreement with the United Nations on the provision of troops should be regarded as a treaty requiring approval of a two-thirds majority of the Senate. The recorded comments of the senators indicate wide agreement with that interpretation. It was also discussed whether the president would need to obtain the consent of Congress to provide troops, when called upon by the United Nations after completion of an agreement. No consensus emerged on the question, but one senator suggested at the time that the size of the force requested could be decisive. Two or three thousand troops for "police action"

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would not need congressional approval, whereas a battle force would.

Soviet representatives have recently expressed a positive view of a U.N. agreement on the provision of troops for enforcement purposes, but they have emphasized that in no case could the troops be provided without the specific approval of the Soviet parliament.

Once agreements on the provision of troops were completed with a fair portion of member states, the Security Council would have the capacity to call into being a multilateral force (land, sea and air) under a U.N. commander "to maintain or restore international peace and security." In military operations the commander would presumably have full tactical authority but would operate under the guidance of the Security Council or a body established by the council to serve this purpose. Subsequent understandings would be required on command, intelligence, logistics and other more or less centralized functions. The Military Staff Committee could, as foreseen 46 years ago, "advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to military requirements." It could do this without acquiring any command authority, which would be inadvisable since it functions on the basis of consensus.

In some ways a U.N. force of this type would be quite similar to a peacekeeping force, since it would be made up of troops provided by member states and would have a U.N. commander. It would differ markedly, however, in mission, armament, composition and command.

A U.N. force of this nature would not entail the problems and disadvantages that the other identified approaches could present. Identification with the United Nations from initiation to end of any operation would be assured, and control could be clearly in the hands of the Security Council. The likelihood of sustained support among U.N. members for the action undertaken would be strong. Yet in this approach, too, likely problems can be identified.

First of all, it is not clear how many states will be willing to conclude the agreements foreseen in the U.N. Charter—or how long this will take. It can only be said that international circumstances, especially in the wake of the Gulf War, appear more favorable than at any time since 1945. It is also questionable whether a force as large and elaborately equipped as one needed to maintain peace in the gulf, for example, could have been organized quickly on this basis. Any very large operation

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is bound to depend heavily on a major contingent from one or more of the principal military powers; the larger and more sophisticated the contingent provided, the less likely the contributing country will be willing to place it under non-national command.

Organization and deployment of a multilateral force by the Security Council would likely require more time than if action were delegated to one or more member states, especially if a large-scale operation were foreseen. To shorten the lead time, the secretary general might be given authority, not subject to the veto, to send an unarmed observer corps to any international border at any time. According to Article 99 of the U.N. Charter, the secretary general "may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." To do so he needs to be informed. An authorization to send observers without specific consent of the parties raises difficulties, but it would allow the Security Council to be forewarned and to make quick preparations if an enforcement action were required. The very presence of observers can have a deterrent effect, possibly avoiding the need for subsequent enforcement.

Then, too, there is a very basic question as to whether a military action can be successfully carried out under multilateral strategic command, or as successfully as under national command. Administrative aspects of managing the use of force by the Security Council have received little attention. Save for peacekeeping and the peculiar conditions permitting the Korean operation, the prospects of using U.N. forces were nil during the Cold War. Nonetheless important multinational dimensions characterized U.S. military plans during the Korean War, in the U.S. commitment to NATO and notably in the Persian Gulf.

The force of the NATO and Korea precedents must not be exaggerated. In both instances there was virtual consensus on the nature of the military threat, decades-long experience of close cooperation and, in Europe, a high degree of cultural and political homogeneity—far more than likely in most future U.N.-sanctioned operations. If the United States should put its forces under another state's commander, one would have to expect a relatively much smaller contribution of U.S. troops and financing than in the gulf operations. By its treaty commitments and geographic deployment, however, the

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United States stood a great chance of being involved in any military operations in Europe and Korea. Any U.N. enforcement action would have to be authorized by the Security Council and would thus be subject to U.S. veto. This fact should reassure Congress.

One question inherent in any big multilateral action concerns the level at which integration of command of multinational forces would occur. The distinction in U.S. military terminology between command and operational control (OPCON) is useful in this respect. Command applies to such matters as discipline, pay, morale and logistics; most of these (perhaps not logistics) would be carried out at the level of the national military contingents. OPCON is likely to be different. If U.S. troops were involved there would probably have to be, under an overall U.N. commander from some country, a U.S. "component commander" operating with substantial independence. OPCON can be decentralized by confining each member's forces to a specific sector, physically dividing up the ground, as has been done in most U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Some other functions may be even harder to divide than OPCON. Intelligence gathering, for example, will be dominated by states with vast technological capacities for overhead and electronic surveillance. In the gulf operation other coalition members presumably accepted U.S. control of intelligence, but if there were substantial Soviet participation the Soviets would likely not accept it. Secure communications would be required among participating forces in the field, either through sharing encryption (politically very sensitive) or cumbersome procedures for transmission and delivery. It is likely that some states will be unable or unwilling to provide adequate logistical support for their troops, and that those with the motivation and ability to do so will have to provide for others. Some U.N. "headquarters" personnel and facilities will be required for these functions, probably drawing on the experience and capabilities of the secretary general's staff.

The problem of financing such military actions demands careful attention. The history of financing past peacekeeping efforts by voluntary contribution is, to say the least, not encouraging. The gulf operation was heavily dependent on the willingness and ability of the most deeply involved states—the United States, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—to pay most of the immediate costs, and in turn their willingness depended

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upon their ability to control the means and ends of military operations. A future operation that less directly engaged the interests of such states would have to rely on broader support, probably through an assessment of all member governments. Reasonably complete and prompt payment of those assessments would have to be assured.

Such problems may be equally severe for the peacetime maintenance of standing earmarked forces. Unless any additional costs incurred can be covered by the United Nations, Third World states may be unable to participate. Certain central (non-state-specific) services, such as administration, intelligence, command and control, perhaps logistics and transport, must be prepared and institutionalized in advance. Provision in the regular budget of the United Nations might cover such ongoing costs of multilateral readiness, with special assessments made to cover the cost of any enforcement actions undertaken.

VI

The credibility of U.N. action to repel aggression and restore international peace and security, as foreseen in the U.N. Charter, has been profoundly affected by the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Security Council showed itself capable of taking decisive action. Its ability to impose comprehensive sanctions and see them enforced was clearly demonstrated, even though the ultimate effectiveness of the sanctions was not adequately tested. By authorizing the use of military force the council gained compliance with all of its relevant resolutions. The Security Council has shown that it has the capacity to initiate collective measures essential for the maintenance of peace in a new world order.

This development can enhance the United Nations' ability not just to restore the status quo as it existed prior to a breach of the peace, but also to change the parameters of the global order to something more favorable than existed under the prior status quo. In this it may even go beyond the vision of the U.N. founders. Furthermore knowledge that the United Nations has such a capability will also enhance its ability to deter breaches of the peace, and so make actual enforcement or later peacekeeping less necessary. Collective security may suppress incipient acts of aggression as well as defeat or punish those that do emerge.

Nevertheless it should not be assumed that any U.N. role in

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enforcement during the 1990s will be automatic. It will require a deliberate political judgment that can only be made by members of the Security Council acting collectively, and will depend on some continuing commonality of interests among the five permanent members of the council—the United States and the Soviet Union in particular. The effectiveness of the United Nations in dealing with international security problems, whether by enforcement measures, peacekeeping or mediation, will always be sensitive to the nature of relations between these two superpowers. A United Nations whose credibility in dealing with aggression and threats to peace has been restored, however, can serve to moderate any revival of tension between them by lessening the need for, or likelihood of, unilateral intervention in regional crises.

The manner in which the gulf military action was executed by the United States and its coalition partners will likely limit the willingness of council members to follow a similar procedure in the future—a procedure that leaves council members little control over the course of military operations and over the conclusion of hostilities. Neither the United States nor any other country will be ready to act under all circumstances to preserve or restore peace. Nor will other states always be ready to endorse unilateral actions. Some states may not wish to contribute to an operation, and the council may not always wish to depend disproportionately on a particular state's contribution.

Some U.N. capacity to carry out these functions on a permanent basis will therefore be desirable. For this reason, as well as others previously mentioned, the Security Council should be able to mobilize a force to serve under U.N. command for enforcement purposes. That capacity may be virtually indispensable in an emergent world order. The chance to achieve it should not be missed.

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Michael J. Glennon

THE GULF WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION

During the January 1991 debate on whether to go to war in the Persian Gulf, many members of Congress were delighted at the legislature's response. "The Constitution, the American people and the cause of freedom have been served well," House minority leader Robert Michel (R-Ill.) said. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) commented, "We have demonstrated to the world the meaning of democracy." Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) rose to "commend President Bush for recognizing Congress' constitutional role." And House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell (D-Fla.) exclaimed: "He [the president] acknowledged the principle! . . . This is very important. By specific language, Congress authorized the war!" After four months of controversy about the allocation of the power to make war, it seemed easy to conclude, as did Representative Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), that "the United States Constitution had prevailed."

Easy, but wrong.

Starting from President Bush's unilateral commitment to defend Saudi Arabia and proceeding to Congress' jury-rigged approval, the episode represented a textbook example of how an audacious executive, acquiescent legislature and deferential judiciary have pushed the Constitution's system of separation of powers steadily backwards toward the monopolistic system of King George III. When President Bush finally requested legislative approval in a letter to Congress January 8, 1991, he never acknowledged that statutory authorization was constitutionally required. In fact, the president said that he still believed he had the authority to act without legislative authorization. "I don't think I need it," he said the next day, and White House aides hinted that the administration had the right to defy any restrictions that Congress might impose.

In addition to raising disturbing constitutional questions,

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these events highlight anew the fecklessness of the War Powers Resolution and the urgent need for that 1973 law to be repealed or revised.

II

The War Powers Resolution provides that authority to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities, actual or imminent, can be inferred only from a provision of law specifically authorizing such an action, a provision which must explicitly refer to the War Powers Resolution. With this latter requirement Congress served warning to both the executive and the courts that the argument used during the Vietnam War would no longer work: congressional approval could not be inferred from anything other than explicit authorization.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee explained in its report on the resolution that the provision was intended "to counteract the opinion . . . that passage of defense appropriation bills, and the extension of the Selective Service Act, could be construed as implied congressional authorization of the Vietnam War."

The congressional debate on explicit authorization for the Gulf War was effectively over long before it began. It should have begun on August 7, 1990, the day after Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced the U.S. commitment to defend Saudi Arabia in the event of an attack by Iraq, which had overrun Kuwait four days earlier. John Kelly, assistant secretary of state for near eastern and south Asian affairs, had previously reminded a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that the United States had no mutual security treaty with Kuwait, and the same applied to other gulf states.

The commitment was thus made as a sole executive agreement—an agreement more sweeping in its terms than any of the seven mutual security treaties to which the United States is party, for none of those contains an ironclad commitment to go to war. The administration could have easily, and probably successfully, sought congressional approval for sending troops to the gulf. Congress was in session and was willing and able to act quickly. In fact, each house adopted measures condemning the August 2 invasion on the very day it occurred.

The train was set in motion, therefore, by a promise of dubious constitutionality. Alexander Hamilton spoke for many of the Founding Fathers when he described the requirement of Senate advice and consent to a treaty as one of the

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"best digested and unexceptional parts of the plan," since it was "unsafe and improper to entrust that power to an elective magistrate of four years' duration." "The history of human conduct," Hamilton believed, "does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world to the sole disposal of a magistrate, created and circumstanced, as would be a president of the United States." Time-honored custom reinforced the proposition that a mutual security commitment could be made only with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate—a requirement that cannot be dispensed with by calling a treaty something other than a treaty.

But nary a word was heard from Congress. It mattered naught that the United States was now committed to defend a feudal monarchy where women could not drive cars, adulterers were stoned and American chaplains would be forced to cover their religious insignia and conduct services clandestinely. Instead, members had nothing but praise for the president's bold response. When on August 5 President Bush announced—again with no congressional consultation, let alone approval—that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait "will not stand," members of Congress applauded. Few then cared how this invasion would be undone, or when and even whether Congress might be asked to approve its undoing. David Boren (D-Okla.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was asked on September 12 whether the president should have at least consulted Congress before sending troops to the gulf. "No, I think the president should be supported on that point," he said. "It is extremely important that we project absolute unity." Only on November 8, when the president claimed the need for an "adequate offensive military option" and decided to double to nearly half a million the number of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, did congressional voices ask from what source the chief executive drew this extraordinary authority to place the nation at war without legislative approval.

The Bush administration, like its predecessor, had on other issues curiously purported to find constitutional insight in "the intent of the framers." Yet once the intent was inconveniently unsupportive, that interest vanished. And there can be no doubt that it was unsupportive. All know that the word "make" in the Constitution was changed to "declare" to permit the president to respond to sudden attacks on the United States

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without the need for congressional approval. But the question regarding Kuwait was not whether the president had the power to protect American civilians or soldiers from attack: the question was whether the president alone could act to place the nation at war.

On this the framers' intent was clear and abundant. Edmund Wilson wrote in 1791 that "as the law is now received in England, the king has the sole prerogative of making war. On this very interesting power, the Constitution of the United States renews the principles of government, known in England before the conquest." At the Philadelphia convention Oliver Ellsworth said that it should be easier to get out of war than into it. George Mason agreed; he was for clogging rather than facilitating war, and for facilitating peace. He was against giving the power of war to the executive because the executive could not be safely trusted with it. Writing in 1793, James Madison, the principal architect of the Constitution, addressed the scope of the executive's power to make war:

> Every just view that can be taken of this subject admonishes the public of the necessity of a rigid adherence to the simple, the received and the fundamental doctrine of the Constitution, that the power to declare war is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature; that the executive has no right, in any case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war; that the right of convening and informing Congress, whenever such a question seems to call for a decision, is all the right which the Constitution has deemed requisite or proper . . . [1]

Madison wrote Jefferson that "the Constitution supposes what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war in the legislature." Madison elsewhere wrote, "Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things be the proper or safe judges whether a war ought to be commenced, continued or concluded." And Jefferson, in an oft-quoted letter to Madison in 1789, wrote: "We have already given in example one effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the executive to the legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."

[1] *The Writings of James Madison*, vol. 6, ed. G. Hunt, 1906, p. 174.

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In *The Federalist*, no. 69, Hamilton explained the commander-in-chief clause:

> The president is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as the first general and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.[2]

Hamilton summarized the meaning of the power to declare war: it meant "when the nation is at peace, to change that state into a state of war; whether from calculations of policy or from provocations or injuries received: in other words, it belongs to Congress only, to go to war."

These observations of the framers are familiar. That their judgment retains wisdom for contemporary policymakers is suggested by the functional attributes of the two branches. One obvious advantage that Congress brings to the decision to go to war is diversity of opinion. Lincoln knew the value of diverse opinion and legislative deliberation. He said:

> In a certain sense, and to a certain extent, [the president] is the representative of the people. He is elected by them, as well as Congress is. But can he, in the nature [of] things, know the wants of the people, as well as three hundred other men, coming from all the various localities of the nation? If so, where is the propriety of having a Congress?[3]

The safety and well-being of the U.S. forces engaged in combat are enhanced if adversaries as well as allies understand that the American public is resolutely behind them. It has been said often but is worth repeating: if a war—or any other foreign policy—cannot be sold to Congress, it cannot be sold to the American people. The national interest is ill served when a president embarks on a military initiative that lacks public support and, for political reasons, must be curtailed.

Congressional participation in a decision to use offensive force against Iraq would of course not preclude error. Congress is not immune to war-making blunders, nor is it neces-

[2] *The Federalist*, no. 69, ed. J. Cooke, 1961, p. 465.
[3] R. Basler, *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 1, 1953, remarks in U.S. House of Representatives, p. 504.

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sarily more disinclined to use force; indeed, Capitol Hill is not territory foreign to hawkish hysteria. Yet history has provided little reason for heavier reliance on presidential judgment in war-powers matters. Lincoln said:

> The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress, was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.[4]

Counterposed against these considerations are the advantages of sole presidential control over the decision to go to war. Few would contest the proposition that the presidency is institutionally better suited than Congress to respond to emergencies. But no emergency confronted the nation when President Bush announced the November buildup in Saudi Arabia. Whatever exigency may have attended the initial deployment of forces to that region had ended.

The administration's legal rationale for claiming sole executive power to make war was never spelled out. Its pleadings filed in *Dellums v. Bush* (1990) did not reach the merits, and argued merely that the court should not hear the case.[5] The administration offered Congress no legal analysis, and no congressional committee demanded any. The fullest justification consisted of remarks by Secretary of State James Baker and Defense Secretary Cheney, the gist of which was that past presidents had used armed force more than 200 times, and that war had been declared only five times.[6]

In principle, custom surely does affect the Constitution's meaning and allocation of power. The president's power to recognize foreign governments, for example, like the Senate's power to condition its consent to treaties, derives largely from unquestioned practice tracing to the earliest days of the republic. But not all practice is of constitutional moment. A practice of constitutional dimension is regarded by *both* political branches as a juridical norm; the incidents comprising the practice are accepted, or at least acquiesced in, by the other

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] The author was on the brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union as *amicus curiae* in *Dellums*.

[6] The list appears in Congressional Record S130-S135, vol. 137, daily ed., Jan. 10, 1991.

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branch. In many of the precedents Baker and Cheney cited, Congress objected. Furthermore, the precedents must be on point. Here, they clearly were not: nearly all involved fights with pirates, clashes with cattle rustlers, trivial naval engagements and other minor uses of force not directed at significant adversaries, or risking substantial casualties or large-scale hostilities over a prolonged duration.

In a number of the "precedents," in fact, Congress actually approved of the executive's action. Constitutionally, Congress need not adopt a declaration of war to authorize the use of armed force; a simple statute will do. The Vietnam War, for example, was validly approved by Congress in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and after it was repealed, in legislation authorizing and appropriating funds for the war and extending the draft. This latter "inferential authorization," however, is now foreclosed by the War Powers Resolution. Congress also validly approved in 1983 the use of armed force for 18 months in Lebanon without declaring war.

One "precedent," the Korean War, represents not a custom but an anomaly. At the outset of the war in 1950 the U.N. Security Council "recommended" in Resolution 83 that member states furnish assistance to South Korea. The Truman administration construed the measure as a treaty obligation incurred under the Constitution and requiring "faithful execution" by the president. But the argument was without merit; the U.N. Charter requires the negotiation of special agreements by the Security Council prior to requisitioning forces from member states.[7] Even if the argument were correct, Secretary Baker knocked out its scaffolding on December 6, 1990, when he testified that Security Council Resolution 678, permitting the use of force against Iraq, did not oblige the United States to use force but merely authorized it. After that acknowledgment, Resolution 678 could not be called into service to substitute for explicit congressional approval.

The administration's willingness to cast off this potential rationale was significant because, prior to its approval on January 12, 1991, Congress had done nothing to authorize the use of force against Iraq. Two separate measures passed by the House and Senate in August 1990 were never enacted. Senate Concurrent Resolution 147 required House approval before

[7] For an elaboration see Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter," *American Journal of International Law*, January 1991, p. 74.

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taking effect, and House Joint Resolution 658 required not only Senate approval but presidential signature. Because no conference committee ever met to iron out their differences, neither body's measure was approved by the other or signed by the president. One need not therefore examine the actual wording of the two measures—both of which, as it turns out, do not even address the use of offensive force.

Some, such as Vice President Quayle, tried to squeeze approval out of legislative inaction, but that is not how the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress must express its will. In *INS v. Chadha* (1983) the Court held that Congress can alter the president's legal powers only by strictly adhering to the "presentment" procedure set out in the Constitution—i.e., by formally presenting a measure to the president for his signature or veto. Congress cannot legislate by saying nothing. Even if Congress had enacted into law the measures on which the vice president later relied, these measures could not constitute approval for waging war. There was no explicit reference to the War Powers Resolution, as that resolution required.

Congress can of course repeal or amend the War Powers Resolution. But if Congress had wished to approve the use of armed force against Iraq, so long as the resolution was in effect, Congress had to meet the two conditions spelled out: authorization must be explicit and it must refer to the War Powers Resolution. The authorization finally enacted by Congress on January 12, 1991, met both requirements.

One final argument concerning war powers was that the only role for Congress came after the fact—in cutting off funds if the president commenced a war that Congress did not support. Two problems inhered in this theory, both fatal. First, it read the declaration-of-war clause out of the Constitution as a separate and independent check on presidential power. The framers intended to give Congress control over waging war both before *and* after the decision to declare (or approve) war was made. Giving Congress a role only after the fact, however, would make its power to declare war nothing but a mere congressional trumpet to herald a decision made elsewhere. Whatever else the framers may have done to enhance the president's power, surely they did not play the neat trick of giving Congress a war power that is really no power at all.

Second, the theory flies in the face of the framers' manifest intention to make it more difficult to get *into* war than *out* of it.

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This approach would do the opposite. For if all Congress can do is to wait for the president to begin a war that it does not wish the nation to fight, and then cut off funds, war can be instituted routinely with no congressional approval—and seldom if ever ended quickly. The practical method of cutting off funds is to attach a rider to the Department of Defense authorization or appropriation legislation. This means, necessarily, passing the legislation by a two-thirds vote so as to overcome the inevitable presidential veto. The alternative is for Congress to withhold funding altogether—and be blamed by the president for closing down not merely the Pentagon but perhaps the entire federal government. The short of it is, therefore, that to view the congressional appropriations power as the only constitutional check on presidential war power is, for all practical purposes, to eliminate the declaration-of-war clause as a constitutional restraint on the president. Proponents of this perspective may believe that Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt could have fought World War I and World War II without prior congressional approval, but this curious interpretation would have been received with astonishment in Philadelphia in 1787.

III

The constitutional conclusion thus seemed clear: the president lacked power to place the United States at war against Iraq without congressional approval. Acting on this belief—after the president's November 8 announcement—56 members of Congress brought an action in *Dellums v. Bush* to restrain the president from war without prior congressional consent. They did not ask the court to rule that the president acted unlawfully, or for it to engage in fact-finding in an area of ongoing hostilities, or to stop a war, or to disrupt any policy or program currently in a state of execution. They argued only that the president's claim of an "offensive option," coupled with a pattern of presidential acts that raised a substantial possibility that the option would be executed, created a case or controversy justifying judicial intervention. Accordingly, they asked that the court issue an injunction ordering the president not to use offensive force against Iraq without prior congressional consent.

In the previous war powers case, *Lowry v. Reagan* (1987), a federal district court had dismissed a challenge by 110 members of Congress to President Reagan's alleged violation of the

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War Powers Resolution stemming from the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf.[8] The court found that judicial decision of the dispute would have risked "the potentiality of embarrassment [that would result] from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." The executive branch thus argued in *Dellums* that judicial intervention would undercut the need that the United States speak with one voice, and "lead Iraq to believe that it can ignore the president's statements of policy [and] confuse the international community."

At one level these concerns were well founded. Yet if embarrassment and confusion were indeed to be created by the granting of this relief, one was impelled to ask whether it was not the president who had brought it on himself, by announcing to the world that he had an "offensive option" that the U.S. Constitution did not give him. There is no requirement in the Constitution that the courts remain silent when a government official claims power that he does not have—even if that proves embarrassing. Avoiding embarrassment is often a principal incentive for complying with the law, and the courts cannot forsake the Constitution because some governments constituted differently than our own do not comprehend it.

As is true with the Constitution's commitment to Congress of the decision to go to war, strong policy reasons undergird the Constitution's commitment to the courts of issues relating to the constitutional allocation of powers. One reason is judicial legitimacy. It has been argued occasionally that the courts' legitimacy is undermined by "venturing into the political thicket" in cases such as this, but it must be remembered that *not* preventing the performance of a manifestly unconstitutional act can also undermine judicial legitimacy. It was not self-evident that public respect for the courts would have been enhanced had they sat idly by in the face of a congressionally unauthorized invasion of Iraq in which thousands of American casualties were incurred—under the din of a wrenching public debate concerning the war's constitutionality.

The argument also occasionally is heard that Congress has enough tools in its legislative box to protect its constitutional prerogatives. Congress, it is contended, could deny funds,

[8] The author served as co-counsel to the congressional plaintiffs in *Lowry*.

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refuse appointments, commence impeachment. But the argument ignores practical problems that frequently render those tools unwieldy. Moreover, if the argument for judicial abdication in cases such as *Dellums* were correct, there would be virtually no case law on foreign affairs disputes (and contrary to conventional belief, there is plenty). As the Supreme Court put it only last year, "the fact that one institution of government has mechanisms available to guard against incursions into its power by other governmental institutions does not require that the judiciary remove itself from the controversy by labeling the issue a political question."

The supposed institutional advantages of judicial restraint in cases such as *Dellums* are slight, whereas the drawbacks are significant. The argument against judicial resolution of the issues presented in *Dellums* was in reality a plea for executive hegemony, for the executive almost always wins if the courts sit on the sidelines. The reason is manifest: the executive can introduce troops swiftly, confronting Congress with a fait accompli. When the courts decline to intervene when a fundamental threat to the separation of powers is posed by the executive, then the executive, not the judiciary, becomes the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution.

Finally, officials in both the executive and legislative branches are entitled to knowledge of the fundamental constitutional rules by which they must live. Judicial deference to the branch that happens to act first denies them this knowledge. In *Baker v. Carr* (1962), the Supreme Court said: "The political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of governmental order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder." For the court to decline to decide a case like *Dellums* undermines the law's predictability and indeed promotes disorder.

In *Dellums*, the court thus wisely declined to dismiss the case as a political question. In important dicta, the *Dellums* court said that the case did not present a political question and suggested that, on its merits, the plaintiffs' claim was well founded:

> If the executive had the sole power to determine that any particular offensive military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute war-making but only an offensive military attack, the congressional power to declare war will be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the executive. Such an "interpretation" would evade the plain language of the Constitu-

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tion, and it cannot stand. . . . Here, the forces involved are of such magnitude and significance as to present no serious claim that a war would not ensue if they became engaged in combat, and it is therefore clear that congressional approval is required if Congress desires to become involved.

The phrase "if Congress desires to become involved" was significant. Grounded on this prerequisite, the court declined to issue the relief sought, holding that the case was not yet ripe for review. "It is only if a majority of the Congress seeks relief from an infringement on its constitutional war-declaration power," the court held, "that it may be entitled to receive it." In support of its decision the court relied on the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in *Goldwater v. Carter* (1979). "If Congress chooses not to confront the president," Powell wrote, "it is not our task to do so." He thus found not ripe for review the challenge by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) to President Carter's termination of the U.S.-Republic of China mutual security treaty because, Powell said, the dispute was between the president and a handful of senators—not the Congress.

The difficulty with the Powell approach is that it precludes the courts from invalidating an unconstitutional presidential act unless Congress first enacts a statute reiterating an existing constitutional requirement. Earlier case law, not surprisingly, revealed a willingness on the part of the courts to overturn invalid executive acts irrespective of congressional silence. In *Brown v. United States* (1814), Chief Justice Marshall found that the president lacked authority to seize enemy property located in the United States during the War of 1812 without prior statutory approval. Congress said nothing with respect to the seizures in question, but the president's act—carried out under an alleged commander-in-chief power—was not permitted to stand. Similarly, in *Yoshida International, Inc. v. United States* (1974), President Nixon's executive order imposing a ten percent surcharge on imports was held invalid on the ground that the imposition of duties represented a tax and a regulation of foreign commerce. Only statutory authorization, the district court held, could support such an act.

This approach makes sense. If the president, acting alone, promulgated a new tax code and directed executive branch officials to commence its implementation, would that not represent a plain constitutional violation that the courts have full power to overturn? There is no reason to think that under such circumstances—or the facts of *Dellums*, where the president

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claimed power to commence war against Iraq—the courts are powerless to act unless effectively permitted to do so by Congress. The judiciary is not a tail to be wagged by a congressional dog. It is an independent branch of the government, charged with the high duty of upholding the Constitution. Citizens of the United States are entitled to expect it to act accordingly.

IV

Judicial action is particularly necessary where structural incentives pull Congress toward inaction—where ambition, to paraphrase Hamilton, cannot be counted upon to counteract ambition. Members of Congress have much to gain politically, and little to lose, by avoiding controversial issues. No vote is more career-threatening than a vote for or against war. The most advantageous political posture was thus for members to position themselves to criticize the president if the gulf policy failed and to join in the praise if it succeeded. As Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Oreg.) put it, Congress was "cheering with one hand and sitting on the other." If this seemed cynical, it was. Yet it was no less cynical than the suggestion that Congress had any real choice to approve or disapprove war after more than 400,000 troops were already placed in the Saudi desert. Most members saw that the buildup conflicted with the policy of pursuing U.N.-mandated sanctions. "All of us know the calendar, the religious holidays and weather conditions that constrain us," said Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.) in casting her vote for war. The alternative of substantially downsizing American forces while sanctions were tested was not seen by most in Congress as a plausible option. Withdrawal, Henry Kissinger wrote, "would lead to a collapse of American credibility, not only in that area but in most parts of the world." That left one alternative: war. *The New York Times* on January 12, 1991, related a meeting between Senator J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.) and President Bush:

> "I told him I continued to favor sanctions and asked if there was any way to withdraw any of the troops." He said Mr. Bush told him there was not. "If you cannot withdraw the troops, you have made the decision to go to war," the senator said.

Many members of Congress agreed and felt compelled to vote for a war they would not otherwise have supported because the alternative seemed worse. Thus Senator Bob Dole

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(R-Kan.), who said on December 30, 1990, that returning the emir of Kuwait to power "wasn't worth one American life," two weeks later led the effort to approve a war aimed at precisely that objective. Senator Charles S. Robb (D-Va.), a key administration supporter, said it would be a "fundamental mistake to give even the appearance of withdrawing our trust and support." In reality, therefore, the commitment to war—barring Iraqi capitulation—was made on November 8, 1990, when President Bush announced the offensive troop buildup. Representative Michel thus asked his colleagues after the debate finally began, "How can we turn our backs?"

On January 12, 1991, Congress approved war. But the vexing issue remained: Had the president effectively placed the nation on a virtually inevitable course toward war? And if so, what ought Congress do to avoid being confronted with a fait accompli?

The Democratic leadership of the House and Senate should have called Congress back into session immediately after the president's November 8 announcement, as senators ranging from Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) to Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) then urged. The leadership had been given the special authority to do so under the unusual terms of the adjournment resolution. The principal argument for not acting was that there was a lame-duck Congress, and that the decision should be made by the newly elected members. But this reasoning was unpersuasive, since under the Constitution this Congress still formally held office, and in January there would be no significant turnover. Congress, after all, had given its leadership this special call-back power for precisely this sort of exigent circumstance.

Yet even in November Congress could have confronted a fait accompli. The president had already committed the nation, declaring as he did that the invasion of Kuwait would "not stand" and that the United States would defend Saudi Arabia. Would not the same question have been asked even then: "How can we turn our backs?"

V

Long-term structural protection for the congressional prerogative to declare war thus requires legislative involvement at that stage in the process when actual commitment occurs. Commitment, the Gulf War suggests, can occur in two ways: words and deeds—or, in constitutional terms, executive agreement or military deployment.

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In the 1970s, when the reassertion of congressional power over foreign affairs reached its zenith, Congress seemed on the verge of enacting legislation to restrict the use of executive agreements. The House Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on a bill that would have subjected certain executive agreements to the possibility of a legislative veto—again, a device invalidated in 1983 by the Supreme Court in *Chadha*. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a measure that would have employed internal parliamentary procedures to block the funding of executive agreements that the Senate believed should be submitted as treaties. But the only measure adopted was the Case Act, which merely required that international agreements be reported to Congress. If Congress is serious about playing a role in the making of military commitments such as those to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the first step is to pick up where it left off and enact framework legislation guaranteeing its explicit participation.

Legislative control over military deployment is constitutionally more problematic. In the early 1970s Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) pushed legislation that would have required the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. The executive resisted on the ground that mere deployment was a sole prerogative of the commander in chief. Congress could arguably preclude the dispatch of troops to a designated area by prohibiting any use of funds for that purpose, rather than relying on its share of the war power, but the law remains unsettled.

This dilemma underscores the most urgent need confronting Congress with the war's end: reform of the War Powers Resolution. The 1973 law is regularly and erroneously said to have been "challenged constitutionally by every president." (Ford and Carter did not challenge it.) In fact, except for its legislative veto, which after *Chadha* has been widely seen as invalid, the War Powers Resolution is probably constitutionally sound. Congress has never lost a war powers dispute with the president that was adjudicated on its merits by the Supreme Court, and the object and purpose of the Constitution's assignment of the war powers provide forceful reasons for upholding the legislative will. The resolution's faults are not in its constitutionality; they are in its structure.

The law's near-complete irrelevance to the events leading up to the war in the gulf speaks volumes about those defects. The sad truth is that these were known to Congress years beforehand, and Congress did nothing. The Senate Foreign Rela-

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tions Committee held hearings in 1977 on legislation to correct those defects, but no legislation was ever reported because the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee let it be known that he opposed any amendment. The same Senate committee established a special subcommittee in 1988 to review the resolution's failings during the Kuwaiti tanker reflagging operations. The subcommittee held illuminating hearings, but like the House Foreign Affairs Committee after its own hearings, issued no report and made no recommendations. Congress has repeatedly dropped the ball on war powers reform.

A responsible Congress would begin by reviewing the resolution's operation to determine why it has proven unworkable. It need not search far for answers. During the 1988 Kuwaiti reflagging operations the resolution was discovered to be judicially unenforceable. In *Lowry v. Reagan* congressional plaintiffs challenged the president's refusal to submit a required report, and a federal district court dismissed the suit. The court found, as did the *Dellums* court, that Congress had created no impasse and, unlike the *Dellums* court, that the case represented a political question. (This failure in *Lowry* to secure judicial enforcement helped to persuade the *Dellums* plaintiffs to avoid it altogether and to bring their action directly under the Constitution.) Absent judicial enforcement, Congress must recurrently consider whether to "invoke" the War Powers Resolution when it believes that the president has failed to submit a required report. But requiring Congress to enact a law to trigger the resolution effectively eviscerates that whole purpose of the resolution. It places Congress in the position of having to muster a two-thirds vote to enact the resolution's 60-day time period over the president's veto, something Congress can do in any event, with or without a War Powers Resolution.

VI

It is time, therefore, that the War Powers Resolution either be revised or repealed. If the law is to be retained, it must be made judicially enforceable. A first step in rewriting the law is to include provisions aimed at facilitating judicial review by precluding the courts from ducking out as they did in *Lowry* and *Dellums*. The resolution can be amended to state explicitly that presidential noncompliance creates an impasse within the meaning of the ripeness doctrine, and that the political ques-

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tion doctrine, to the extent that its application is not mandated by the Constitution, may not be used as a grounds for dismissal.

A second step is to refine the reporting requirement. President Bush reported to congressional leaders on August 9, 1990, under the War Powers Resolution. Because he asserted that he did not "believe that involvement in hostilities is imminent," the 60-day time period was not triggered. Neither "hostilities" nor "imminent" is defined by the resolution, so it was hard to quarrel with that assessment. If that judgment now appears to have been correct, it might nonetheless be noted that there was, at that time, a not unfounded belief that Saudi Arabia was about to be attacked; that the president did tell the Iraqi people on September 16 that the two nations were "on the brink of war"; and that the administration did certify on September 20 that U.S. troops deployed in Saudi Arabia were eligible for "imminent danger" pay. A properly drafted War Powers Resolution would have caused the 60-day time period to have been clearly triggered on one of those dates, or at least on November 8, when President Bush announced his intent to move to an offensive option. Such a resolution would be a major step toward ensuring congressional participation at a meaningful stage in the commitment process.

A variety of further amendments to the resolution would enhance the prospects for genuine collaborative decision-making between the branches. The original Senate-passed version of the War Powers Resolution contained provisions that would have prohibited uses of force not specifically approved by the resolution or Congress. That provision, dropped in the conference committee, should be modified in light of subsequent experience (e.g., the legitimate need to use limited force to protect U.S. citizens in danger abroad) and incorporated in the resolution. It should be backed by prohibitions on funding, a most forceful tool since Congress' power over the purse is plenary rather than shared.

Finally, the emergence of the collective security machinery of the U.N. Security Council suggests that the council might yet become, to use Churchill's words, the "constabulary power before which barbaric and atavistic forces will stand in awe." That role presupposes the presence of U.N. forces under the direction of the council's military staff committee. Such forces would be made available by member states pursuant to special agreements with the council. In the United States, the U.N. Charter's implementing legislation—the U.N. Participation

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Act—requires that Congress approve any such agreement. None has yet been negotiated with any member state. The time may soon be ripe to commence that process, and an appropriate place to set forth that approval, including the conditions and restrictions under which the United States could provide standing forces to the council, would be a revised War Powers Resolution.

Ironically, therefore, an operational War Powers Resolution could play a key role in the legislative framework of any "new world order based upon the rule of law." It scarcely befits any legal regime that a centerpiece of that system—such as the resolution—should be reduced to an academic curiosity. This is doubly so with the Constitution: the rule of law is not upheld if it is honored only internationally. Respect for the rule of law implies adherence to both international and domestic legal precepts, whether they promote or obstruct favored policies. Compliance precedents are in the universal long-term interest of actors within each legal system, and noncompliance in either system ultimately undercuts an actor's standing to object to the noncompliance of others. The concept of the rule of law is incoherent if it can be honored in one system but forgotten in the other.

VII

It is no doubt true, as Lord Bryce reminded us, that "the student of institutions as well as the lawyer is apt to overrate the effect of mechanical contrivances in politics." Most "mechanical contrivances" such as the War Powers Resolution are no stronger than the political will to enforce them, or the public outrage when they are violated. One troubling lesson of the war in the Persian Gulf may be that the political will and public outrage needed to make the War Powers Resolution work is too ephemeral to promote consistent compliance. Procedural safeguards such as the resolution, like the Constitution's balanced war powers, represent structural protections that in the long term are critical to preserving liberty. And liberty, as Judge Learned Hand said, "lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it."

More and more nations are looking to the U.S. Constitution as a model for their new domestic orders. Before they look too closely, architects of the "new world order" might consider devoting some attention to shoring up the United States' own legal order.

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John Lewis Gaddis

TOWARD THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

For the first time in over half a century, no single great power, or coalition of powers, poses a "clear and present danger" to the national security of the United States. The end of the Cold War has left Americans in the fortunate position of being without an obvious major adversary. Given the costs of confronting adversaries who have been all too obvious since the beginning of World War II, that is a condition worthy of greater appreciation than it has so far received.

It would be foolish to claim, though, that the United States after 1991 can return to the role it played in world affairs before 1941. For as the history of the 1930s suggests, the absence of imminent threat is no guarantee that threats do not exist. Nor will the isolationism of that era be possible in the 1990s. Advances in military technology and the progress of economic integration have long since removed the insulation from the rest of the world that geographical distance used to provide. The passing of the Cold War world by no means implies an end to American involvement in whatever world is to follow; it only means that the nature and the extent of that involvement are not yet clear.

Finding one's way through unfamiliar terrain generally requires a map of some sort. Cartography, like cognition itself, is a necessary simplification that allows us to see where we are, and where we may be going. The assertion that the world was divided between the forces of democracy and those of totalitarianism—to use the precise distinction made in President Harry S. Truman's announcement of the Truman Doctrine—was of course a vast simplification of what was actually happening in 1947. But it was probably a necessary one: it was an exercise in geopolitical cartography that depicted the international landscape in terms everyone could

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understand, and so doing prepared the way for the more sophisticated strategy of containment that was soon to follow.

The end of the Cold War was too sweeping a defeat for totalitarianism—and too sweeping a victory for democracy—for this old geopolitical map to be of use any longer. But another form of competition has been emerging that could be just as stark and just as pervasive as was the rivalry between democracy and totalitarianism at the height of the Cold War: it is the contest between forces of integration and fragmentation in the contemporary international environment. The search for a new geopolitical cartography might well begin here.

II

I use the term "integration" in its most general sense, which is the act of bringing things together to constitute something that is whole. It involves breaking down barriers that have historically separated nations and peoples in such diverse areas as politics, economics, religion, technology and culture. It means, quite literally, the approach to what we might call—echoing some of the most visionary language of World War II—one world.

Integration is happening in a variety of ways. Consider, first, the communications revolution, which has made it impossible for any nation to deny its citizens knowledge of what is going on elsewhere. This is a new condition in international politics, the importance of which became clear as revolution swept through eastern Europe in the fall of 1989. A new kind of domino theory has emerged, in which the achievement of liberty in one country causes repressive regimes to topple, or at least to wobble, in others. Integration through communications has largely brought this about.

Consider, next, economics. These days, no nation—not even the Soviet Union, or China, or South Africa or Iraq—can maintain itself apart from the rest of the world for very long. That is because individual nations depend, for their own prosperity, upon the prosperity of others to a far greater extent than in the past. Integration also means that transnational actors like multinational corporations and economic cartels can have a powerful influence on what happens to national states. And in Europe, integration has led to the creation of a potential new superpower in the form of the European Community (EC). Europe as a whole, not just Brit-

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ain, France or Germany, is already a major player in the world economy, and it may soon become one in world politics as well.

Consider, as a third manifestation of integration, security. It used to be the case that nations relied exclusively upon their own strength to ensure their safety, and that is still primarily the case. But Woodrow Wilson began the movement toward collective security after World War I with his proposal for a League of Nations, and although that organization proved ineffective, it did give rise to a United Nations that in recent years has become a major force in international diplomacy. It is significant that the United States waited to gain U.N. approval before using force in the Persian Gulf. Washington has not always been so solicitous in the past, and the fact that the Bush administration proceeded in this way suggests that it has come to see important advantages in the collective approach, which is to say the integrative approach, to security.

Then consider the integration of ideas. The combination of easy communications, unprecedented prosperity and freedom from war—which is, after all, the combination the Cold War gave us—made possible yet another integrationist phenomenon: ideas now flow more freely throughout the world than ever before. This trend has had a revolutionary effect in certain authoritarian countries, where governments found they had to educate their populations in order to continue to compete in a global economy, only to discover that the act of educating them exposed their minds to the realm of ideas and ultimately worked to undermine the legitimacy of authoritarianism itself.[1] The consequences can be seen in Chinese students who prefer statues of liberty to statues of Mao, in Soviet parliamentarians who routinely harangue their own leaders on national television and in the remarkable sight of the current president of Czechoslovakia—himself a living symbol of the power of ideas—lecturing the Congress of the United States on the virtues of Jeffersonian democracy.

Finally, consider peace. It has long been a central assumption of liberal political philosophers that if only one could maximize the flow of ideas, commodities, capital and people across international boundaries, then the causes of war would drop away. It was for a long time an idea based more on faith than on reality. But there is some reason to think that a

[1] See Theodore S. Hamerow, *From the Finland Station: The Graying of Revolution in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Basic Books, 1990, pp. 210–25, 300–9.

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by-product of integration since 1945 has indeed been peace, at least among the great powers. The prosperity associated with market economics tends to encourage the growth of liberal democracies; and one of the few patterns that holds up throughout modern history is that liberal democracies do not go to war with one another.[2] From this perspective, then, the old nineteenth-century liberal vision of a peaceful, integrated, interdependent and capitalist world may at last be coming true.

III

Would that it were so. Unfortunately, the forces of integration are not the only ones active in the world today. There are also forces of fragmentation at work that are resurrecting old barriers between nations and peoples—and creating new ones—even as others are tumbling. Some of these forces have begun to manifest themselves with unexpected strength, just when it looked as though integration was about to prevail. The most important of them is nationalism.

There is, to be sure, nothing new about nationalism. Given that the past half century has seen the number of sovereign states more than triple, it can hardly be said that nationalism was in a state of suspended animation during the Cold War. Still, many observers did have the sense that, among the great powers at least, nationalism after World War II had been on the wane.

The very existence of two rival superpowers, which is really to say, two supranational powers, created this impression. We rarely thought of the Cold War as a conflict between competing Soviet and American nationalism: we saw it, rather, as a contest between two great international ideologies, or between two antagonistic military blocs, or between two geographical regions we imprecisely labeled "East" and "West." One could even argue that the Cold War discouraged nationalism, particularly in western Europe and the Mediterranean, where the mutual need to contain the Soviet Union moderated old animosities like those between the French and the Germans, or the Greeks and the Turks, or the British and everybody else. Much the same thing happened, although by different and

[2] Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Summer/Fall 1983, pp. 205–35, 323–35; also Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, December 1986, pp. 1151–69.

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more brutal means, in eastern Europe, where Moscow used the Warsaw Pact to suppress long-simmering feuds between the Hungarians and the Romanians, or the Czechs and the Poles, or the (East) Germans and everybody else. Nationalism might still exist in other parts of the world, we used to tell each other, but it had become a historical curiosity in Europe. There were even those who argued, until quite recently, that the Germans had become such good Europeans that they were now virtually immune to nationalist appeals and so had lost whatever interest they might once have had in reunification.

Today the situation looks very different. Germany has reunified, and no one—particularly no one living alongside that new state—is quite sure of the consequences. Romanians and Hungarians threaten each other regularly now that the Warsaw Pact is defunct, and nationalist sentiments are manifesting themselves elsewhere in eastern and southeastern Europe, particularly in Yugoslavia, which appears to be on the verge of breaking up.

The same thing could even happen to the Soviet Union itself: nationalist pressures the regime thought it had smothered as far back as seven decades ago are coming to the forefront once again, to such an extent that we can no longer take for granted the continued existence of that country in the form that we have known it.

Nor should we assume that the West is immune from the fragmenting effects of nationalism. The Irish question ought to be a perpetual reminder of their durability; there is also the Basque problem in Spain, and the rivalry between the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium. The American presence in the Philippines is becoming increasingly tenuous in the face of growing nationalism, and similar pressures are building in South Korea. Nationalism is even becoming an issue in Japan, what with recent controversies over the treatment of World War II in Japanese history textbooks and the Shinto ceremonies that officially began the reign of the Emperor Akihito. It is worth recalling as well how close the Canadian confederation came in 1990 to breaking up—as it yet may—over the separatist aspirations of Quebec. There was even a point last year when the Mohawk Indians were demanding, from Quebec no less, recognition of their own rights as a sovereign state.

But the forces of fragmentation do not just take the form of pressures for self-determination, formidable though those

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may be. They also show up in the field of economics, where they manifest themselves as protectionism: the effort, by various means, to insulate individual economies from the workings of world market forces. They show up in the racial tension that can develop, both among states and within them: the recent killings of blacks by blacks in South Africa, after the release of Nelson Mandela, illustrates the problem clearly.

They certainly show up in the area of religion. The resurgence of Islam might be seen by some as an integrationist force in the Middle East. But it is surely fragmentationist to the extent that it seeks to set that particular region off from the rest of the world by reviving ancient and not-so-ancient grievances against the West, both real and imagined. Forces of fragmentation can even show up as a simple drive for power, which is the only way I can make sense out of the fiendishly complex events that have torn Lebanon apart since the civil war began there in 1975. One can look at Beirut as it has been for the past decade and a half and get a good sense of what the world would look like if the forces of fragmentation should ultimately have their way.

Fragmenting tendencies are also on the rise—they have never been wholly absent—within American society itself. It would be difficult to underestimate the disintegrative effects of the drug crisis in this country, or of the breakdown of our system for elementary and secondary education, or of the emergence of what appears to be a permanent social and economic "underclass." Well-intentioned efforts to decrease racial and sexual discrimination have increased racial and sexual—as well as constitutional—tensions.[3] Linguistic anxieties lurk just beneath the surface, as the movement to make English the official language of the United States suggests. Immigration may well be increasing at a faster rate than cultural assimilation, which in itself has been a less than perfect process. Regional rivalries are developing over such issues as energy costs, pollution control and the bailout of the savings and loan industry. And the rise of special interest groups, together with their ability to apply instant pressure through instant communications, has thrown American politics into such disarray that elections are reduced to the unleashing of attack videos, and the preparation of the budget has come to

[3] See "Race on Campus," *The New Republic*, Feb. 18, 1991; also Dinesh D'Souza, "Illiberal Education," *The Atlantic*, March 1991, pp. 51–79.

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resemble the endless haggling of rug merchants in some Oriental bazaar. When the leading light of American conservatism has to call for a return to a sense of *collective* interest, then the forces of fragmentation have proceeded very far indeed.[4]

All of this suggests that the problems we will confront in the post-Cold War world are more likely to arise from competing processes—integration versus fragmentation—than from the kinds of competing ideological visions that dominated the Cold War. Unlike the old rivalry between democracy and totalitarianism, though, the new geopolitical cartography provides no immediately obvious answer to the question of which of these processes might most threaten the future security interests of the United States.

IV

It would appear, at first glance, that the forces of integration ought to be the more benign. Those forces brought the Cold War to an end. They provided the basis for the relative prosperity that most of the developed world enjoyed during that conflict, and they offer the most plausible method of extending that prosperity into the post-Cold War era. They combine materialism and idealism in a way that seems natural to Americans, who tend to combine these traits in their own national character. And they hold out the promise of an international order in which collective, not unilateral, security becomes the norm.

But is the trend toward integration consistent with the traditional American interest, dating back to the Founding Fathers, in the balancing of power? Has that interest become obsolete in the new world that we now confront? The long-standing American commitment to the balance of power was based on the assumption that the nation would survive most comfortably in a world of diversity, not uniformity: in a homogeneous world, presumably, one would not need to balance power at all. No one would claim that the progress of integration has brought us anywhere close to such a world. Still, the contradiction that exists between the acts of balancing and integrating power ought to make us look carefully at the post-Cold War geopolitical map. Jumping to conclusions—in

[4] William F. Buckley, Jr., *Gratitude: Reflections On What We Owe To Our Country*, New York: Random House, 1990.

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favor of either integrationist or fragmentationist alternatives—could be a mistake.

Consider the long-term ecological problems we are likely to face. The prospect of global warming looms as a constraint upon future economic development conducted in traditional—which is to say, polluting—ways. Integration here, in the form of expanding industrialization and enhanced agricultural productivity, has created a new kind of danger. The worldwide AIDS epidemic illustrates how one integrative force, the increasing flow of people across international boundaries, can undermine the effects of another, which is the progress made toward the conquest of disease. Population pressure, itself the result of progress in agricultural productivity and in conquering disease, is in turn magnifying disparities in living standards that already exist in certain parts of the world, with potentially disintegrative results. The forces of integration, therefore, provide no automatic protection against ecological threats: indeed, they are part of the problem. Despite classical liberal assumptions, we would be unwise in assuming that an ever-increasing flow of people, commodities and technology across international borders will necessarily, at least from the ecological standpoint, make the world a safer place.

Consider, next, the future of Europe. The reunification of Germany, together with the enfeeblement and possible breakup of the Soviet Union, is one of the most abrupt realignments of political, military and economic power in modern history. It has come about largely as a result of those integrative forces that ended the Cold War: the much-celebrated triumph of democratic politics and market economics.[5] And yet, this victory for liberalism in Europe is producing both integrative and disintegrative consequences. In Germany, demands for self-determination have brought political integration, to be sure, but the economic effects could be disintegrative. There are concerns now over whether the progress the EC has made toward removing trade and immigration barriers will be sufficient to tie the newly unified Germany firmly to the West; or whether the new Germany will build its own center of power further to the east, with the risk that this might undo the anticipated benefits of 1992.

[5] An extreme, but prominent, example of such celebration is Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, pp. 3–18.

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In the Soviet Union, the triumph of liberalism has had profoundly disintegrative consequences. The central government faces the possibility of becoming irrelevant as power diffuses down to the level of the republics, and even below. No one knows what the future political configuration, to say nothing of ideological orientation, of the potential successor states might be. Civil war, and even international war growing out of civil war, are by no means unrealistic prospects; such disruptions would be all the more dangerous because the Soviet Union's massive arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons will not disappear, even if the Soviet Union itself does.[6] The future of Europe, in short, is not at all clear, and it is the increasing tension between processes of integration and fragmentation that has suddenly made the picture there so cloudy.

Then consider the Middle East and Africa. The combination of German reunification with Soviet collapse, if it occurs, will involve the most dramatic changes in international boundaries since the end of World War II. And yet no one seems to be thinking about what precedents this might set for other parts of the world where boundaries inherited from the colonial era do not even come close to coinciding with patterns of ethnicity, nationality or religion. If the Lithuanians are to get their own state, it will not be easy to explain to the Palestinians or the Kurds or the Eritreans why they should not have theirs also. If the boundaries of the dying Soviet empire are to be revised, then why should boundaries established by empires long since dead be preserved?

Finally, consider the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It was Iraq's integration into the international market in sophisticated military technology that made it possible for Saddam Hussein to perform this act of aggression. His arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, to say nothing of his surface-to-air-missiles, Scuds, Mirages, the nuclear weapons he probably would have had if the Israelis had not bombed his reactor in 1981 and the long-range artillery he certainly would have had if the British had not become suspicious of his orders for very thick "oil pipes" early in 1990—all of this hardware was not forged by ingenious and self-reliant Iraqi craftsmen, working tirelessly along the banks of the Euphrates. Saddam obtained it,

[6] The depressing possibilities are well summarized in George F. Kennan, "Communism in Russian History," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1990/91, pp. 182–84.

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rather, by exploiting an important consequence of integration, which is the inability or unwillingness of highly industrialized states to control what their own entrepreneurs, even those involved in the sale of lethal commodities, do to turn a profit.

The global energy market—another integrationist phenomenon—created the riches that made Kuwait such a tempting target in the first place; it also brought about the dependence on Middle Eastern oil that caused so rapid a military response on the part of the United States, its allies and even some of their former adversaries. The eagerness of this improbable coalition to defend the principle of collective security would hardly have been as great if Benin had attacked Burkina Faso, or vice versa.

There is, of course, no assurance that Saddam Hussein would have refrained from invading Kuwait if the Cold War had been at its height. But there is a fair chance that either the United States or the Soviet Union—depending upon which superpower Iraq was aligned with at the time—would have sought to exert a restraining influence, if only to keep its principal rival from exploiting the situation to its own advantage. Certainly distractions associated with the end of the Cold War in Europe during the first half of 1990 prevented both Washington and Moscow from giving the attention they should have to Persian Gulf affairs.

It is also worth remembering that the first post-Cold War year saw, in addition to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the near-outbreak of war between India and Pakistan, an intensification of tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors, a renewed Syrian drive to impose control over Lebanon and a violent civil war in Liberia. Conflict in the Third World, it appears, is not going to go away just because the Cold War has; indeed it may well intensify.

Finally, consider one other form of regional conflict that is likely to affect the post-Cold War era: it is what we might call the "post-Marxist revolution" crisis. The most potent revolutionary force in the Third World these days may well be democracy. But it is no clearer there than it is in Europe that this supposedly integrative "triumph of liberalism" will necessarily promote peace. For just as the United States used to justify its intervention in Third World countries as a means of "inoculating" them against the "bacillus" of communism, so the post-Cold War era could see military interventions by the old democracies for the purpose of confirming in power—or

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restoring to power—new democracies. The violent, but overwhelmingly popular, American military operation to apprehend General Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama could well portend things to come.

Threats can arise, though, not only from external sources; for the way in which a nation chooses to respond to threats can, under certain circumstances, pose as much of a danger to its long-term interests as do developments beyond its borders. The United States did not *have* to involve itself, to the extent that it did, in the Vietnam War. It did not *have* to become as dependent as it has on foreign oil. It did not *have* to accumulate such massive budget deficits that the government will have no choice but to allocate a significant percentage of its revenues, well into the 21st century, to paying off the accumulated debt. All of these were decisions Americans made, not their adversaries; yet their consequences have constrained, and in the case of energy dependency and the national debt, will continue to constrain, American freedom of action in the world for years to come.

These problems evolved from a curious unevenness that exists within the United States these days in the willingness to bear pain. Americans have readily accepted pain in connection with their integrative role as a global peacekeeper. They have repeatedly sent troops and resources overseas for the purpose of resisting aggression, even in situations where the probability of an attack was remote and where the states they were defending did not always see fit to contribute proportionately to their own defense. The United States has been unwilling to accept even moderate pain, though, when it comes either to raising the taxes necessary to support the government expenditures its citizens demand, or to cutting back on those expenditures to bring them into line with the taxes its citizens are willing to pay. The United States is generous, even profligate, with its military manpower and hardware, but it is selfish to the point of irresponsibility when it comes to issues of lifestyle and pocketbook.[7] As a result, a kind of division of labor has developed within the international community, in which the United States contributes the troops and the weaponry needed to sustain the balance of power, while its allies

[7] James Chace has suggested, persuasively in my view, that this attitude goes back to Lyndon Johnson's attempt to fight the Vietnam War without asking for sacrifices on the home front. See his *Solvency: The Price of Survival*, New York: Random House, 1981, p. 15.

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finance the budgetary, energy and trade deficits Americans incur through their unwillingness to make even minimal sacrifices in living standards.

Whatever the causes of this situation, the long-term effects cannot be healthy ones. Americans will not indefinitely serve as "mercenaries" overseas, especially when the troops recruited in that capacity come, as they disproportionately do, from the less fortunate social, economic and educational classes. Resentment over this pattern—when it develops—is likely to undermine whatever foreign policy consensus may yet remain. Pressures will eventually build for *all* Americans to bear their fair share of *all* the burdens that are involved in being a world power, and that may considerably diminish the attractions of continuing to be one.

The end of the Cold War, therefore, brings not an end to threats, but rather a diffusion of them: one can no longer plausibly point to a single source of danger, as one could throughout most of that conflict, but dangers there still will be. The architects of containment, when they confronted the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism in 1947, knew which side they were on; the post-Cold War geopolitical cartography, however, provides no comparable clarity. In one sense, this represents progress. The very absence of clear and present danger testifies to American success in so balancing power during the past four and a half decades that totalitarianism, at least in the forms we have considered threatening throughout most of this century, is now defunct. But, in another sense, the new competition between the forces of integration and fragmentation presents us with difficult choices, precisely because it is by no means as clear as it was during the Cold War which tendency we should want to see prevail.

V

Examine, first, the most extreme alternatives. A fully integrated world would be one in which individual countries would lose control of their borders and would be dependent on others for critical resources, capital and markets. It would mean, therefore, a progressive loss of national sovereignty, and ultimately the loss of whatever remained of national identity. A fully fragmented world would approximate the Hobbesian state of anarchy that theorists of international relations assume exists but that, in practice, never has: the

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world would be reduced to a gaggle of quarreling principalities, with war or the threat of war as the only means of settling disputes among them. Both of these extremes—for these are obviously caricatures—would undermine the international state system as we now know it: the first by submerging the autonomy of states within a supranational economic order; the second by so shattering state authority as to render it impotent.

No one seriously claims that, with the end of the Cold War, we can abandon the international state system or relinquish national sovereignty: not even our most visionary visionaries are prepared to go that far. This suggests, therefore, that the United States and its allies retain the interest they have always had in the balancing of power, but that this time the power to be balanced is less that of states or ideologies than of the processes—transcending states and ideologies—that are tending toward integrationist and fragmentationist extremes. Instead of balancing the forces of democracy against those of totalitarianism, the new task may well be to balance the forces of integration and fragmentation against each other.

What would this mean in practical terms? In the best of all possible worlds, of course, it would require taking no action at all, because integrationist and fragmentationist forces would balance themselves. Unfortunately, though, in the imperfect world in which we live things rarely work out this neatly. Gaps generally exist between what one wants to have happen and what seems likely to happen; it is here that the choices of states—and of the leaders who govern them—make a difference.

These choices in the post-Cold War world are likely to center on those areas in which integrationist and fragmentationist forces are not now balanced; where the triumph of one over the other could upset the international stability upon which rest the security interests of the United States, its allies, and other like-minded states; and where action is therefore needed to restore equilibrium. They are likely to include the following:

The Soviet Union and eastern Europe.

Over the next decade, the most serious source of instability in world politics will probably be the political, economic and social fragmentation that is already developing where communism has collapsed. Marxism-Leninism could hardly have suffered a more resounding defeat if World War III had been

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fought to the point of total victory for the West. Fortunately victory, this time, did not require a war. The trouble with victory, though, is that it tends to produce power imbalances. It was precisely to avoid this danger that the peacemakers of 1815 and 1945, who designed the two most durable peace settlements of modern times, moved quickly after their respective triumphs to rehabilitate defeated adversaries and to invite them back into the international state system. Perhaps because the communist regimes of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe have not actually suffered a military defeat—and also because of recent distractions in the Persian Gulf—we in the West are not focusing as carefully as we should on the problems of reconstruction and reintegration in that part of the world. But should fragmentationist forces prevail there, the resulting anarchy—and mass emigration away from anarchy—could destabilize any number of power balances. The situation then would certainly command our attention, even if it does not now.

The peoples of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe will of course have to bear the principal burdens of reconstruction. But they will not be able to accomplish this task alone, and already discouragement and demoralization have set in among them. It is in dealing with this kind of despair that aid from the "West"—including Japan—can have its greatest impact. A multinational Marshall Plan for former communist states sounds impractical given the extent of the problem and the existence of competing priorities at home, but the "highly leveraged" character of that earlier and highly successful enterprise ought not to be forgotten. The Marshall Plan worked by employing small amounts of economic assistance to produce large psychological effects. It restored self-confidence in Europe just at the point, some two to three years after the end of the war, at which it was sagging. What was critical was not so much the extent of the aid provided as its timing, its targeting and its publicity: its main purpose was to shift the expectations of its recipients from the belief that things could only get worse to the conviction that they would eventually get better.

It will serve no one's interests in the West now, anymore than it would have served the interests of the victorious allies after World War II, to allow despair, demoralization and disintegration to prevail in the territories of defeated Cold War adversaries. What happened in Germany after World

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War I ought to provide a sufficiently clear warning of the consequences that can follow when victors neglect the interests of those they have vanquished, and thereby, in the long run, neglect their own.

New security and economic structures for Europe.

Glaciers, when they invade a continent, not only obscure its topography but, through the weight of the accumulated ice, literally press its surface down into the earth's mantle. Retreats of glaciers cause old features of the landscape slowly to rise up again, sometimes altered, sometimes not. The expansion of Soviet and American influence over Europe at the end of World War II had something of the effect of such a glacier. It froze things in place, thereby obscuring old rivalries and bringing peace—even if a "cold" peace—to a continent that had known little of it throughout its history.

But now that the Cold War is over, geopolitical glaciers are retreating, the situation is becoming fluid once again, and certain familiar features of the European landscape—a single strong German state, together with ethnic and religious antagonisms among Germany's neighbors to the east—are once more coming into view. The critical question for the future stability of Europe is the extent to which the Cold War glacier permanently altered the terrain it covered for so long. Integrationist structures like the EC and NATO suggest such alteration; but they could also have been artifacts of the glaciation itself. If so, these organizations will become increasingly vulnerable as the forces of fragmentation revive.

No economic or security structure for Europe can hope to be viable over the long term unless it incorporates and benefits all of the major states on that continent: the classic lesson is the Versailles Treaty of 1919, which sought to build a peace that treated Germany as a pariah and excluded Soviet Russia altogether. But neither the EC nor NATO has given sufficient attention to how each might restructure itself to accommodate the interests of the former Warsaw Pact states, including whatever is left of the Soviet Union. Few efforts have been made to think through how these integrative organizations might expand the scope of their activities to counter the fragmentationist challenges—coming from the reunification of Germany, the liberation of Eastern Europe and the possible

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

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

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

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collapse of the U.S.S.R.—that are already evident.[8]

The United States has used its influence, over the years, to favor integration over fragmentation in Europe; indeed without that influence, it is difficult to see how integration could have proceeded as far as it has. But Americans cannot expect to maintain the authority the Cold War gave them on the continent for very much longer, especially now that the Soviet "glacier" is so obviously retreating. We would do well, then, to consider what new or modified integrative structures might replace the role that the United States—and, by very different means, its former adversaries—played in "freezing" disintegrative forces in Europe during the Cold War. Otherwise, serious imbalances could develop in that part of the world as well.

Deterring aggression.

One thing the Cold War did was to make the use of force by the great powers against one another virtually unthinkable. It created inducements that caused states to seek to resolve peacefully—or even to learn to live with—accumulated grievances that could easily, prior to 1945, have provoked major wars. It did this by appealing more to fear than to logic, but patterns of behavior that arise out of fear can, in time, come to seem quite logical. Few today would question the desirability of perpetuating, and if necessary reinforcing, the inhibitions that arose, during the postwar decades, against once violent patterns of great power behavior.

The unprecedented multinational response to Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait suggests that an opportunity now exists to extend disincentives to war beyond the realm of the great powers. The need to do this is urgent because the end of the Cold War is likely to end the informal crisis-management regime the United States and the Soviet Union have relied upon in the past to keep such regional conflicts limited.

Woodrow Wilson's vision of collective international action to deter aggression failed to materialize after 1919 because of European appeasement and American isolationism, and after

[8] The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, now little more than a framework for negotiations, suffers from a deficiency opposite to that of NATO and the European Community: with the single exception of Albania, it includes all of the states of Europe, from the largest to the most microscopic, and it requires unanimity in order to act, which in most cases ensures that it will not.

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1945 because of the great power rivalries that produced the Cold War. None of these difficulties exist today. The world has a third chance to give Wilson's plan the fair test it has never received, and fate has even provided an appropriate occasion: successful U.N. action to restore Kuwaiti independence sets a powerful example that could advance us some distance toward bringing the conduct of international relations within the framework of international law that has long existed alongside it, but too often apart from it.[9]

Can such a legalistic vision sustain the realistic security interests of the United States? Whether rightly or wrongly, the answer was negative after World Wars I and II; but Americans have reasons, this time, for giving a more positive reply. The "long peace" that was the Cold War has already created in the practice of the great powers mechanisms for deterring aggression that have worked remarkably well: these did not exist prior to 1945. There could be real advantages now in codifying and extending this behavior as widely as possible. The evolution of a new world order designed to deter aggression could ensure that the most important benefits of the "long peace" survive the demise of the Cold War. It could also counteract the dangerous conviction, which American leaders still at times appear to hold, that only the United States has the will and the capacity to take the lead in policing (or nannying) the world.

Finding appropriate limits of interdependence.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait raises another issue, though, that will involve more difficult choices: it has to do with just how far we want economic integration to proceed. The purpose of having global markets is to ensure prosperity, not to compromise national sovereignty. And yet, it was the international market in oil and armaments that made it possible for Saddam Hussein to violate Kuwaiti sovereignty. Economic integration, in this instance, produced literal political fragmentation. This unexpected and dangerous juxtaposition suggests strongly the need to think, more seriously than we have to this point, about how the economic and political forces that

[9] For an eloquent discussion of the advantages adherence to international law can offer, see Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *On the Law of Nations*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.

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are shaping our world intersect with one another, and about where our own security interests with respect to these lie.

Certainly there is much to be said, from a strictly economic perspective, in favor of reducing barriers to trade, investment and even labor flows across international boundaries if the result is to maximize production, minimize prices and ensure that consumer needs are satisfied. But what if the result is also to allow despots easy access to sophisticated military technology, or to increase the West's reliance on energy resources it does not control? Do market principles require that we welcome on a continuing basis the dispatch of troops to safeguard critical supplies halfway around the world? There are political costs to be paid for economic integration, and we are only now beginning to realize what they are.

These issues are only part of the much larger problem of how one balances the advantages of economic integration against its political and social disadvantages. Are Americans really sure, for example, that they want to integrate their own economy into the world market if the result of doing that is to shut down industries they have historically relied upon for both jobs and national defense? When the effects of integration are to transform once-diversified industrial complexes into strings of fast-food outlets and shopping malls, with the reduction in wages that kind of employment normally brings, one can hardly expect people to be out in the streets cheering for them, however ingenious the rationalizations of our professional economists.

Increasing labor mobility, together with the liberalized immigration policies that facilitate it, provides yet another example of how economic integration could produce political fragmentation. There are undeniable advantages in allowing immigration, not just because it provides cheap labor but also because in some instances the host nation can gain a diverse array of sophisticated skills as a result. But immigration also risks altering national identity, and the forces of integration have by no means advanced to the point at which one can dismiss concerns over that issue as anachronistic.[10] As a nation of immigrants, the United States handles problems of cultural assimilation more easily than most nations. Still, they are real

[10] William H. McNeill sets this problem within a long-term historical context in "Winds of Change," in Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, ed., *Sea-Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990, pp. 184–87.

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problems, and they exist on a world-wide scale. Attempts to write them off as reflections of an antiquated "nationalism," or even "racism," are not likely to make them go away.

What all of this suggests, therefore, is that we need better mechanisms for balancing the processes of integration and fragmentation at those points at which economic forces intersect those of politics and culture. The increasing permeability of boundaries is going to be an important characteristic of the post-Cold War world, and it would be a great mistake to assume—as market principles encourage us to assume—that in such an environment an "invisible hand" will always produce the greatest benefits for the greatest number. As in most other areas, an equilibrium will be necessary: if imbalances of power are not to develop, then a certain amount of protectionism, within prudent limits, may be required.

Regaining solvency.

The principle of balancing power also requires that ends be balanced against means. National security, even in the most auspicious of circumstances, does not come cheap. This country's reluctance to bring the costs of providing for its security into line with what it is willing to pay suggests that integrative and disintegrative mechanisms are imperfectly balanced within the United States as well as beyond its borders.

The last American president to preoccupy himself with solvency, Dwight D. Eisenhower, regularly insisted that the National Security Council specify as "the basic objective of our national security policies: maintaining the security of the United States and the vitality of its fundamental values and institutions." To achieve the former without securing the latter, he warned, would be to "destroy what we are attempting to defend."[11]

Too often during the years that have followed Eisenhower's presidency the quest for security has overwhelmed concern for the vitality of fundamental values and institutions. The Vietnam War, which came close to tearing this country apart, was fought for geopolitical reasons that remain obscure to this day. The Watergate and Iran-contra scandals revealed how excesses committed in the name of national security can subvert constitutional processes. And no one would be more appalled

[11] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 135–36.

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than Eisenhower himself to see the extent to which Americans now finance the costs of defense—as well as everything else—on credit extended by the unborn (who cannot object to the process) and by foreigners (who someday may).

A return to solvency in its broadest sense—by which I mean not just balanced budgets but bearing the full pain of what one is doing at the time one is doing it—might discipline our conception of the national interest in the way that it should be disciplined: through the constantly annoying, but also intellectually bracing, demands of stringency. The result might well be less grandiose visions, but more sustainable policies.

VI

Which is going to win—integration or fragmentation? At first glance, it would seem that the forces of integration will almost certainly prevail. One cannot run a modern postindustrial economy without such forces, and that, many people would say, is the most important thing in the world. But that is also a parochial view. Running a postindustrial economy may not be the most important thing to the peasant in the Sudan, or to the young urban black in the United States or to the Palestinian who has spent his entire life in a refugee camp. For those people, forces that might appear to us to be fragmentationist can be profoundly integrationist, in that they give meaning to otherwise meaningless lives.

We should also recognize that the forces of integration may not be as deeply rooted as we like to think. It comes as something of a shock when one realizes that the most important of them—the global market, collective security, the "long peace" itself—were products of the Cold War. Their survival is by no means guaranteed into the post-Cold War era. Fragmentationist forces have been around much longer than integrationist forces, and now that the Cold War is over, they may grow stronger than at any point in the last half century.

We should not necessarily conclude from this, though, that it will always be in our interest to try to ensure that the forces of integration come out on top. Surely, in light of the Persian Gulf War, the international community will want to restrict future sales of arms across boundaries, and it would not be a bad idea to develop alternatives to dependency on Middle East oil as well. The increasing permeability of borders—the very thing most of the world welcomes when it comes to the free flow of ideas—will by no means be as welcome when commod-

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ities, capital and labor begin flowing with equal freedom. And Americans are already beginning to move away from the view that they can leave everything—international trade, energy resources and especially the regulation of the savings and loan industry—to the "invisible hand" of market forces that the integrationist model in principle recommends.

But swinging toward autarchy, nationalism or isolationism will not do either. The forces of fragmentation lurk just beneath the surface, and it would take little encouragement for them to reassert themselves, with all the dangers historical experience suggests would accompany such a development. We need to maintain a healthy skepticism about integration: there is no reason to turn it into some kind of sacred cow. But we also need to balance that skepticism with a keen sense of how unhealthy fragmentationist forces can be if allowed free rein.

So we are left, as usual, groping for the middle ground, for that rejection of extremes, that judicious balancing of pluses and minuses, that is typical of how articles like this are supposed to end. This one will be no exception to that rule. I would point out, though, that practical statecraft boils down, most of the time, to just this task of attempting to navigate the middle course, while avoiding the rocks and shoals that lie on either side. Certainly Americans, of all peoples, should find this a familiar procedure, for what is our own Constitution if not the most elegant political text ever composed on how to balance the forces of integration against those of fragmentation? It had been necessary, Madison wrote in *The Federalist*, no. 51, so to contrive "the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places."[12] That would not be a bad design to follow with regard to the external world as all of us think about how we might come to grips—as the Founding Fathers had to—with the centripetal and centrifugal forces that are already shaping our lives.

[12] *The Federalist Papers*, New York: New American Library, 1961, p. 320.

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William J. Crowe, Jr.
Alan D. Romberg

RETHINKING SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC

While the world's attention has been riveted on eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the Middle East, transforming events have also been taking place in East Asia. American interests there are at least as deep, and though the changes are not as dramatic the United States can ill afford to ignore them or leave its reaction in the hands of the fates—or compromises in Washington's bureaucracy.

Not only is the economic strength of Japan and the newly industrializing economies in the region of great importance to the United States, but Asian security issues also offer complex new challenges to U.S. defense planners. On the one hand, the Soviet threat has undergone a profound change; this movement has been manifested in some Soviet force reductions and changed dispositions in Asia, as well as in the plethora of Pacific arms control overtures. On the other hand, American forces must still deal with a sizable Soviet military presence in the region and play more subtle roles not related to the Soviet Union.

In the new post-Cold War era, what is the appropriate U.S. military role in Asia? Indeed what are Washington's security objectives? And, especially in light of the economic pressures that Americans face at home and the growing nationalism and economic strength of many Asian countries, what sort of presence is necessary, appropriate and affordable to carry out that role? How is the United States to share responsibilities—both burdens and power?

II

The qualities that define Asia are enduring: it is huge, diverse, dynamic and, frequently, dangerous. America's involvement in World War II began and ended in Asia, and

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since then the United States has fought two major wars there—Korea and Vietnam. Even today the risk of war in Korea remains palpable; fighting in Cambodia continues and is likely to do so at some level despite any eventual agreement.

Traditional rivalries among the nations of the region may have been muted, but they have not disappeared. The most dangerous for two-and-a-half decades, the Sino-Soviet confrontation, has receded. But mutual, long-term suspicions and national competition between Moscow and Beijing have by no means evaporated. The same wary attitudes exist between China and Japan, as well as among other states in the region. Despite collaboration within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand remain potential rivals. Instability in the Philippines could contribute to turbulence in the region. Vietnam, now racked with a host of problems, seeks better relations—especially economic ones—with ASEAN states; yet despite withdrawal of its operational combat forces from Cambodia, Hanoi is still suspected by its neighbors of harboring long-term ambitions for hegemony over both Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia.

The United States is viewed in Asia as the only nation that can be the key balancing or stabilizing force in the region. By preventing creation of a security vacuum, the U.S. presence relieves others of the need—or opportunity—to establish regional hegemony. The degree to which nations hold this view and the latitude they would allow Washington in playing this role vary, but it is a perspective shared now even in Beijing, Moscow and Hanoi. (Virtually alone, Pyongyang appears to cling to a different vision.)

Having said that, it is not clear just what the United States would actually do in most regional conflicts. In case of attack on its allies or its own forces, the response would be certain. But it is most unlikely, and would surely be unwise, for the United States to engage in military action to separate the various rival claimants to disputed territory.

III

The major strategic issue is still the U.S.S.R. It is unclear how the United States should cope with the remaining, and in some respects growing, Soviet military capability in the Asian-Pacific area. This issue emerges at a time of revolutionary change in Moscow's security and foreign policies but also amid

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potential chaos within the U.S.S.R. whose effects could spread abroad.

The Soviets are reducing forces in Asia as they are in Europe, but most of the 120,000 troops being withdrawn from the Far East had been deployed along the Sino-Soviet border (either in the U.S.S.R. itself or in Mongolia). In any case, close to half-a-million troops will remain on station in the region once the drawdown is completed. The United States has only 135,000 forces based in East Asia and will reduce that figure to about 120,000 by 1993.[1] Moreover, while obsolescent Soviet ships, aircraft and other equipment are being dismantled along with SS-20 intermediate-range missiles (in accordance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty), some more modern equipment is being deployed, raising the mobility and firepower (if not the numbers) of the U.S.S.R.'s strategic forces. And although it has only limited seaborne air capabilities, the Pacific Fleet remains Moscow's largest.

Though the Soviets lack the economic and even political capacity to sustain protracted combat in Asia, recent events in the U.S.S.R. are worrisome. Thus, certain American and allied forces remain essential to counter the Soviet deployments; they must not only offset the threat of strategic missiles, but also deal with naval forces (including both ships and ground-based naval aircraft) targeted on the crucial U.S. aircraft carriers.

U.S. deployment of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) was in large measure a response to this anti-carrier threat.[2] The deployment of American nuclear-powered attack submarines similarly was designed mainly to deal with the rapidly increasing Soviet naval deployments, especially nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). These Soviet capabilities have not disappeared.

In addition, for obvious reasons of geography, the United States is a maritime power, requiring widely dispersed naval and air forces to protect commercial and potentially military lines of communication. It is argued—far more assertively

[1] This plan is presented in the Pentagon's extensive response to the Nunn-Warner amendment to the FY 1990 Defense Authorization Act. It outlines the rationale for a continued military presence in the Asian-Pacific region over the coming decade. See *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century*, U.S. Department of Defense, April 1990.

[2] The purpose was to diversify U.S. naval nuclear weapons, thereby complicating the Soviets' targeting problem and reducing their concentration against carriers.

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today than in the past when "anti-Soviet" arguments were more fashionable—that the U.S. mission in Asia has for several decades not been primarily related to the Soviet threat, but rather to less well-defined contingencies falling within the scope of the American balancing role. That role remains critical to regional peace and stability and to the preservation of U.S. interests there.

Moreover, American interests in the Persian Gulf have traditionally been protected in significant measure by the Seventh Fleet and by other forces deployed from or through the Pacific. Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines have been important support facilities for U.S. interests in the Middle East.

IV

It would be foolish, however, for the United States to continue on a straight-line course. It would also be naïve to assume this is possible given the current political and fiscal climate.

The Pentagon's Asian strategy calls for a 10–12 percent reduction by 1993. Its intentions for the rest of the decade, however, are purposefully vague. To some extent this vagueness is due to uncertainty about the evolution of the Asian security picture; to some extent it arises from fear of alarming Asian friends with sudden changes. Both reasons are sound. Still, Asians worry increasingly about an American withdrawal from the region, and the vagueness of the plans beyond 1993 feeds their fears rather than reassures them.

Washington will panic its allies if it acts without consultation and care. But that is exactly what the defense budget process will drive the United States to do if it does not get ahead of the curve and plan where it needs to be a decade or more down the road, and how it proposes to get there.

For example, U.S. basing arrangements in the Philippines will undergo significant change. Final agreement on the post-1991 arrangements is under negotiation. If an agreement is possible, its outline is clear: a much lower U.S. Air Force profile in the immediate future and, eventually, perhaps a less robust naval presence as well. This will prove less convenient and, if the United States wants to maintain roughly the same level of operations in the Pacific and Indian oceans as before, more costly. But the adjustments need not substantially decrease the American ability to play an effective stabilizing role.

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Maintaining the U.S. base structure in Japan and arrangements for access to logistical, training and other facilities in the Philippines, Singapore and other countries can support substantial forward deployments; they thus serve as a functional replacement for disappearing forward bases elsewhere. In any case, the missions the United States needs to address are not immutable. With respect to the Persian Gulf, for example, regional tensions and conflicts will still require effective access for American forces (as the recent war made all too clear). But the heretofore primary American goal of deterring possible Soviet attempts to intimidate South and Southwest Asian nations and to control access to vital oil resources hardly needs to be a priority concern for the foreseeable future.

In Korea, even now, a combination of budgetary pressures in the United States and growing military capabilities—and political sensitivities—in South Korea argue for a substantial reduction in U.S. deployments over the next five to ten years.[3] The key will be to ensure that the manner of the drawdown does not send erroneous signals to North or South Korea or others, including potentially nervous U.S. allies in Japan, about the firmness of the American security commitment.

In Japan the level of political maturity since 1960 has relieved the security relationship of much of the anxiety found among other allies; but questions are being raised about the value and purpose of the U.S. alliance in the post-Cold War era. These questions can and should be answered to the satisfaction of most Japanese and Americans. But the alliance will need to evolve, and part of that evolution could entail some adjustment in U.S. basing presence.[4]

V

To deal with Soviet strategic forces and to contribute to regional stability will involve new dimensions in arms control.

The Soviets continue to argue that it is unreasonable and unacceptable for the United States to press for elimination of Soviet advantages as a continental power in Europe (in the agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe) while clinging

[3] The Pentagon has already announced a drawdown over the next three years of 2,000 air force support personnel and 5,000 army personnel from the 43,000 U.S. forces currently in Korea.

[4] U.S. forces based in Japan are about 55,000, including 7th Fleet personnel home-ported there. Current plans call for a reduction of 5,000–6,000 of those forces by 1993.

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to American superiority as a maritime power in the Pacific. Senior Soviet military officers have long warned that the arms control process in Europe would eventually come to a halt unless naval forces were brought into the equation. It would be hard to draw a straight line between this rhetoric and the recent evidence of Red Army recalcitrance on conventional and strategic force reduction agreements. But Washington should not dismiss such a general linkage in terms of Soviet military claims that President Gorbachev has yielded too much for too little return.

For their part, U.S. naval officers and civilian defense officials have resisted with considerable vigor even a hint of naval arms control for two reasons: first, there is a sense that the United States needs what it has—and has what it needs—in terms of naval superiority. As a major maritime power, the United States must maintain that control to protect its security and economic prosperity. Second, they have said—at least until recently—Moscow's concessions in ground force reductions in Europe, as well as in nuclear forces, are a function of domestic pressures in the Soviet Union and will therefore continue in any case.

The American stance also derives in part from fears that once measures to limit the navy are contemplated, the fleet's basic strength might be threatened. The concern is understandable, but sells short American negotiators. Confidence-building measures, for example, could enhance the navy's security. One can argue that modern intelligence methods limit the potential gains from such CBMs as prior notification of major naval exercises or invitations to observers. One could also argue that the United States might compromise its security by having potential adversaries on hand to judge, for example, the effectiveness and operational procedures of fleet exercises. But these considerations need to be weighed against the sense of confidence that such steps would give each side about the intentions and capabilities of the other, and the potential to reduce the risks of dangerous misunderstandings and to promote further arms control measures.

High-level, military-to-military dialogue on doctrine and deployments in the Pacific would also be useful. There is already a history of such talks in Europe but nothing focused directly on Asia. Given the importance of the region to the United States and the Soviet Union, this gap ought to be closed in some fashion.

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Arms control, including CBMs, is not an end in itself. To be successful it must either reduce the prospects for conflict—purposeful or accidental—or it must lower the costs of maintaining at least as favorable a situation as now exists for all parties to it. But in attempting to achieve these ends, and in light of the evolving strategic and fiscal realities, it is important to entertain new ideas.

One area where this is of particular relevance—indeed the only class of naval ships whose numbers are dictated almost solely by the U.S.-Soviet confrontation—is in the submarine force. The Soviets developed a substantial nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet starting in the late 1960s, both as a challenge to American aircraft carriers and, as Moscow moved to its "bastion defense" strategy, to protect ballistic missile submarines in waters relatively close to Soviet shores, especially in the Sea of Okhotsk.

It is stabilizing, some argue, for the Soviets to have a reliable and survivable second-strike capability such as its SSBN fleet. So, submarine protection of that fleet is not inherently bad for the United States. But American defense experts estimate that the Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet is perhaps twice the size necessary to perform that mission; the rest will be available to threaten our aircraft carriers and other principal surface vessels, both naval and merchant.

An unintended consequence of the extensive Soviet nuclear submarine construction program has been to stimulate an American response in kind, presenting the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet with a significant threat that Moscow finds disconcerting. To reduce the threat that each side perceives, agreement on substantial cuts in attack submarines would appear to have promise. Given Soviet predominant numbers, these reductions could not be on a one-for-one basis. But the economic benefits as well as the strategic gains from mutual reductions should not be ignored.

Such considerations also suggest there would be substantial benefits from mutually denuclearizing all naval forces except for sea-launched ballistic missiles, which fall under the agenda of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

The military rationale for deploying nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles—on submarines or on surface vessels—is not so clear-cut as it once was. Conventional weapons are politically more usable than tactical nuclear weapons in any case, and precision-guided weapons, including conventional SLCMs, con-

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stitute an increasingly credible deterrent. This conclusion has been underscored by the dramatic effectiveness of these weapons against Iraq.

From an American perspective the case for the elimination of naval nuclear cruise missiles would be especially strong if the Soviets removed the nuclear threat to American aircraft carriers—from land-based naval aircraft as well as from ships—which sparked deployment of U.S. nuclear SLCMs in the first place. Even this would not remove all nuclear threats to the fleet, but it would be a major step forward. Thus land-based naval weapons should be included in any maritime denuclearization regime.

In private conversation, the idea of eliminating nuclear SLCMs from U.S. and Soviet surface vessels finds a substantial number of American adherents, even in defense circles. Submariners, however, worry about intrusive verification requirements. Not only is the case for nuclear SLCMs eroding, the potential for effective verification may be growing. In the end, if the United States cannot devise acceptable procedures to verify the absence of nuclear SLCMs on submarines, then it should at least proceed with denuclearization of the surface fleet. Despite the difficulties involved, the Soviet submarine-based SLCM threat to U.S. carriers is sufficiently serious to merit a genuine effort to do away with it.

To sum up: the United States, as a maritime power with global interests and responsibilities, should maintain a sizable and effective naval force, including specifically in the Pacific. It is precisely for this reason, to ease the problem of retaining that capability in the face of growing political and economic challenges, that some form of carefully limited naval arms reduction negotiations and other cooperative efforts with the Soviets should be examined carefully.

VI

With or without arms control, and beyond Soviet contingencies, the United States will need the military capabilities required to defend other interests in the region. In broad terms, the U.S. security role is one of deterrence, requiring maintenance of access and influence. But what does this mean in practice?

At one level, it can be argued that the American contribution to regional stability can only come in the context of continued forward deployments; any reduction of U.S. mili-

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tary presence would be seen as a diminution of U.S. capability and commitment. Such perceptions are as important as "hard facts," and the risk of unintended consequences must always be a conscious concern of policymakers. With respect to basing arrangements in particular, it is only realistic to recognize that what America takes out, it will not be able to put back, except possibly in times of crisis.

American forces have been forward deployed in the Pacific since the end of World War II. They reached a peak of about 238,000 during the Vietnam War, but have now declined to 135,000. U.S. forces in the area are primarily air and naval units (including marines), with the only substantial army contingent being the 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea. Though always open to reinforcement, this deployment pattern accurately reflects the American post-Vietnam strategy—to rely on its allies in the region to bear the brunt of any ground combat, while the United States would supplement their forces with the American air and sea power that the regional allies could not adequately supply.

Only six percent of U.S. forces are forward deployed in the Asian-Pacific theater, and only 16 percent are "dedicated" to the region. Given the space they are responsible for, they should not be proportionately reduced along with other cuts around the world. Indeed, with the political evolution in Europe, there is no need for such proportionality.

It is essential to retain enough of a presence in the region to assure mutually suspicious nations there that the United States is not withdrawing or contributing to the creation of a security vacuum. This concern is likely to grow as the military power of regional players grows, including their capacity to develop nuclear and other advanced weapons technologies. The sense of security that Asian nations have felt and the contribution this has made to their political, economic and social development has been of enormous benefit to American national interests. It is worth a great deal to the United States to preserve that sense of security and the developments it fosters, including by maintaining both a force presence and a nuclear umbrella over those who feel the need to be protected by it.[5] It

[5] While it has been convenient to maintain part of this umbrella on board ships, there are other ways to deploy it. Cruise missiles on U.S.-based aircraft and even long-range missiles (SLCMs and ICBMs) targeted in a "tactical" mode come to mind.

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is also important that regional nations bear their fair share of the burden.

Korea.

Since the Korean War, the United States has continuously stationed forces on the peninsula. Those forces have been reduced over the years, but their continuing presence bespeaks the seriousness of the North Korean threat and of the American commitment to back South Korea in meeting it. The obvious fact is that the combined capability of U.S. and R.O.K. forces has successfully deterred war in the 38 years since the armistice was signed.

But the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the North has not only periodically engaged in commando-type raids, it has cold-bloodedly murdered South Koreans. For instance, much of the R.O.K. cabinet was killed in a bombing in Rangoon in 1983 and scores of civilians died in the sabotage of a Korean airliner in 1987. Huge tunnels continue to be detected under the demilitarized zone that separates North from South. The D.P.R.K. maintains two-thirds or more of its one million-man force (750,000 of whom are in ground units) poised in offensive positions close to the DMZ, heightening the advantages it would have in case of surprise attack. Of particular concern has been the recent discovery of an unsafeguarded nuclear facility believed to be part of a clandestine D.P.R.K. nuclear weapons program.[6]

Over the years, the R.O.K. has developed a formidable military force of its own—some 650,000 well-trained and well-equipped troops, 550,000 of whom are ground forces. Even in air and naval power, where South Korea still depends on the United States to fill the gaps, the South's forces are impressive.

South Korea's economy is galloping ahead in one of the world's most impressive performances. The R.O.K. political system may not be a Jeffersonian democracy, but it has made

[6] Despite its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty, which it signed in 1985 under Soviet pressure, North Korea has not negotiated a full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Though not foolproof, IAEA inspections would provide at least some level of assurance against a weapons program. Should Pyongyang actually "go nuclear," this would be extraordinarily destabilizing not only with respect to the situation on the peninsula, but throughout the region. In its effort to prevent this, the United States should continue to press both Beijing and Moscow to use leverage with Pyongyang to accept safeguards. Both say they have tried, but it is not clear how much real muscle they have put behind those efforts.

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an impressive transition in recent years from military-dominated authoritarianism to an increasingly stable, pluralistic society. On the other hand, not only is the North Korean economy stagnating, but Pyongyang has suffered enormous diplomatic setbacks with the establishment of Soviet-South Korean relations, the collapse of eastern Europe, and even China's step-by-step movement toward the R.O.K. Taken together, these developments demonstrate clearly—even, one must assume, to Pyongyang—that the trendline of history is running against the D.P.R.K. As a result, new opportunities may be opening up to convince the North Koreans that they need to accommodate both to the world at large and most particularly to the reality of the South. This may be reflected in Pyongyang's acceptance of North-South prime-ministerial talks and in the opening of negotiations to normalize relations with Japan. Moreover, though still unacceptable, the North's arms control proposals in recent months have displayed somewhat more realism and flexibility than in the past. How serious the D.P.R.K. will ultimately be, however, remains an open question.

The United States has a role in maximizing these opportunities. On the one hand, it should maintain security relations with the R.O.K., firmly adhering to its treaty commitments. This will require preserving whatever level of presence is necessary, in combination with the South's own forces, to provide adequate deterrence and, if need be, to defend against Northern aggression. In our view, however, this can be done with progressively lower American troop levels.[7]

Beyond the drawdown of 7,000 Americans already scheduled by 1993, we believe that in light of South Korea's increasingly strong army American ground forces could be reduced further—perhaps by as much as half—over the next five years. Continued deployment of American air force units at roughly current levels, however, will be militarily essential. In fact, recent experience in Iraq argues that U.S. air power has now assumed an even more decisive role in defeating armor in large formations.

At some point, progress in the North-South dialogue, or domestic R.O.K. politics, may require elimination of the U.S. force presence. But that is a distant prospect. Meanwhile, the

[7] Concern for turmoil during a leadership transition in North Korea needs to be factored into this calculation, but it need not paralyze the process of adjustment.

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remaining U.S. ground and air forces will serve both as a political symbol—to North and South Korea—of the steadfast U.S. commitment and as a "tripwire" calling forth an immediate American response to a D.P.R.K. attack.

The other side of the coin, however, is that the United States should reach out to North Korea in support of Seoul's policy of drawing the D.P.R.K. into the world community. Washington should move beyond the low-level, relatively sterile conversations that have taken place between American and North Korean diplomats in Beijing over the past two years (more than a dozen such meetings have occurred so far). It is time to discuss at a higher level and with specificity the steps that would lead to the establishment of normal relations.

The United States has laid particular emphasis on resolution of concerns over the North's nuclear program as a key element in normalization. But Washington has resisted linking that call with the D.P.R.K. demand for removal of American nuclear weapons deployments in the South and for a U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons against the North. Eliminating the North's nuclear program should be a priority and, in principle, these issues should be treated separately. The North does, after all, have an obligation to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and the question of U.S. deployments is a matter between Washington and Seoul. Still, the actual presence of any nuclear weapons in South Korea is not necessary to maintain a nuclear umbrella over the R.O.K.; in fact, such a presence would likely become a political football in U.S.-R.O.K. relations over time.

Thus solutions should be sought that would result in the North's accepting full-scope safeguards, the removal of any American nuclear weapons that might be in South Korea, and the establishment of relations between Washington and Pyongyang. The final formula, of course, must be consistent with both sides' basic principles and interests, including Seoul's. Whatever nuclear assurances Washington provides to Pyongyang should be conditioned on the North's own assurances neither to commit aggression against South Korea nor to acquire nuclear weapons. Reiteration of Soviet and Chinese nuclear non-first-use pledges—making them specifically applicable to Korea—would also be desirable. Working out a solution encompassing these elements may be difficult, especially since Pyongyang's willingness remains to be determined. But, with some compromise, it should not be impossible.

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Meanwhile, working closely with the R.O.K., the United States should encourage the North and South to adopt confidence-building measures within the Joint Security Area and along the entire DMZ and eventually beyond. North-South discussion of deployments and exercises that are particularly provocative to the other should be included on the agenda.

Japan.

The U.S. alliance with Japan is closely tied to concerns in Korea, as well as to the defense of Japan itself. It also is a key element in the U.S. ability to project its power effectively throughout the region. But the alliance is not simply a military pact; rather, it is an essential ingredient in the overall U.S. relationship with Japan. It undergirds the U.S. ability to play not only a security role but also a constructive political and economic role in Asia—a role that is vital to American national interests. The "cap in the bottle" imagery invoked by a senior American military officer in Japan (suggesting the U.S. presence in Japan was to contain that nation's military ambition) was destructive of confidence. But the U.S.-Japan alliance does, in fact, ease the concerns of Japanese themselves and other Asians about the future of Asian security. Above all, it helps dispel the impression that the United States might withdraw from Asia, leaving a vacuum that Japan might fill.

Moreover, by remaining so obviously engaged through the alliance, the United States not only enhances its own efforts but also facilitates an effective Japanese economic and political role throughout the region. Though Japan's trade and especially its investment is generally welcomed, there is already unease over Tokyo's potential dominance in the region. Even Japan's economic involvement would become more problematic if Washington were seen to be leaving the field to Tokyo.

U.S. withdrawal would also raise serious concern over Japan's possible remilitarization. Tokyo's military budget is already, in absolute financial terms, the third largest in the world. Japanese Self-Defense Forces are modern, capable and obviously expandable. But it is important to note that Japan does not possess either offensive or nuclear capabilities. Absent a rending of the alliance, this will—and should—remain the case. In the meantime, although Japan's defense budget will continue to grow, the rate of that growth will drop from almost six percent annually to three or four percent. At the same time, Tokyo's support of U.S. forces will rise to about 50

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percent of total costs, encompassing virtually all yen-based expenditures. American frustration over trade problems should not obscure the significance of this contribution or risk the harmony in U.S.-Japanese relations by making unreasonable demands that Tokyo do something qualitatively different on defense. Nor, at the other extreme, should it cause one to yield to some nineteenth-century notion of power blocs, seeking good relations with China, for example, to balance off Japan.

The Gulf War raised in a sharp way the issue of an appropriate role for Japan in collective security efforts beyond financial contributions. Japan should contribute personnel to U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping efforts in whatever way is politically feasible. Whether this includes assigning personnel from the Self-Defense Forces—even noncombat personnel—is obviously sensitive within Japan and throughout the region. But this issue needs to be faced squarely if Japan is to be taken seriously as a major international political force.

Southeast Asia.

Earlier perceptions that Southeast Asia is strategically vital to the United States have changed as tensions among the United States, the U.S.S.R., the P.R.C. and regional powers have abated. Today the U.S. role in Southeast Asia is one of denial and reassurance, of being a stabilizing presence, more than anything else. U.S. concerns to keep open the sea-lanes to the Middle East are also a factor, though it is not entirely clear who could prevent the United States from reopening the "choke points" should they be blocked off.

The more salient issue is not whether the United States should maintain a presence, but at what level and how. The only "permanent" U.S. facilities are those in the Philippines, and now those are becoming less assured. Philippine as well as U.S. interests dictate an arrangement less vulnerable to the baggage of the former patron-client relationship and the vagaries of everyday politics. The United States can probably maintain access to some important logistical and training facilities, but nothing like in the past. The American F-4 air wing stationed at Clark Air Base will be removed, its designated replacement F-15 wing diverted to Alaska, and the remainder of the U.S. presence at Clark circumscribed.

Subic Bay Naval Base, which has been very important to U.S. ability to operate in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf,

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may be available somewhat longer. But planners would be foolish to depend on that as a continuing option beyond the late 1990s, at least on the current basis. Various kinds of access, as at Clark, may be possible for some years to come, but the unpredictability of Philippine politics makes even that less than a sure bet.

Augmented transit rights and even arrangements for home-porting in Singapore or perhaps elsewhere may be less efficient than what the United States has enjoyed heretofore, but they may have to suffice. This would require more support ships and other logistical supplements to keep our fleet on station. But in the end quality, readiness and positioning will count far more than numbers. And though major reductions in the fleet are not advisable—certainly not a total withdrawal—the fact is that no one can challenge U.S. control of the seas, and the United States could safely provide a level of comfort in the region with less than is there now if, as is likely, the budget process so dictated.[8]

In Southeast Asia, it is important to end the Cambodian tragedy and integrate that nation, along with Laos and especially Vietnam, into the economy and polity of the region, creating stable structures of relations and interests that will work to dampen future confrontation. An active American role in this process, including a robust program of trade, aid and investment, will not only be of value in and of itself but will reassure U.S. partners of American interest in their viability. Southeast Asians are likely to favor a U.S. presence for some time to come. But especially as they continue to develop their own security cooperation, and as—and if—localized tensions abate, their perception of what is necessary or desirable may change, thus reducing the American burden.

Some have suggested that America's interest in access and stability can be better served through multilateral security arrangements. These could at least be the locus of multilateral arms control discussions, including not only CBMs but perhaps even agreements to modulate the flow of arms to the region. Moscow has supported this approach and has insistently pressed for inclusion in Asia-wide forums, making several proposals of its own for conferences and even new institutions.

[8] This raises the larger issue of whether the navy should rely more on reserves, as the other services do. While that issue goes beyond the scope of this essay, it is one the United States and the navy will have to confront in the evolving strategic and, especially, budget environment.

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Many Americans, especially in the current administration, resist such ideas because they could give the Soviets a way to undermine U.S. security relations in Asia. Thus, they have opposed recurrent Soviet proposals for a security conference in Asia, an "Asian Helsinki" or CSCA, modeled after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Instead, they have promoted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process as the vehicle for providing a sense of structure and collective focus for the region.

In our view, Washington should now promote creative mechanisms for involving the Soviet Union in global and regional economic groupings as a way of stabilizing the Soviet economy and placing Moscow's policies in a more benign and constructive context. But this is quite a different proposition from giving the Soviets, or anyone else, a substantial voice in determining the security arrangements that the United States and others work out. Not only the United States but most regional countries agree there is no need for a security conference to do that. Indeed, arms control works best in a two-sided situation, when it is clear what is being measured against what. In multipolar settings, and especially where there are complex sets of overlapping rivalries, such efforts are likely to be both infeasible and undesirable beyond a limited number of confidence-building measures.

In all likelihood, some aspects of both approaches—CSCA and APEC—will eventually be adopted, and they may well serve a useful purpose as forums to exchange views or promote economic and political cooperation. This could even extend to cooperation on such shared concerns as piracy and drug smuggling. But their prospects and, in current circumstances, their utility with respect to resolving basic security issues are still doubtful.

China.

The future power of China is a long-run concern of several Asian nations. The P.R.C. is the only indigenous nuclear power in East Asia, and over time one can expect China to become a considerable military factor. In the future, Beijing could become an increasing threat to U.S. interests. But for the present, the principal U.S. objective should be to establish a political framework and set of economic relationships that will maximize cooperative and constructive ties between China and its neighbors, as well as with the United States. While no

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guarantee, this would at least minimize the possibility that future P.R.C. power will become an instrument for aggression or intimidation.

Though Chinese military planners adamantly refuse to accept the idea at this point, it will be necessary to impress upon them that what they do will have a direct bearing on what others do. This has particular reference to Japan, where the perception of a powerful and potentially intimidating China will shape the debate over Japan's own military future. Settlement of outstanding territorial disputes will be a benchmark for all to view about the way China conceives the use of power. One can hope that something will come of expressed P.R.C. willingness to set aside competing territorial claims in the South China Sea and to pursue cooperative economic development of the resources there. But China has yet to indicate a willingness to compromise on its claims, and the emerging Chinese navy lurks in the background as a possible instrument for imposing P.R.C. sovereignty once and for all.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the American security relationship with China went through various phases, generally, though not steadily, on an upward trend. This was brought to an abrupt halt in the wake of the Tiananmen tragedy of June 4, 1989, when virtually all military connections were suspended, including the sale of military equipment and the further liberalization of technology allowed to be transferred to the P.R.C.

Barring a total turnaround in Soviet foreign and security policy, there would seem to be little inclination in Washington or Beijing to return to the heyday of triangularity when the United States and the P.R.C. indulged in games of baiting the "polar bear." Still, China will be a major force in the region and beyond. It is, of course, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.

An important question remains: How can the United States fine-tune its relations with the P.R.C. in the absence of fundamental movement by Beijing toward policies compatible with U.S. values? For one thing, the People's Liberation Army may well be a significant player in ongoing debates about the future course of China's political and economic reform and its foreign policy. Thus, as a general matter, isolating the Chinese, including cutting off all ties with the PLA, is not wise. In the long run, the United States will need to reconsider military exchanges with China, including high-level visits, information

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exchanges, port calls and possibly, over time, even some further military sales. In the near term, clearing up the pending agenda of suspended military cooperation will need to be addressed, however discomfiting that may be. As in the past, whatever the United States does with China in the military sphere will need to take account of its possible impact on the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait.

VII

The Asian-Pacific region not only will remain vital to U.S. security and well-being, it will grow in importance. It will be the U.S. responsibility, along with its friends and allies, to assure that the current benign environment is maintained. Even more, to the extent possible, America needs to work to reduce tensions that still exist, the most dangerous being in Korea.

The American public will not support the same defense establishment that it did at the height of the Cold War. Nor should it. Those who argue for modest cuts in ground forces and status quo in the navy may be correct in saying we have what we want, and we want what we have. Certainly the need for caution is strong. North Korea remains unpredictable and potentially dangerous; a precipitous U.S. withdrawal could undercut regional stability; and the Soviets have neither destroyed the bulk of their weapons nor given up their drive to remain a major power in the world. Moreover the future shape of Soviet domestic politics has not been settled.

But we also believe it is necessary to be more forthright in addressing U.S. budgetary problems and in discussing the consequences of those problems with America's friends and allies. A restructured but assured presence in Asia and the Pacific, undergirded by a stronger financial and economic base, will serve everyone well for many years to come. This will require a more dynamic policy, one that is more forward looking and that seeks to help shape the inevitable changes in the region and in the world rather than resist them. It will also require more imagination and boldness in considering what U.S. security interests truly are, and strong leadership in fashioning a strategy to meet them.

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Zvi Gitelman

GLASNOST, PERESTROIKA AND ANTISEMITISM

Antisemitism in the Soviet Union is more visible and blatant today than at any time in the past forty years. It draws on both traditional Russian sources as well as sentiments evoked by the current radical changes in Soviet society. The glasnost, or openness, unleashed by President Mikhail Gorbachev has permitted suppressed antisemitic instincts to appear on the public agenda, and perestroika, or economic restructuring, has opened entrepreneurial opportunities that many Soviet citizens view with distrust and identify with Jews. Moreover perestroika has made possible the mobilization of ethnicity by encouraging the formation of grass-roots organizations, many of which are ethnically based. While such organizations in the Baltics, the Ukraine and Moldavia have explicitly condemned antisemitism, a few groups, especially in the Russian republic, have adopted harshly antisemitic platforms.

There are 1.45 million Jews in the Soviet Union. They enjoy more cultural and religious freedom than at any time since 1948, but they also perceive themselves as more vulnerable than at any time since the openly antisemitic campaigns launched by Stalin in that year.

Soviet Jews today see antisemitism emerging mainly from the grass roots, and they are afraid that the various governments in the Soviet domain are unable to curb antisemitic excesses, even if these governments were committed to doing so. Thus, Jews are increasingly choosing to leave the Soviet Union. The Communist Party newspaper, *Pravda*, pointed out on July 22, 1990, that "Judophobia has become popular among some intellectuals. This unprecedented 'respectability' of antisemitism is especially alarming [and] prompts Jews to emigrate. The fear of pogroms turns into a panic."

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II

The existence and extent of antisemitic feelings among Soviet peoples throughout history is difficult to quantify, because only now is it becoming possible to survey freely and objectively Soviet attitudes toward ethnic groups. But historical evidence is clear in showing that antisemitism is deeply rooted in some segments of Soviet society.

The Russian Orthodox church long identified the Jews as the "enemies of Christ," indeed, his killer. Especially when the village priest was the only local resident who could read or write—the situation in much of the Russian countryside until 1918—the influence of the church and its doctrines was great.

The state, closely intertwined with the church, shared these attitudes. Jews were barred by law from living in the Russian empire until 1772, when Russia, Prussia and Austria divided Poland. The Russians swallowed eastern Poland and, to their chagrin, found that a large Jewish population came with that territory. After the Jews were reluctantly admitted to the empire they were confined to the Pale of Settlement—the 15 western provinces that had been Polish and Lithuanian—so that they would not "infect" the rest of the population.

At the turn of the nineteenth century 97 percent of Jews lived in the Pale. A *numerus clausus* was established to keep the number of Jews in higher education and professions artificially low. Jews were barred from owning land, although from time to time the tsars would permit small groups access to this most basic asset of agricultural economies. They were also effectively excluded from the heavy industries that began to develop in the nineteenth century. Jews were totally excluded from the civil service and the officer corps. Waves of pogroms hit the Jewish settlements, especially in the 1880s after the assassination of Alexander II, around 1903–05 and again in 1918–21. The well-known slogan of the pogromists was "Bei zhidov, spasai Rossii" ("Beat the kikes, save Russia"). It is little wonder that between 1881 and 1914 about two million Jews fled the Russian empire for western Europe and North America.

The fall of tsarism ended legal discrimination against Jews. The Bolsheviks also pledged to give all ethnic groups equal rights and opportunities. Indeed, while there were fewer than a thousand Jews among the Bolsheviks before 1917, Jews were driven to support the new regime by the pogroms conducted by the anti-Bolsheviks and the fact that the Red Army was

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practically the only military force in the country that did not pogromize the Jews.

The new regime gave Jews unparalleled educational and vocational opportunities. There were considerable numbers of assimilated, atypical Jews in the upper echelons of the party and state. Trotsky, for example, had grown up in a nonreligious family on a farm outside the Pale of Settlement, far removed from the Jewish population, and did not consider himself a Jew. When asked whether he was a Jew or a Russian, he replied, "I am neither; I am an internationalist, a Social Democrat." This was typical of the "non-Jewish Jews" who had rejected their own ethnic group but failed to find acceptance among the Russians. They sought to create a world where ethnicity no longer mattered, and where all would be equal.

For many non-Jews in Soviet Russia it seemed "unnatural" for Jews to wield power. Because of their higher levels of literacy and education, Jews filled the posts that the Russian intelligentsia deserted when they fled the revolution. To some, it appeared that the Jews, previously among the lowest strata, had taken over the country. This image was strengthened by the prominence of Jews in the secret police and the military, at least until the purges of the 1930s.

The German occupiers reinforced antisemitic inclinations in the 1940s by propagandizing the Soviet population. The message was that the Germans had come to liberate the Soviets from the "Judeo-Bolshevik" regime and that the misfortunes of the war should be blamed on the Soviet Jews. Immediately after the war, in which a few hundred thousand Soviet Jews were killed in combat and about 1.5 million were murdered by the Nazis, Stalin launched his infamous "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign that accused Jews of disloyalty to the country and the regime.

In 1948 all Jewish cultural institutions in the Soviet Union were closed. Not a single Jewish school, theater or publishing house remained in the land. Jewish cultural and political leaders were arrested and exiled and, in 1952, the most prominent were shot. The Kremlin announced early the following year the "Doctors' Plot," in which Jewish doctors were accused of medically murdering some prominent Soviet leaders. Much of the population seemed to believe the tale, shied away from Jewish doctors and attacked Jews verbally and physically.

After Stalin's death the most egregious forms of antisemi-

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tism were curbed, but Jews were permanently excluded from the upper echelons of the party and government, the directorships of important enterprises and research institutes, the foreign ministry, ministry of foreign trade, secret police, military academies and other "sensitive" positions. It became very difficult for Jews to enter the humanities or social sciences. The last channel of mobility for Jews was science and technology, which explains why such a high proportion of Jewish émigrés are scientists, engineers and technicians.

Between 1957 and 1964 there was a renewed campaign against religion. A disproportionate amount of media attention was devoted to Judaism, even though by then the great majority of Jews no longer practiced their faith. Intensive anti-Zionist campaigns were used in the 1970s to mask antisemitism. In 1967 Alexei Kosygin, chairman of the Council of Ministers, declared, "There has never been and there is no antisemitism in the Soviet Union."[1] This declaration foreclosed any public discussion of the issue.

It is clear, however, from surveys of émigrés who lived in the U.S.S.R. at that time that the realities—or at least their perceptions of them—were far different. In 1980–81 a group of 1,161 ex-Soviet citizens was interviewed. All had left the U.S.S.R. between 1977 and 1980 and resettled in Israel or the United States. Respondents were asked whether they "had personally experienced antisemitism in the Soviet Union." The following table, arranged by the regions in which they had

TABLE 1
FREQUENCY OF ANTISEMITIC ENCOUNTER, BY REGION
(percent)

	Russia	Ukraine	Baltic	Moldavia	Georgia	Central Asia
Often	33.2	38.0	26.8	25.2	6.3	13.1
Sometimes	40.4	31.9	36.9	37.4	20.5	34.3
Rarely	21.2	16.9	22.3	18.3	30.4	31.3
Never	4.1	12.7	11.5	18.3	40.2	19.2
Don't know/ No Answer	1.0	0.5	2.5	0.9	2.7	2.0

[1] Quoted in William Korey, *The Soviet Cage*, New York: Viking, 1973, p. 3.

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lived most of their lives, displays the results.[2]

There were surprisingly no consistent differences by age in perceptions of antisemitism; it mattered little during which historical period one had come of age. The survey also found no relationship between the strength of one's Jewish background, upbringing or religiosity and perceptions of antisemitism. The higher one's education, however, the stronger one's perceptions of antisemitism. This is no doubt explained by the difficulties Jews encountered in employment and in admission to higher educational institutions. Less educated people generally found blue-collar jobs without much trouble, but more educated Jews found it more difficult to get positions in their fields.

Higher educated Jews were also more likely to be aware of media and literary attacks on Judaism, Israel, Zionism and, by implication, Jews. Interestingly, 30.4 percent of former Communist Party members reported encountering antisemitism "often," and 41.1 percent "sometimes." It seems that the higher one's professional status in the Brezhnev period, the more one encountered or perceived antisemitism. The findings in this survey are in line with those of four others.[3] The reality of societal and state antisemitism was denied by the authorities throughout the Brezhnev period, thus making its existence all the more galling to the Jews.

III

The first rumors of pogroms began circulating in the summer of 1988 in connection with the celebration of the Christian millennium. Rumors of pogroms spread in the Ukraine in the spring of 1989 and were discussed in the press, which cited threats to Jews: "What happened in Poland in 1968 [a massive purge of Jews] and in Sumgait in 1988 [clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis] will happen to you."[4] The Moscow publication *Argumenty i fakty*, which in 1989

[2] For details of the sample, see Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Antisemitism and its Perception by Soviet Jews," in *Antisemitism in the Contemporary World*, ed. Michael Curtis, Boulder: Westview, 1986, pp. 198–202.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 202.

[4] "Chi bude pogrom?" *Zoriia* (Dnepropetrovsk), April 18, 1989. See also O. Desiaterik, "Bez uperedzhenosti," *Ibid.*, May 16, 1989. One 19-year-old who had put up posters threatening pogroms was caught and depicted as a marginal character from a broken home with an alcoholic father. He was said to have joined several "informal" organizations, including Hare Krishna. Readers were assured he had worked alone and that there were no coconspirators. L. Gampolsky, "Kto rasprostranial slukhi o pogromakh," *Dnepr vecherny* (Dnepropetrovsk), July 5, 1989.

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enjoyed the highest circulation of any Soviet newspaper, discussed rumors of a pogrom scheduled for August 19. It said that the ministry of internal affairs reported hearing such rumors before and that it had taken preventive measures.[5]

At the same time, *Komsomolskaia pravda* reassured its readers that previous rumors of pogroms had proved unfounded.[6] A newspaper in the Russian city of Kursk observed that the rumors of pogroms were designed "to sow panic, insecurity among people of Jewish nationality."[7] *The New York Times* reported in February 1990 that authorities in Odessa had issued an "unusual warning that fanning racial hatred is a crime punishable by imprisonment," because a "wave of fear and rumors of pogroms had swept through Soviet Jewish circles across the country." A meeting of Moscow writers was disrupted in January 1990 by intruders—unrestrained by police—who demanded, "Yids, get out to your Israel!" It was also widely rumored that there would be pogroms on May 5, and this elicited several "news accounts and government warnings against pogroms."[8]

Against this background one can understand the reaction of Grigori Kanovich, a distinguished Jewish writer from Vilnius elected to the Congress of People's Deputies on the ticket of Sajudis, the Lithuanian movement for perestroika. In an article published in the Vilnius edition of *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Kanovich described Jews all over the country as considering leaving, and suggested the real question was, "Can we stay?" Could Jews stay in the U.S.S.R., he asked, "when leaden pogrom clouds are hanging over our heads . . . when the lightning of intolerance and hostility is flashing ominously near and far, when there is an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust all around us?" He concluded, "We still have no long-term guarantees of an equal and secure existence."[9]

Kanovich was among 200 members of the Congress of People's Deputies who signed a petition asking Gorbachev to publicly condemn antisemitism. The petition was not granted, further exacerbating the fear of pogroms that the government would be powerless to stop. While pogroms did not material-

[5] *Argumenty i fakty*, Aug. 19–25, 1989.
[6] "Neuzhto ne slykhali?" *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Aug. 22, 1989.
[7] B. Kirillov, "Razmyshlenie po povodu polzut slukhi," *Kurskaia pravda*, July 2, 1989.
[8] Frances X. Clines, "Anxiety Over Antisemitism Spurs Soviet Warning on Hate," *The New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1990.
[9] G. Kanovich, "Evreiskaia romashka," *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Vilnius, Oct. 5, 1989.

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ize, antisemites nonetheless succeeded in spreading anxiety and even panic among Jews across the country.

Social scientists of the newly established Jewish Research Center interviewed 352 delegates and guests at the December 1989 congress of Jewish communities and organizations. They asked whether "you have personally encountered antisemitism in the last half year in your area of residence?" Responses were evenly distributed: 35 percent answered "very often" or "quite often," 38 percent "sometimes," and 25 percent "rarely" or "never."

But when asked if there could be an upsurge of antisemitism in the near future in their area, 52 percent deemed it possible; only a quarter said it was not possible, and the rest could not say.

Perceptions of antisemitism are also quite different in various parts of the country. While 94 percent of Leningraders and 72 percent of Muscovites polled thought an upsurge of antisemitism was possible, only 21 percent of those from the Caucasus and 29 percent of those from central Asia thought the same. The strongest fears of antisemitism were expressed by those from the largest Jewish communities of the European U.S.S.R.[10]

IV

In contemporary Soviet antisemitism there are four main themes: Jewish disloyalty to the Soviet Union, and specifically to Russia; Jewish domination of elite positions; Jewish privilege, as exemplified by a special right to emigrate, with emigration in turn proving Jews' disloyalty and ingratitude; finally, Jews as the root of all of society's evils.

It was not until the end of 1988 that the politically liberal magazine *Raduga*, published in Russian in Estonia, became perhaps the first Soviet publication to treat the issue in depth. The magazine published a symposium on antisemitism in which the lead writer asked, "Isn't it true that until recently prostitution and drug addiction also did not exist among us? We had no shortages, there was no corruption, no mafia and, similarly, there was no antisemitism."[11]

Earlier, on February 1, 1988, *Pravda* criticized the Russian nationalist organization Pamiat for antisemitism, as did *Izvestia*

[10] *Vestnik evreiskoi sovetskoi kultury*, Feb. 14, 1990, p. 4.
[11] Vladimir Ramm, "Antisemitizm," *Raduga*, 1988, p. 80.

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on February 27, mocking Pamiat's allegations of a Zionist-Masonic conspiracy for world domination. The newspaper *Sovetskaya kultura* criticized Soviet writings as antisemitic, though the writings purported to be merely anti-Zionist. And the widely read magazine *Ogonyok* published an article saying: "Unfortunately, in the recent past the criticism of Zionism was not always conducted from a class position in the works of certain Soviet authors. Scientific analysis was replaced by ambiguous hints, and the concepts 'Jew' and 'Zionist' were often confused. Antisemitism and its social roots were passed over in silence . . . or received an incorrect evaluation."[12]

The traditional sentiment of Russian nationalism has also resurfaced with glasnost. Almost all of the groups in today's Russian nationalist camp have values radically different from those of the dissident movement of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as from those of the Soviet regime. The dissident movement had a high proportion of Jews. Its values are associated, in the minds of many Soviet citizens, with "Jewish thinking."

"The dissident movement . . . failed to garner broad support . . . because of its limited and legalistic approach to human rights, and its appeals to Western support," writes Nicolai Petro. "By contrast, patriotic sentiment appeals to strong visceral attachments of people . . . [and] gives them not only a cause but a specific agenda to act upon. Moreover, such action is not limited to urban centers. . . . By its very orientation Russian nationalism displays a belief in the people which many dissidents lack."[13] One need not agree with his characterization of the dissident movement to appreciate the contrast between its values and those of the "patriots."

Petro also contrasts the values of the nationalists with what he sees as the values of the Soviet regime, and the regime's values closely resemble those that most Soviet citizens attribute to Jews. Jews are perceived as oriented toward Europe, cosmopolitan, educated, urban, nonreligious and at home in too many cultures to be unswervingly committed to Russian culture. The association of Jews with political liberalism and a lack of patriotism was emphasized in an article by a Leningrad chemistry teacher, Nina Andreevna, that became a political cause célèbre. "Another special feature of the views of 'left-

[12] *Ogonyok*, June 1988.

[13] Nicolai Petro, "The Project of the Century: A Case Study of Russian National Dissent," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Autumn/Winter 1987, p. 250.

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liberals' is an obvious or camouflaged cosmopolitan tendency, a sort of denationalized 'internationalism'," Andreevna wrote, citing Trotsky as the epitome of this tendency. Trotsky, in her view, slighted Russian culture and the Russian proletariat. She then linked "militant cosmopolitanism" to the desire to emigrate and to "refuseniks" who commit "outrages" by demonstrating publicly.[14]

The brunt of Andreevna's article was an attack on perestroika. It was thus widely bruited about that she was speaking for a conservative political faction whose leaders were in the highest echelons. Regardless, her views undoubtedly reflect those of many others. It is important, therefore, to note her explicit observations on the Jews made in an interview with *The Washington Post*.

> In our society there are less than one percent Jews. Just a few, fine, so then why is the Academy of Science . . . and all the prestigious professions and posts in music, culture, law, why are they almost all Jews? Look at the essayists and journalists—Jews, mostly. At our institute people of all different nationalities defend their theses. But Jews do it illegally. We can see that the work they hand over is a simple dissertation, but they insist that they have made a world-class discovery. And there's nothing in it at all. . . . Certain Zionist organizations are carrying out their work here. . . . They are clever conspirators. I know that our Leningrad professors . . . go once a month to the synagogue and give them money on the day they get their salary. This goes on. This is constant mutual aid. In such a way the Jewish people keep getting into the institute.[15]

Similar arguments are made by others, such as K. V. Ostashvili, leader of one faction in Pamiat and the first person to be sentenced to jail for antisemitic slander. He asserts, "A Zionist-influenced commercial-financial mafia is operating in our country. It is taking over the spiritual and economic life of the country and making a dash for power." Ostashvili claimed that Jews are overrepresented "in all areas of government and public life" and called for proportional representation of nationalities in those areas.[16]

The theme of Jewish privilege and even domination has been agitating the writers' unions in Leningrad and Moscow. The magazine *Oktiabr* was criticized for publishing the "anti-Russian" works of Vassily Grossman (a Jew who died in 1964),

[14] *Sovetskaya Rossiia*, March 13, 1988.
[15] David Remnick, "Gorbachev's Biggest Detractor," *The Washington Post*, July 28, 1989.
[16] Interview in *Izmailovskii vestnik*, no. 2, 1990, p. 3.

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Alexander Yanov (a Jewish émigré) and Andrei Sinyavsky (a Russian émigré who published under the Jewish-sounding pseudonym, Abram Tertz). One Leningrad writer characterized the writers' debates as a "struggle between the Russian and Jewish peoples." Another charged that "only a lack of elementary respect for us Russian writers on the part of writers who are of Jewish nationality can explain the fact that we Russian writers make up only 20 percent of the Leningrad organization." And at one such debate a writer from Krasnoyarsk observed, "I wasn't familiar with the Jewish matter before, but when I asked why they're everywhere I was told, 'Because they're smart'. . . . But why have they led us up a blind alley? (laughter, applause)" The writer continued, "People ask Gorbachev, 'Why do you oppose the Jews?' He answers, 'Come on!' Twenty percent of the people in executive positions are Jews. If we don't start talking about this openly and calmly, this question is going to hang over us like a sword of Damocles."[17]

Another writer claimed that the writers' dispute was not a Russian-Jewish debate but "a dispute between Zionism, the worst form of world fascism [*sic*], and mankind." She asked, "How long are Russian writers, . . . native Russians, going to groan under the heel of oppressors and usurpers?" She mentioned two Russian writers who "are grey-haired, yet they're pleading and suffering, in essence like Palestinian children. (applause) We have an obligation to help our blood brothers, for they are in trouble. Russian blood . . . is thicker than water!"[18]

This kind of discussion is not confined to the closed meetings of writers' groups. In Moscow in December 1989 a televised rebuttal was aired to a previous program in which Russian writers distinguished between "Russian" and "Russian-language" writers, who they claimed dominated the Russians, not allowing them to publish or restricting the size of their editions. When the moderator pressed the participants to specify who the "Russian-language" writers were, they replied, "the Jewish mafia."

The distinguished scientist and former dissident Igor Shafarevich has described the Jews as a "lesser people" (*maly*

[17] "Life, Books and the Writer's Position," *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, Dec. 1, 1989, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (CDSP), Jan. 24, 1990.
[18] *Ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1990.

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narod), a concept developed in connection with the French Revolution. According to Shafarevich, a "lesser people" is one that lives "in its own intellectual and spiritual world, detached from the people at large, . . . an elitist group whose essential beliefs are antithetical to those of the people as a whole." His argument proceeds as follows:

> One indication that we are dealing at present with a stratum that is suffused by elitist sentiment and has no desire to enter into contact with the main social strata . . . can be seen in the fact that so many articles and statements produced by members of this group are directed at the problems of a *minority*. For example, the question of leaving the country, which is relevant to perhaps a few hundred thousand people, has aroused incredible passion. . . . A veritable 'cult of emigration' has developed, wherein emigration has become a . . . philosophy of life that reflects contempt for, and isolation from, life in our country.

Shafarevich charges the writers Pomerants, Amalrik, Shragin, Yanov and the American professor Richard Pipes—all but one of whom is Jewish—with "contempt for the Russian people" or "Russophobia." He complains that while the Russians are scorned, "there is only one nation whose concerns we hear about almost daily. Jewish national emotions are putting not just our country but the whole world into a fever, affecting disarmament talks, trade pacts and international ties among scholars and provoking demonstrations." He then continues, "the 'Jewish question' has assumed incomprehensible power over minds, obscuring the problems of the Ukrainians, Estonians and other peoples, while the existence of the 'Russian question' is not even acknowledged." Ultimately he warns, "if the 'lesser people' ideology were to succeed, it would spell the final destruction of the religious and national foundations of life."[19]

The paradox is that these sentiments could not have been expressed as sharply and openly before glasnost. Nor could the extremist Russian nationalist organization Pamiat have engaged in such public, blatant antisemitic agitation.

V

Pamiat has gained considerable notoriety inside and outside the U.S.S.R., but it is only one of several groups that advocate Russian chauvinism at the expense of the Jews. Liberal polit-

[19] Igor Shafarevich, "Russophobia," *Nash sovremennik*, June 6, 1989, translated in CDSP, Dec. 13, 1989.

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ical commentator Fyodor Burlatsky believes that if a multiparty system were to come into being, Pamiat would "grow in size to ten million in one year."[20] While the amount of support Pamiat enjoys is not clear, its ideology is. It was described in an interview with an Italian journalist by Dmitrii Vasilev, one of Pamiat's leaders. "We have reached the conclusion that it is no coincidence that we have been witnessing for years the destruction of our historic monuments, our traditions and the customs of . . . the Russian people," Vasilev said. "There is clearly some evil force wanting to . . . destroy our culture." He concluded that the force was "Zionism and Freemasonry." When asked whether by "Zionists" he meant Jews, Vasilev said:

> Yes, always these Jews, as though there were nobody else in this world. The Jews live everywhere, own the capital, live like parasites throughout the world, emigrate freely from country to country and are always depicted as the most unfortunate nation. . . . It is enough to read the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion' to realize who created this situation. However, not all Zionists are Jews and not all Jews are Zionists. This is why we are not antisemitic.[21]

Once again there are the same themes: Jewish dominance, persecution of Russians and worldwide conspiracy. A Pamiat poster dated November 1989 complains that while Article 36 of the Soviet constitution guarantees equal rights to all peoples, Russians are underrepresented and Jews overrepresented in higher education and in "the upper echelons of science, culture, administrative organs and other privileged spheres." A Pamiat circular "reveals" the "true identity" of Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, as "Leah Alekseevna Fishberg," and that of Leonid Brezhnev as "Alfredo [*sic*] Izrailovich Garpinsky." And even Stalin is said to have been born of a Jewish mother and an Ossetian prince.

VI

Glasnost has brought forth more open and explicit forms of antisemitism, but some of the old types still linger. Despite the improvement of Soviet relations with Israel and the general

[20] "Political Changes in the Soviet Union," meeting report, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, D.C., December 1989.

[21] Interview with Fiammett Cucurnia, *La Repubblica*, Feb. 26, 1988, quoted in Nicolai Petro, "Perestroika from Below: Voluntary Socio-Political Associations in the RSFSR"; paper prepared for the University of Pennsylvania/Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 13, 1989.

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curtailment of the more absurd excesses of Brezhnev-period propaganda, "anti-Zionism" is still used to mask antisemitism.

After Grigory Alpernas, a Zionist activist from Vilnius, spoke at the Jewish Cultural Association in the Ural mountain city of Chelyabinsk, he was accused of saying that the Jews "already rule the world and they need only take power into their hands." The Jewish Cultural Association was accused of hosting "nationalist and Zionist" ideas and was warned that its activities could not continue in this vein.[22] Several Russian nationalist and politically conservative journals have continued to attack Zionism with the same rhetoric used in the Brezhnev era. A 1990 circular admonished: "Russians! Brothers! Our danger comes neither from the right nor the left. Our main enemy, the enemies of Russia, are the Zionists! . . . Under the guise of 'left radicals,' 'democrats,' 'national frontists,' the Zionists are making a desperate dash for power."

The respectability and visibility recently accorded Christianity also raise some doubts among Jews because of antisemitic traditions in the Russian Orthodox, Ukrainian and Lithuanian Catholic churches. Religious homilies are now shown on Soviet television, and a Russian Orthodox mass was shown on Christmas. The bells of St. Basil's Cathedral in the Kremlin were rung for the first time since the revolution. At the televised funeral of former Politburo member Kirill Mazurov the camera focused on a Russian Orthodox priest who approached the coffin, laid a rose on it and crossed himself—no doubt a first for the funeral of a Politburo member.

Some church leaders—for example, Metropolitan Pitirim—have cooperated with Jewish cultural activists, but others have adopted more traditional stances. One church publication called former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin the "Zionist Führer," and quoted CIA documents captured in Iran in an effort to show that the Israeli secret services use Jewish communities around the world for their "nefarious" purposes. Soviet Zionists, said the writer, are undoubtedly secret agents of Israel.[23]

In difficult times people often look for scapegoats when rational explanations for their troubles elude them. Soviet

[22] S. Peisner, "Pod flagom Izraiilia," *Chelyabinsky rabochii*, Oct. 26, 1989, and "Po povodu odnoi publikatsii," *Ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1989.

[23] Evgenyi Korshunov, "Vse tak zhe stavka na terror?" *Moskovsky tserkovny vestnik*, August 1989.

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peoples are today being bombarded with information about their failures and mistakes, past and present. Non-Russians can at least point the finger of blame at Russians, accusing them of having imposed a flawed system on the non-Russians, thus shifting blame from themselves to the prevailing nationality.

Russians are angered by what they see as the ingratitude and even perfidy of peoples upon whom they have conferred the benefits of literacy, industry, security and social welfare. But if non-Russians can blame Russians for the failures of the system, who can the Russians blame? Perhaps only themselves. Some, however, are tempted to find non-Russian scapegoats, usually the Jews, or Jews and Masons.

Soviet society finds itself ill prepared to deal with the troublesome issues glasnost released from Pandora's box. Instead of dealing with these issues with techniques developed in more open societies, where there are organizations that aim to ameliorate ethnic, religious and racial conflict, some Soviet peoples can only resort to ancient and primitive traditions, resulting in disorder, suffering and tragedy.

Soviet Jews can draw no encouragement from eastern Europe, where antisemitic expressions have accompanied the recent political upheavals and uncertainties. In Hungary, Poland and Romania economic privation and political competition have spurred some elements to stress the "alien" character of local Jews and to blame them for the ills of communism, economic difficulties or disloyalty to "the nation." Some political parties in Hungary and Romania, especially those whose origins and even leaders go back to the prewar period, have lapsed partially into their traditional antisemitic postures. In Poland, where the Jewish population is today less than 10,000—compared to over three million in 1939—the purported "Jewish origins" of Tadeusz Mazowiecki became an issue in the 1990 presidential election campaign. And Lech Wałeşa called on candidates "of Jewish origin" to identify themselves. There have been no pogroms in eastern Europe thus far, but the emergence of antisemitism in a period of political and economic transition is instructive for Soviet Jewry.

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VII

From a Western perspective the behavior of Soviet Jews today may seem irrational, even hysterical. Strictures against religion have been eased; Jewish books and other items can be freely shipped in from abroad, and some Jewish religious books have begun to be published in the Soviet Union. Three small yeshivas have been established in Moscow and Leningrad. Very few Jews have been killed in the ethnic violence of the past three years. Some Jews have attained prominence in the Soviet intelligentsia, and those who are truly frightened can leave. Only 914 Jews were allowed to emigrate in 1986. The number grew to over 8,000 the following year, 18,965 in 1988, and over 71,000 in 1989. This last figure represents an increase of 20,000 over the previous peak emigration year, 1979. But in 1990, over 184,000 Soviet Jews left, setting a new record and constituting the largest annual immigration to Israel since 1951.

Whereas 35,000 Jews left in December 1990, only 14,000 left in January 1991, and less than half that in February. Emigration offices were reported to be curtailing their hours severely, and the number of refusals for emigration permits rose. This may reflect Gorbachev's backing away from glasnost and perestroika, the increased influence of the KGB and the military, and a general "tightening up" of social order. On the other hand, it may be the result of difficulties immigrants are experiencing in Israel or of the war in the Persian Gulf. It is too early to tell if this downturn portends a long-term policy change. In any case, it does not stem from antisemitic motivations.

A recent study of antisemitic attitudes conducted in the Moscow region found that 18 percent of the respondents said they disliked Jews, an equal proportion said they liked them, and 65 percent said they were neutral. Nearly equal proportions thought that "most people in the Soviet Union are anti-Jewish" and that "very few people are anti-Jewish." Over 90 percent thought Jews should have the right to emigrate or choose to stay in the U.S.S.R., and 88 percent favored equal employment opportunities for Jews.[24]

Robert Brym interprets data from two polls to support the

[24] Frank Prial, "Survey in Moscow Sees a High Level of Anti-Jewish Feeling," *The New York Times*, March 30, 1990, p. A8.

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contention "that there is in Moscow today considerable overlap among attitudes that have historically been associated with one another—authoritarianism, anti-Westernism, antisemitism and extremist Russian nationalism. They also suggest that roughly a third of the population is sympathetic to this ideological complex."[25]

Though these results—which may not be extrapolated to the country as a whole—indicate higher levels of antisemitism than most surveys find in the United States, they do not indicate the widespread and intense anti-Jewish feelings that would lead to pogroms. Moreover, in elections to local soviets in March 1990, "right-wing" candidates associated with extremist nationalism and antisemitism were soundly trounced in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and other areas. Russian nationalists won only about 10 percent of the vote in the Russian republic. A study conducted in the Moscow region by American social scientists found less antisemitism than expected, and little support for policies that discriminate against Jews. Those resistant to change, the less educated and those with a deteriorating financial condition are more likely to express antisemitic feelings.[26]

In 1990 over six million people subscribed to the liberal publications *Novy mir* and *Ogonyok*, while one million subscribed to the conservative *Molodaya gvardiya* and *Nash sovremennik*, which have carried antisemitic articles. Why, then, is there still a widespread fear of pogroms and a rush to flee the country?

VIII

Soviet Jews and others are suspicious that the political reforms of the late 1980s are temporary or will not work, and that dictatorship is as likely as democracy in the near future. By early 1991 Gorbachev's conservative shift confirmed these suspicions and raised the specter of an antisemitic backlash. Soviet Jewish perspectives, moreover, are quite different from Western outlooks; they have been molded in a specific historical context and in circumstances very different from those of American Jewry. For Americans, the Russian civil war, the

[25] Robert J. Brym, "Perestroika, Public Opinion, and Pamyat," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, Winter 1989, p. 30.

[26] James Gibson and Raymond Dush, "Cultural Antisemitism in the U.S.S.R.," unpublished paper, University of Houston.

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Holocaust and the "black years" of Stalinism, if known at all, are abstract matters. They happened "in Europe." For Soviet Jews, these events took the lives of sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, other relatives and friends. They have an immediacy and reality that few Americans can grasp.

American Jews take pride in their communal organization and their political power. The Jewish population of the U.S.S.R. is only just beginning to organize itself, and the "Vaad" founded in December 1989 has not achieved recognition by the Soviet government, or even by world Jewry and the state of Israel. While American Jews may pride themselves on their political "clout," Soviet Jews have none. They could not even get their government to issue a formal condemnation of antisemitism. They feel politically impotent and hence vulnerable. Unlike Western Jewries, Soviet Jewry has no defense organizations. Individuals who feel discriminated against or threatened have no antidefamation league or civil rights organization to turn to.

American Jews assume that antisemitic acts will be punished by the law, that their government affords them basic protection against discrimination and persecution. Historically the Soviet government ceased enforcing equal protection by the end of the 1920s, itself sponsored antisemitism in the 1940s and 1950s, and more subtly promoted it in subsequent decades. Though the present regime seems to have moved away from the practices of its immediate predecessors, it has not "returned to Leninist norms" in condemning antisemitism, let alone taken active measures against it.

A Soviet Jew cannot feel secure in the knowledge that the force of government will be applied against those who attempt to persecute him or her. The once powerful central government has proved incapable of stemming ethnic violence and imposing order in troubled regions. Whereas in earlier decades Jews feared the power of the government, in the late 1980s and 1990 they were frightened by its weakness. The central government may have neither the will nor the ability to intervene effectively against antisemitic attacks. But a turn toward militant, and military, conservatism may change these perceptions.

For Soviet Jews the danger today seems to come more from "below" than from "above." This grass-roots antisemitism is in some ways more frightening. When the government was the

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main source of anti-Jewish agitation, Jews experienced a kind of anonymous antisemitism, one which was more remote, not ad hominem, but systemic. The current antisemitism in the Soviet Union is "face to face," more personal, and hence more frightening. Whereas it was once mostly radicals, refuseniks and "marginal types" who faced persecution, now conformist and highly acculturated Jews suddenly find themselves the targets of direct attacks, which the government does not stop.

IX

There seem to be three alternative scenarios for the short-term Soviet future. First, at the beginning of 1991 the U.S.S.R. seemed to be on the brink of chaos or revolution. There existed all the ingredients of a classic prerevolutionary situation: a divided elite, a leadership unsure of its course, a disintegrating empire, discontented nationalites, an economy in shambles and a hitherto repressed population exhilarated by finding its voice and using it before new rules of civil discourse had been worked out. Chaos, revolution or civil war would make anti-Jewish outbursts from below a distinct possibility as part of massive social disorder.

The second scenario is the imposition of social order along a more conservative course with an increasing reliance on the military. The obvious failures of perestroika and Gorbachev's instinct for political self-preservation have led him to retreat to more conservative positions, including curbs on glasnost. The military—resentful of budget and manpower cuts, troubled by the loss of forward positions in eastern Europe and embarrassed by criticisms in the media, desertions and draft dodging—is now attacking Gorbachev directly. At the same time, Gorbachev is relying on the armed forces and the KGB to reassert control over the streets and secessionist republics. There have been some attempts to curb the black market and even foreign economic involvement, as urged by KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov, but there is no clear indication of fundamental changes in the economy. Some even talk of a "Pinochet solution" (named for Chile's former dictator) in which severe political and cultural curbs would accompany the freeing up of the economy to market forces.

In this scenario, the Jews may not be very much affected. They want emigration and cultural autonomy, not secession. If the East-West relationship remains good, there is every reason to grant them both. While Jews would regret general cultural

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and political curbs, they would welcome a stronger central government that could prevent pogroms and social disorder.

A third scenario envisions not only the reimposition of social order but the restoration of tight controls and repression. Gorbachev could well be replaced by a reactionary, not merely conservative, coalition or single leader standing on a domestic platform of restoring discipline and advocating a Slavophilic foreign policy. Emphasis on the uniqueness of the Slavic lands could lead to drastically curtailed cultural ties with the West and the denigration of Western values. Demagogic appeals to save the country from being bought and conquered by the West could mobilize significant segments of the population against all those construed as "westernizers"—Balts, intellectuals, economic and political reformers and Zionists.

Jews would be then singled out as the perpetrators of perestroika and held accountable for its failings. Relations with Israel would be chilled and a tilt back to the militantly pro-Arab policies of the 1970s could be expected. Emigration would again be limited, perhaps to a few "humanitarian" cases. Jewish religious and cultural life would be cut down to some symbolic functions on grounds that spontaneous cultural and religious activity had led to Zionism, emigration and "the separation of the Jewish masses from other nationalities." Like the first scenario the consequences of such a course are highly unpleasant for Jews—and many other nationalities.

If there is one lesson learned since 1985, it is that rapid change could come to what had previously been seen as a moribund, static society and state. Possibly the only thing that is certain about the near-term Soviet future is uncertainty itself. In light of recent history, with the loss of tens of thousands of their fellow Jews in the civil war and over a million in the Holocaust, many Soviet Jews are not inclined to wait and see what the future will bring. They would rather try to determine their own futures as free men and women than as the objects of other peoples' frustrations and resentments.

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Robert G. Kaiser

GORBACHEV: TRIUMPH AND FAILURE

In just over five years, Mikhail Gorbachev transformed the world. He turned his own country upside down. He woke a sleeping giant, the people of the Soviet Union, and gave them freedoms they had never dreamed of. He also gave them back their own horrific history, which his predecessors had hidden and distorted for sixty years. He tossed away the Soviet empire in eastern Europe with no more than a fare-thee-well. He ended the Cold War that had dominated world politics and consumed the wealth of nations for nearly half a century. Then he discovered that he had started a revolution he could not control—a discovery that led to chaos and tragedy. These are the most astounding historical developments that any of us are likely to experience.

Many of these changes were the fruit of Gorbachev's personal endeavors. Others were more logical than they may have seemed as they were happening. Gorbachev was often working with the forces of history, not against them. The West has not always grasped the uncertain nature of Soviet history. It tended to see a monolithic, totalitarian power, hell-bent on world domination; for many years, it also saw a Soviet Union that seemed to be advancing that goal relentlessly. Those were flawed images. One of the most important reasons why Gorbachev was possible was that the Soviet system never worked as well as advertised. By the time he was a candidate for national leadership, it was stumbling badly. His prescriptions for radical change were acceptable to many of his countrymen because they understood their country had fallen into a disastrous state.

Ultimately Gorbachev may enjoy the historical status of a transitional leader—one who bridged two eras by keeping a foot in both. It is clear that Gorbachev's ability to maintain a sort of split personality as both Party man and revolutionary was what enabled him to shatter the Stalinist system. If there

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had not been two Gorbachevs, there would have been no Gorbachev of the kind we will now remember. But Gorbachev's inability to renounce his roots in the Party limited his freedom of action and, eventually, his capacity to manage the forces that his revolution unleashed. Because he was a good Party man he succeeded; because he was a good Party man he failed. That may prove to be the ultimate paradox of Gorbachev.

The events of early 1991 in Lithuania and Latvia allow for a new and more complete set of answers to basic questions about Gorbachev the man and Gorbachev the reformist leader. They are discouraging answers, especially for those in the Soviet Union and around the world who had allowed themselves to romanticize this man. He turned out to be something less than noble, something more recognizably Soviet and communist and political.

Mikhail Gorbachev's historical reputation will depend largely now on how far the violence goes—on how willing he proves to be to reverse his own civilizing reforms. It seems likely that the positive contributions for which he will be remembered have all been made. Moreover he has assured himself a large place in history, and a large part of his reputation will be positive, despite his ultimate failures.

II

If the formation of character cannot be divined, the character itself is not so mysterious. Gorbachev's character is formidable and has made him stronger than those around him in Soviet politics. He has intimidated and impressed everyone who has worked near him. Boris Yeltsin, his great rival, admitted this in his autobiography:

> What he has achieved will, of course, go down in the history of mankind. I do not like high-sounding phrases, yet everything that Gorbachev has initiated deserves such praise. He could have gone on just as Brezhnev and Chernenko did before him . . . draped himself with orders and medals; the people would have hymned him in verse and song, which is always enjoyable. Yet Gorbachev chose to go another way. He started by climbing a mountain whose summit is not even visible. It is somewhere up in the clouds and no one knows how the ascent will end: Will we all be swept away by an avalanche or will this Everest be conquered?

Gorbachev saw firsthand many of the most important dramas of the Stalin years. He joined the crowds who mourned

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Stalin, and then joined the intense student conversations that Stalin's death had suddenly made possible. As an official in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), he participated in the excitement initiated by Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956, and was a delegate to the 22nd Congress where Khrushchev put his assessment of Stalin's crimes on the public record. These were experiences Gorbachev shared with countless of his contemporaries—the so-called children of the 20th Congress.

Westerners cannot easily appreciate the way Stalinist mythology overpowered Gorbachev's generation. It successfully defined reality for millions of Soviet citizens, including many who considered themselves free-thinking and cynical but who still could not escape the world view inculcated by official propaganda from kindergarten onward. The myths became a kind of political and intellectual straitjacket, limiting the freedom of movement of several generations of Soviet leaders. Gorbachev broke out of the straitjacket. The experiences of his life, which taught him from an early age that propaganda could be misleading, also enabled him to make this critical break with the conventional thinking of his time and caste—the caste of the Communist Party officials.

Gorbachev cannot be understood apart from his membership in that caste. He grew up in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; he is a Party man, instantly recognizable as such by other Party men. The Russians use the world *partinost*, roughly translatable as "partyness," to signify qualities connected with the Party. Gorbachev has always had it. Just as Richard Nixon's conservative credentials enabled him to open relations with China, so Gorbachev's *partinost* allowed him to go so far toward destroying the Soviet Communist Party. Other Party men saw him as "one of ours," and initially they accepted his prescriptions as necessary to preserve the Party's leading role.

Over the years Gorbachev's initial optimism that he could take the Party with him in a new direction was replaced by frustration, even outright hostility. He could be seen losing patience beginning with the Central Committee plenum of January 1987, when he first introduced the idea of significant political reforms. The Party apparat blocked the decisions taken then, and it blocked the economic reforms approved at the plenum of June 1987. Another important turn came during the preparations for the 19th Party Conference in June

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1988. The theses for that meeting outlined a new kind of Soviet state in which the Communist Party would have a clearly secondary role. Some of the Party elders became openly hostile to Gorbachev, and there was no sign of greater cooperation from the apparat. Then at the 28th Party Congress in July 1990, Gorbachev pushed through reforms that removed the Party from a direct role in running the country.

III

Through all of this, Gorbachev never hinted at a loss of faith in communism. But he did redefine it. In April 1990 he gave a remarkable speech to a Party gathering called to celebrate Lenin's 120th birthday. He used the occasion to consummate a process he had begun earlier of repositioning Lenin in official hagiography, converting him into an ardent ally of perestroika. "We have to look back to the sources of our Great Revolution," he said, "to realize what kind of society emerged from it, and why we need another revolution of no less importance." The society that emerged was a distortion of Leninist ideas: Lenin died too soon to prevent this. The cause was "taken up by Stalin, which spelled disaster for the Party, society and socialism. Over a short period of time, the Party was actually turned into a tool of the administration-and-command system, with all the far-reaching consequences that can still be felt today." Lenin would be on the side of a new revolution, Gorbachev suggested, because he was always the first to entertain new ideas and policies when new conditions revealed a need for them.

A month later, in May 1990, *Time* magazine asked Gorbachev, "What does it mean to be a communist today, and what will it mean in years to come?" His answer was intriguing:

> To be a communist, as I see it, means not to be afraid of what is new, to reject obedience to any dogma, to think independently, to submit one's thoughts and plans of action to the test of morality and, through political action, to help working people realize their hopes and aspirations and live up to their abilities. I believe that to be a communist today means first of all to be consistently democratic and to put universal human values above everything else. . . . The Stalinist model of socialism should not be confused with true socialist theory. As we dismantle the Stalinist system, we are not retreating from socialism, but are moving toward it.

In those few sentences Gorbachev appeared to reject (or simply ignore) virtually everything the West had previously

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associated with Soviet communism. He embraced a flexible, moralistic and humane outlook that could have come from the mouth of an American Unitarian. Yet when his own moment of truth came in Lithuania, Gorbachev could not fulfill his new definition of a communist. Instead he reverted to an earlier type.

He continued to call himself a "convinced communist" and a socialist even after he had embraced economic reforms that looked more like capitalism than socialism. "Socialism . . . is entrenched among the people," he said at the end of November 1990, "and I don't think it is necessary to destroy it, as some are trying to do."

"Yes," he went on, "we have bid farewell to the past—an agonizing process." He rejected "the barracks-like mentality of Stalinism" but he would not "renounce my grandfather and what he did. This would mean rejecting generations and what they did. Well then, did they live in vain?" In other words, if we had to admit that the whole Bolshevik experiment was a terrible mistake, we would have nothing to live for. That, I think, is what Gorbachev believes: don't take away the very essence of our cause, lest we have nothing at all.

Here, perhaps, is a clue to the flaw in Gorbachev's character that threatens to turn his revolution from a great crusade into something horrific. In the end he perceived his very identity as part of a continuum that began with Lenin. Two sentences of his April 1990 speech on Lenin are striking: "It is high time we put an end to the absurd idolization of Lenin," he said, then added: "But we condemn wholeheartedly the desecration of his memory, whatever form it takes." Don't make Lenin a golden idol, but revere him! It was a thin line to tread.

IV

Gorbachev's insistence on trying to preserve his communism ultimately undermined his position in the country. Relatively few of his countrymen shared his concern with redeeming Lenin's revolution—they wanted something to eat, some sign of progress toward a normal society and normal lives.

Although Gorbachev held on to his communist identity, he was overhauling Soviet communism to create a better Soviet Union and better communism. But communism held no appeal for large numbers of people, and the union itself held no appeal for many, probably most, of the non-Russian citizens of the U.S.S.R.

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Yet there has been much more to Gorbachev's revolution than an effort to preserve communism and the Soviet Union. At certain moments there was nobility, even morality. I am convinced that Gorbachev is, in some way difficult to define, a man of faith. Part is his secular political belief in Lenin's revolution, but Gorbachev has hinted at religious faith too.

The idea that Gorbachev is a believer is certainly beguiling; I hasten to add there is no concrete evidence to support it. A member of the Congress of People's Deputies who worked closely with Andrei Sakharov and who has come to know Gorbachev, suggested the novel theory that a shared religiosity bound those two men together—not so much a conventional religion, but a faith that "history and life have a purpose." Sakharov's moral strength grew out of his conviction that men were obliged to treat each other humanely. One could argue that Gorbachev was striving—at least until late 1990—for a similar moral authority in his renunciation of the use of force and his more tolerant attitude toward virtually everyone.

In January 1987 Gorbachev had announced that democracy was as necessary to society as air. But in July 1990 at the Party Congress, he reformulated that metaphor. "Spiritual rebirth is as essential to society as oxygen," he declared.

None of this proves that Gorbachev is actually religious; nor does his admission that his grandmother baptized him. But I am convinced he has had serious moral concerns, that he is interested in spiritual values and that he feels he is serving a larger purpose than most politicians. I do not think he could have taken on the challenges he did without some measure of faith.

V

It is a large jump from questions of belief to matters of tactics, but Gorbachev cannot be understood without an appreciation of his great gifts as a political tactician. His deftness during moments of crisis has sometimes been breathtaking—for example, when he used the young German Mathias Rust's landing of an airplane in Red Square to sweep away the upper echelon of his reactionary military establishment; or when he turned the Chernobyl nuclear accident into a reason for more aggressive glasnost; or his decision to undermine his critics in the Central Committee by publishing their reactionary criticisms of him. Those earlier examples of deftness made the crudeness of his tactics in early 1991 all the more striking.

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Generations of future historians will argue over the degree to which Gorbachev was a modern Machiavelli, who knew from the start what he hoped to achieve, but never revealed a card in his hand until he absolutely had to. To my mind this is the wrong way to think of him. As he conducted his revolution, he improvised, reacted. Yes, he did set off with a body of ideas about what needed to change. They were contained in a speech before he came to power. But there was no blueprint; there were just guiding principles.

"In 1985 we all came to the conclusion that one could not live that way," Gorbachev said in a reflective speech in November 1990. "We began looking for an answer, for a new way to live. A concept came into being for the country and the world. Speaking of internal affairs we called it perestroika, and we put forward a simple formula: more democracy, more glasnost, more humanity. Everything must be developed so that the individual in this society feels like a human being. That is a simple formula. We used exactly the sort of language that people would understand."

"He didn't have a plan," observed Evgeny Velikhov, the Soviet scientist, "but he did have a direction. And he was willing to experiment." Sergei Stankevich, the deputy mayor of Moscow, put it like this: "Gorbachev is not a man who has one set of ideas, one vision. He carries lots of ideas in his head, and if conditions push him, he'll take up one of them."

Similarly Gorbachev the revolutionary could take a break and pass the baton to Gorbachev the apparatchik, who would then behave like a reliable Party man in some situation or other, and pass the baton back to the revolutionary. He switched between the two roles as he saw fit—usually infuriating those who sympathized with whichever role he had just given up. His recurrent incarnations as a Party man led to hesitation and delay, often to the exasperation of reformers waiting for him to recommence his revolutionary crusade. In the first five years these interludes of retrenchment probably smoothed the way for further change. Gorbachev could not have bulled ahead stubbornly without any pause or hesitation; the system could not have tolerated the strain of such incessant movement.

The ability to change his mind made Gorbachev a better tactician. In the case of Yeltsin alone, Gorbachev changed his mind four or five times. In early 1986 he could speak harshly of Sakharov as a criminal; at the end of the same year he could

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

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

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

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

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

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make the dramatic phone call to Gorky that led to Sakharov's release from internal exile and eventual transformation into Gorbachev's political ally. One month the idea of a multiparty political system was "rubbish"; the next month he was urging the repeal of Article 6 of the constitution to open the way for a multiparty system. He was such a good tactician that many of his liberal supporters refused to believe, in the final months of 1990, that he was abandoning them. Instead they perceived another feint to the right in preparation for a more definitive move to the left. The blood spilled in Lithuania ended that optimism and led to bitter denunciations of Gorbachev by old allies.

At the heart of Gorbachev's tactics was the idea that he should always be somewhere in the middle. The Soviet historian Yuri Afanasyev described him in May 1990 as "a vector politician" who constantly looked for the median position between left and right. For years he cast himself as a wise and moderate leader who could thread a path between "conservatives" unprepared for change and "ultraleftists" who wanted to "skip stages" and jump ahead too quickly. Sometimes this effort to plant himself in the middle was transparently preposterous, but it often worked. He did maneuver the Party out of direct power.

Eventually the center all but disappeared. The new democratic forces drew many of those who long stood with Gorbachev in the center to the left; the deterioration of conditions in the country and the rise of nationalism drew others to the right. For five years after he came to power Gorbachev was a liberal reformer; in the sixth year he found himself on the right, a reactionary trying to stem the tides that his own reforms had created.

This was ironic as well as tragic. For years Gorbachev had argued—and seemed to believe—that democratization was the key to success. When old comrades complained that democracy resulted in the wholesale defeat of traditional communism at the polls, Gorbachev rebuked them. We wanted to give the people a voice, he said—this is why we began our reforms. But when the popular voice turned against him personally, and when democracy threatened the survival of the union, Gorbachev changed his stripes.

VI

From 1985 onward Gorbachev was hobbled by his own shortcomings. One was his inability to choose the right aides and associates, a serious disability for a political revolutionary

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trying to push a giant nation in a new direction. Apart from Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze, Gorbachev never found reliable, resourceful peers who could help him achieve his goals. In the end he even fell out with those two friends. He made many bad appointments and never built a staff of younger associates. Nor did he establish close working relationships with the new political figures his reforms had spotlighted, people like Stankevich and Gavril Popov in Moscow and Anatoli Sobchak in Leningrad. He stuck to Party apparatchiks with a loyalty that exasperated his liberal intellectual supporters.

Was this tactics, or genuine preference? Probably the latter. Gorbachev never seemed comfortable with unconventional people who might be in his intellectual class—he preferred good Party men. But his preference suited his tactics: Party men would have been alarmed if Gorbachev had suddenly embraced a retinue of liberal intellectuals with no Party background.

One reason why Gorbachev did not reach out for more talented associates may have been his excessive confidence in himself. At the outset Gorbachev seemed overconfident in his ability to carry the Party apparatus with him as he initiated reforms. Perhaps the most egregious example of his overconfidence was his failure to confront the need to create a new system to replace the one he was so successfully destroying. Gorbachev seemed to convince himself that he could postpone this task for three years, then four, then five. In the sixth year his procrastination caught up with him.

Gorbachev's first years were such a great triumph at home and abroad that when the country began to turn against him late in 1989 (angered initially by disappearing food supplies and deteriorating economic conditions), he could not adjust. In 1990, when it became clear that the Soviet Union was in real danger of disintegrating, Gorbachev allowed himself to become one of the very people he spent his first five years struggling against—a stubborn office-holder determined above all to retain power. By late 1990 it was obvious that love of power for its own sake was motivating Gorbachev, which is not surprising. This was a man who invested 23 years as a Party functionary in Stavropol to get his shot at power in Moscow. Power was important to him long before democratization was.

His inclination to take offense is another weakness. It

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aggravated his relations with many who ought to have been close allies, helping to create a real schism among the liberal intellectuals. Gorbachev never seemed comfortable with the new people created by his own policies—the aggressive liberals who actually believed in democracy, and acted accordingly.

VII

Two of the chinks in Gorbachev's armor have been substantive areas that the Soviet leader could not master: nationalities issues, as the Russians call them, and economics. They are two of the most important matters he faced, and he had a tin ear for both.

In his second speech to the 28th Party Congress he admitted his ignorance about the true state of relations among the many national groups of the Soviet Union, and accused his comrades of sharing it. "All of us—go on, admit it—honestly believed that all of this [ethnic strife] had been happily resolved," Gorbachev said. "For the most part it was toasts to the friendship of peoples at the tables of meetings and at Party gatherings. That's what our work in the area of nationalities policy amounted to. And suddenly we saw it all revealed, and the problems that faced us. . . . Nor did we immediately reach a correct assessment and understanding."

One might dismiss that confession as disingenuous; perhaps it was. It required a certain obtuseness to miss the hostility that Lithuanians and Latvians feel toward Russians, for example, or to disregard the hatred dividing Azerbaijanis and Armenians. But it is possible that Gorbachev's ideological blinders—or wishful thinking—had led him to overlook the evidence and believe the propaganda about a harmonious multinational Soviet state. This was one of the strongest myths that he had grown up with.

Whatever the explanation, the consequences of Gorbachev's obtuseness are obvious. Only after five years in power did he really begin to come to grips with the ethnic divisions that would make it so difficult to preserve the Soviet Union. Ironically the problem became vastly less soluble as a consequence of Gorbachev's reforms. Once Latvians, Ukrainians, Moldavians, Armenians and all the others felt free to speak their minds, organize politically and express their aspirations, the days of the old union were numbered. The logic of glasnost and democratization led inexorably to stronger nationalist sentiment, and from there to separatism. But Gor-

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bachev refused to accept that logic. Indeed, he abandoned his own finest principles to contradict logic and hold the country together by force.

Gorbachev's economic incompetence was also serious. It led to his failure to make early progress in reforming the economy. In the first five years his only real accomplishment was the launching of a private, or cooperative, sector of the economy, which began at once to fill in some of the many holes in the state-run system. In many other sectors there was no progress, only deterioration.

From his first months in office Gorbachev convinced the economists who advised him that he had no grasp of their subject, and no confident sense of where to lead the country. Several of those economists have confided privately to colleagues that in the early phases Gorbachev just could not understand the seriousness of the economic situation or come to terms with the pain that real reform might inflict.

The general secretary's uncertainty was clearly reflected in the contradictory initiatives undertaken as perestroika unfolded—unraveled might be a better word in this context. Gorbachev did seem to believe the system needed less central control and more autonomy for localities and enterprises. Ostensibly these were the objectives of his reforms. But the most important of them, designed to make every enterprise "self-financing," was hopelessly compromised by a system of fixed prices that hid real values. Hence, "cost accounting"—the subject of many slogans—was meaningless. When the self-financing system introduced at the beginning of 1988 began to falter, Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, with Gorbachev's support, issued numerous new decrees revoking key elements of the independence that had been promised. By the end of 1989 the economy had been effectively recentralized.

At the end of 1990 I asked Abel Aganbegyan, one of Gorbachev's economic advisors, why the economic situation was so bad. I expected him to say that the problems inherited from the past had turned out to be worse than he and the other reformers realized—in other words, an evasive answer. Not at all. Gorbachev's economic policies had been on the wrong track since the Central Committee plenum of June 1987, he said. The budget deficit had ballooned from three percent of gross domestic product (the Soviet equivalent of gross national product) in 1987 to ten percent in 1989, and higher still in 1990. The money that had to be printed to cover

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these deficits had dramatically aggravated inflationary pressures, he said. The anti-drinking campaign went out of control when prices for vodka were doubled, stimulating both an enormous black market and the disappearance of sugar, which home brewers used to make their own white lightning. The government had to spend 25 billion rubles to cope with the sugar crisis, Aganbegyan said. Then after the coal miners' strike of July 1989, wages started to rise at a terrifying rate, although workers' productivity fell. This generated more inflationary pressure. And the government's only response to all this, according to Aganbegyan, was to debate and discuss alternative reform plans.

The dark realm of economics brought Gorbachev face to face with the true consequences of Stalinist rule. This is where much of the worst damage had been done. The Soviet economy had grown according to arbitrary planners' preferences, so it was hopelessly out of balance. The men and women who ran it had no experience with independent decision-making or basic notions such as profit maximization. In a system where prices did not reflect values, the whole idea of profit was confused. Left to its own devices, the economy would more likely collapse than thrive.

Gorbachev eventually had to confront the fact that the conventional tools he had relied on for more than five years to improve economic performance were ineffectual. Managers who did not want to be responsible for the fate of their enterprises simply refused to take responsibility. Bureaucrats in Moscow who did not want to give up their power over individual enterprises found ways to hold on to it. Incentives could not be found to induce farms to grow more food or factories to produce more goods. Higher wages provided no tangible benefits, largely because there were so many extra rubles in circulation chasing too few consumer goods. The entire mechanism had devoured its lubricants and was locked.

Gorbachev's inability to brag of any positive economic results was disastrous for his standing in the country. This failure to produce goods that people wanted to eat and buy was also an incentive to the old guard reactionaries who felt defeated by the first five years of Gorbachev's rule. They revived themselves in the sixth year when they realized that they could discredit all Gorbachev's liberalizing reforms by blaming them for food shortages and worsening economic conditions.

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Ultimately the facts of Soviet life—objective reality, as a Marxist might put it—were Gorbachev's greatest enemy. He could open up the Soviet Union, restore its history, initiate debate on fundamental issues, even convert a nation of sheep-like followers into a vibrant new political organism, but he could not overcome the fundamental terms of existence in his country. So, after nearly six years, he had succeeded brilliantly, but also failed. He had thrown off the yoke of Stalinism, an astounding accomplishment; but even without the yoke the country was crippled by the consequences of the past.

Gorbachev's failures are not surprising. Consider what he proposed to do: take a huge multinational empire that had been created by force and coercion; give it a large measure of democracy, while loosening all the traditional bonds that held it together—thus encouraging the rebirth of long-suppressed local nationalisms; allow its citizens to travel quite freely around the world, but at home fail to give them attractive consumer goods, food, housing and so on—fail worse and worse, while proclaiming the benefits of your reforms; do all this in a backward land whose citizens have little training and less experience useful for building a democratic society of self-reliant citizens, a country whose economic infrastructure is collapsing. This is obviously no formula for success. It may actually be a formula for disaster.

Disaster could come in many ways. Economic collapse and famine are conceivable. Many of the 15 republics may try to go their own ways, creating chaos or civil war. Ethnic warfare could become commonplace. Ironically, Shevardnadze had warned in April 1990: "If perestroika fails, dictatorship is possible. However much we brush aside such a forecast, history does not allow us to forget it." Eight months later he was on the podium of the Congress of People's Deputies, shocking them with the announcement of his resignation and warning again of dictatorship, this time more directly. History, which he had invoked in April, was moving much faster than even he had foreseen. History—it hovers over the entire amazing enterprise, reminding all concerned that Russia has never learned how to be really free.

As he dismantled the old system, Gorbachev never eliminated the mechanisms that make a dictatorship possible. The army shrank but never lost its influence, and the Soviet version of the military-industrial complex apparently retained its ability to commandeer the most desirable economic resources.

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The KGB survived at full strength—hundreds of thousands of agents. Many of the hard-nosed Party hacks who maintained discipline for the old regime remained available for service. Censors never forgot how to censor. Prosecutors and judges still know how to take arbitrary orders from above, and probably do not know how to resist them. As the dismaying events of January 1991 made clear, Gorbachev himself never fully overcame the authoritarian instincts that he grew up with.

"They think they are real democrats," Alexander Bovin, the political commentator, said prophetically in May 1990, speaking of Gorbachev and his colleagues. "But in fact, deep down, their commitment to democracy is still limited." How could it be otherwise? An authoritarian political culture cannot learn democracy in five years.

Nor can a Soviet society that has lived through six years of perestroika quickly be reconfined in some new version of the old dictatorship. The Brezhnev-Andropov Soviet Union is gone; the pillars on which it stood have rotted away. In many parts of the country, citizens have achieved a significant measure of control over local affairs; they will resist giving that up. People have learned to speak their minds and to speak the truth. The communist mythology that propped up the old system has been destroyed. Would-be dictators might win initial support simply by promising stability and food, but that is not a compelling cause on which to rebuild the totalitarian system. Millions of Soviet citizens have cast their lot with the new thinking—people working in co-ops, people engaged in politics, readers of the liberal press, young technocrats and so on. Many took seriously Gorbachev's promises of a "rule-of-law state." They will not be easily cowed. If indeed the army and police are ready to try to reimpose totalitarian control, they will need to have an enormous appetite for blood.

VIII

The future does not belong to Gorbachev, but to others. Will they be the new democrats, who really do exist by the millions? Or will the new centurions of the Red Army and the KGB take control? They too have millions of allies in a culture whose tolerance for authoritarianism has been cultivated for centuries.

One possibility is that both groups will have a turn. First could come authoritarians in the style of General Wojciech

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Jaruzelski's junta, which took power in Poland in 1981 to crush Solidarity. Eight years later Jaruzelski voluntarily gave power back to Solidarity after he had failed to find a way to govern effectively. Like Solidarity in 1981, democrats might have to wait their turn now. First we may see a period of reactionary retrenchment that leads to no positive result, and then another try at meaningful democratization and economic change.

If the future is unpredictable, the situation in some respects is clear. The country is collapsing, economically and politically. Nationalistic popular fronts have won the allegiance of majorities in many republics. The restoration of dictatorship might eliminate the continuing chaos, but it offers no prospect of solving the country's problems. The army and its friends would find reviving the economy even harder than Gorbachev did. They would have no practical solution to nationalist tensions. They would be unable to stop the rot. That is why Shevardnadze was right when he said, at the close of his dramatic resignation speech last December, that "the dictatorship will not succeed." I hope he was also right when he added that "the future belongs to democracy and freedom."

Gorbachev has thought a good deal about his place in history. Once, when asked to which earlier Russian leaders he compared himself, he listed three reformist czars: Peter the Great, Catherine the Great and Alexander II. But of course, he added, the one I feel closest to is Lenin.

Lenin won the revolution and destroyed the old order, but he died in 1924 at age 53, long before a new order was established. Stalin established it several years later.

Gorbachev will also have left the scene before the next new order is established. Like Lenin, Gorbachev was a missionary figure who could lead a crusade to a new Russia. He has the personality of a missionary—zealous, utterly self-confident, solemn to a fault. His determination to turn away from the past and start afresh was his greatest strength. But his zealotry and his self-confidence were confining. He could begin the process of reinventing his country, but at the critical moment he could not reinvent himself.

Perhaps Gorbachev will be remembered as the leader of the prologue to true perestroika—the real renewal of Russia. This is no small accomplishment. On the contrary, his is a heroic achievement, because Machiavelli was right when he observed that nothing is more difficult than taking the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.

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Andrew J. Pierre

BENDING WITH THE WINDS: KURT WALDHEIM AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Seymour Maxwell Finger and Arnold A. Saltzman. New York: Praeger, 1990, 144 pp. $37.95.

All those who wish to see the revitalization of the United Nations, and who believe that selecting a truly superior secretary general is key to this, should read this book. The sections dealing with Kurt Waldheim do not offer much that is new, but the sensitive evaluation of an allegedly flawed individual is meticulously undertaken on the basis of many interviews by the authors, experienced former diplomats. Waldheim does not emerge as evil as some have depicted him, and there is no evidence that he was blackmailed by governments, but he is viewed as mediocre, excessively ambitious and lacking in vision and integrity. How this man was originally chosen, given a second term and almost elected to a third is discussed in some detail and does little to maintain one's confidence in the decision-making process and wisdom of governments. The other parts of the book talk about the attributes that should be sought in a secretary general and suggest the procedures that would allow a first-class person to be chosen. This makes the book important today.

AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS. By Hurst Hannum. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990, 503 pp. $44.95.

With the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflict appears to be reemerging as subnational groups fight to be heard and represented. Hence the value of this well-researched volume. Focusing on individuals and groups rather than states, the author searches for means of accommodating conflicting claims. This is done through a series of case studies ranging from the Kurds to the South Tyroleans of Italy. Government legitimacy is seen as resting on more than simple majority rule, on respect for human rights and the effective participation of all the various segments of society in the decision-making process.

TO CRAFT DEMOCRACIES: AN ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS. By Giuseppe Di Palma. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, 248 pp.

The topic is the transition to democracy: What are the impediments? How can it be achieved? This essay was completed just before the liberation of eastern Europe, but it could not be more apropos to the process now underway in that region. Writing eloquently and without political science jargon, Di Palma takes us through a sensitive discourse on political craftsmanship. He argues that transferring loyalties to democracy—not just from communist societies, but from others such as military dictator-

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ships in Latin America and right-wing authoritarian regimes—may be less difficult than some believe, provided it is done artfully. This is an optimistic but not utopian work.

THE WAYS OF POWER. By George Liska. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990, 551 pp. $39.95.

Reaching back to Thucydides, and delving into all the social sciences, this is a weighty volume—in pages and in propositions and ideas. The culmination of a life's work by this distinguished scholar, it is hard work to absorb it all. But reading it will be rewarding to those who seek a pattern in, and a deeper understanding of, the fundamentals of international politics.

THE POLITICS OF TERRORISM: TERROR AS A STATE AND REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY. Edited by Barry Rubin. Washington: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1990, 250 pp. $29.95 (paper, $15.50).
THE POLITICS OF COUNTERTERRORISM. Edited by Barry Rubin. Washington: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1990, 222 pp. $40.25 (paper, $19.00).
TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA: DILEMMAS FOR GOVERNMENT, JOURNALISTS AND THE PUBLIC. Edited by Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter. Washington: Brassey's, 1990, 147 pp. $19.95 (paper).

Most books on international terrorism are collections of essays of uneven quality, and these works are no exception. The first two books are intended as companion volumes. The first has some thoughtful essays on terrorism in a number of nations, some of which, like Egypt and Peru, have been little analyzed. The work on counterterrorism examines the experience of democratic nations such as France, Italy, Japan and the United States, and shows how they have been able—not without difficulty—to overcome domestic obstacles to effective strategies for dealing with terrorists. The third volume does a fine job of outlining some of the dilemmas that coverage of terrorism can present for the media. Can news reports and coverage—the very things terrorists seek—actually encourage such incidents? And where is the dividing line in delicate situations between self-censorship and the responsibility of the press to keep the public informed?

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Gregory F. Treverton

PERESTROIKA AND SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY. By Michael MccGwire. Washington: Brookings, 1991, 510 pp. $39.95 (paper, $18.95).
DETERRENCE AND THE REVOLUTION IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE. By Raymond L. Garthoff. Washington: Brookings, 1990, 210 pp. $29.95 (paper, $11.95).

Two deans of Soviet studies probe the Gorbachev revolution. Garthoff draws on a newly available Soviet military journal to elucidate the Soviet emphasis on war-prevention—in contrast to the more technical American emphasis on deterrence—and also to document Moscow's more recent acceptance that security must be mutual. MccGwire's magisterial study reaches back to 1945 but focuses on the 1980s. By then the open-ended

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burden of assuring that the Soviet Union would not "lose" a world war was becoming crippling. The turning point came in 1986 when Gorbachev accepted that democratization was essential to reform. More controversial, MccGwire argues that Reagan's anti-Soviet toughness, far from causing the Soviet revolution, may have slowed it.

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY: CONGRESS AND U.S. DEFENSE POLICY. By Barry M. Blechman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, 249 pp. $24.95.

Neither Blechman's conclusions nor his recommendations are unfamiliar: for instance, that many members of Congress serve longer and so are more experienced than their executive branch colleagues; that the nation's interests are best served when the two branches conspire, as they did over the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty; and thus that the executive should seek comity more often than it does. But Blechman is both seasoned in the executive and sympathetic to Congress, and the recent war in the Persian Gulf makes his exhortation all the more welcome.

THE DEFENSE REVOLUTION: STRATEGY FOR THE BRAVE NEW WORLD. By Kenneth L. Adelman and Norman R. Augustine. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990, 230 pp. $19.95.

The authors describe themselves as "an arms controller and an arms builder." Neither has been known for diffidence, as anyone who has sampled *Augustine's Laws* can attest, and both have a belief in government service that did not always characterize the top of the Reagan administration they both most recently served. Their readable book ranges widely, but its heart is how the United States buys its weapons. Much of their concluding guidance is both eminently sensible and politically improbable—for example, that Congress abandon the frustration of parallel appropriation and authorization, or that it and the executive agree on a multiyear core defense program.

AFTER THE WALL: AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD GERMANY. By Elizabeth Pond. A Twentieth Century Fund Paper. New York: Priority Press, 1990, 111 pp. $8.95.

Pond, a distinguished foreign correspondent who wrote for *The Christian Science Monitor,* was caught by the fall of the Berlin Wall midway through a book on German-American relations. This interim product is her account of the history since that time. It stays close to current policy issues but is enriched by her broader purpose and understanding.

ANALYZING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY. By Charles L. Glaser. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, 378 pp. $45.00 (paper, $16.95).

Even if you think the waning of the Cold War has made nuclear strategy about as relevant as lapidary poetry, you will be taken by the power of Glaser's relentless logic. So much of nuclear analysis looked at the world through hopes or fears. It could not be the case, for instance, as doves sometimes argued, that mutual assured destruction made preemption useless *and* that counterforce weapons were destabilizing because they increased the risk of preemption. MAD is a condition of life, not a strategy. And it is a condition, Glaser concludes, that is not bad compared to the

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alternatives, which are not feasible anyway, given foreseeable politics and technology.

CAUTIOUS REVOLUTION: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ARRIVES. By Clifford Hackett. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990, 256 pp. $42.95 (paper, $15.95).

By now most Americans know "1992" is not a European commemoration of Columbus' discovery, but knowledge, let alone understanding, of the European Community remains in short supply. This book, which had its origins in a Council on Foreign Relations study group, is a helpful primer on the Community's history and institutions, written by a former diplomat and congressional aide.

WAR BY OTHER MEANS: SOVIET POWER, WEST GERMAN RESISTANCE AND THE BATTLE OF THE EUROMISSILES. By Jeffrey Herf. New York: The Free Press, 1991, 357 pp. $24.95.

This is not one more telling of the Euromissile tale. It is that, done well, but Herf's purpose is much broader: to probe the interaction between interstate power and internal political cultures. His particular concern is the postwar struggle for the soul of the West German political left, which came to a head in the debate over the missiles. He makes a powerful case: it is hard to imagine today's changes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union without the defeat the missile deployments represented for the Soviet Union *and* without the democratic victory reflected in the reaffirmed ties between West Germans and their allies.

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONS: THE PARTICIPANTS SPEAK. Edited by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Jacquelyn K. Davis. Lexington (MA): Lexington Books, 1990, 388 pp. $45.95.

There is a nice grit of bureaucratic reality to the 23 interviews excerpted from the Fletcher School's oral history project. Yet while the interviews themselves will be valuable grist for future historians, organizing the excerpts into short sections on the National Security Council or Middle East crises is unsatisfying; the accounts are too partial and parochial. Rather than what the interviewees thought *about*, the editors might have searched for patterns in *how* they thought—the mindsets they brought, the analogies they jumped to, their sources of information and the trains of logic they followed.

NUCLEAR AMBITIONS: THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1989–1990. By Leonard S. Spector, with Jacqueline Smith. Boulder (CO): Westview, 1990, 450 pp. $54.00 (paper, $12.95).

This, the fifth in Spector's acclaimed series on the spread of nuclear weapons, provides sections on ballistic missiles, submarines and the nuclear trade, in addition to detailed country studies. The Gulf War makes its background all the more timely.

NEW THINKING AND OLD REALITIES: AMERICA, EUROPE AND RUSSIA. Edited by Michael T. Clark and Simon Serfaty. Cabin John (MD): Seven Locks Press, 1991, 212 pp. $24.95 (paper, $13.95).

The "new thinking" is that of Gorbachev; the "old realities" are those of interstate relations, and the strength of the book, beyond its distinguished authors, lies in reminding us that, for all the changes, the future is still

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imprinted by the past. John van Oudenaren, for instance, recalls that Gorbachev was chosen not because he was a revolutionary but because there was no other logical choice; he began with a weak position. Josef Joffe sees in German and Soviet policy a natural convergence, which began before unification and continues after. For different reasons, both nations seek a transformation of the European system away from blocs—though not too rapidly.

MUTUAL SECURITY: A NEW APPROACH TO SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. Edited by Richard Smoke and Andrei Kortunov. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, 430 pp. $49.95 (paper, $19.95).

Simultaneously printed in America and the Soviet Union, this book is the product of a two-year collaboration between the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University and the U.S.A. Institute in Moscow. The pace of change first made its innovative approach mainstream, then cast into doubt its implicit assumption that each nation is the other's main security threat. Its rich analyses range widely, however, and its approach to "mutual security" is powerful—not common sense or cooperation, but rather "a tough-minded joint investigation of each side's fundamental national security interests and the means by which perceived threats might be reduced."

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED LEADERSHIP. Edited by Jessica Tuchman Mathews. New York: Norton, 1990, 362 pp. $22.95.

Exceptionally well focused for a collection of papers, this volume sheds much light on major environmental issues, the adequacy and inadequacy of economic approaches to their management, the experience of international negotiations, the need for new institutions and the implications of all this for American policy. The new political importance of environmental questions makes this collection of realistic papers produced by the American Assembly and the World Resources Institute especially valuable.

BEYOND BRUNDTLAND: GREEN DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1990s. By Thijs de la Court. New York: New Horizons Press, 1990, 128 pp. $12.95 (paper).

This Dutch environmentalist summarizes the influential report of the U.N. Commission on Environment and Development and reports the criticisms it has received. Those who believe that the commission's concept of "sustainable development" is too favorable to economic growth and too optimistic about future technology apparently believe that real solutions require "a just sharing of power, access to natural resources on the part of local populations, and the conservation of the cultural and social integrity of the different societies of the world."

THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER. By Daniel Yergin. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, 876 pp. $24.95.

Except, perhaps, for not reminding his readers that the Garden of Eden

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was near some of the oldest known sources of petroleum, Yergin touches all possible bases in his striking history of "the age of oil." Generalizations are made vivid by specifics, quotations and anecdotes as he looks at the business, strategic and technological aspects of the story. The 1980s are dealt with at length, and Saddam Hussein and George Bush are not neglected.

GLOBAL POWER STRUCTURE, TECHNOLOGY AND WORLD ECONOMY IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Mihaly Simai. London: Pinter, 1990, 290 pp. $29.50.

This wide-ranging book presents thoughtful reflections on such basic issues as the relation of structural change in the world economy to the lasting difficulties that began in the 1970s, developments in technology and the difficulties of technological transfer, the relations of economic and political power and the need for new forms of multilateral cooperation in the global system of the late twentieth century. Simai is director of the Institute for the World Economy at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

EASTERN EUROPE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Laszlo Csaba. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1990, 403 pp.

What were once progressive ideas for reforming economic cooperation among the communist countries have been partly fulfilled, partly made obsolete and partly supplanted by new difficulties. Even a thoughtful and well-informed Hungarian economist such as Csaba of the Institute for the World Economy can throw light on only some of the changed issues.

LA POLITIQUE AMERICAINE DE COMMERCE AVEC L'EST, 1969–1989. By Marie-Helene Labbé. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990, 213 pp. Fr.98.

Any serious study of American trade policy toward the communist countries has to take account of contradictions and inconsistencies, shifts in opinion and analysis, differences between Congress and the executive, divisions within the executive, changes in objectives from economic warfare and export promotion, disputes with allies, diplomacy versus public opinion and the never-ending game of "sending signals." Labbé condenses these matters very neatly, lays out some criteria and comes to the conclusion that, with all their weaknesses, export embargoes and the linkage of trade pressures with other tactics have been more effective than many observers believe. To sustain this view she naturally has to make some judgments about cause and effect and alternatives that not everyone will accept.

EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY. Edited by Peter Montagnon. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1990, 135 pp. $14.95 (paper).

To foster competition governments need to do more than remove import barriers and apply antitrust laws. This excellent and timely book focuses on what the European Community has done and left undone with regard to mergers, dumping, subsidies, government monopolies, the regulation of utilities and the establishing of links between competition and trade policies. The four authors of several nationalities make concrete

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recommendations for the Community but their analysis applies to other countries as well.

EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Edited by David A. Baldwin and Helen V. Milner. New York: St. Martin's, 1990, 227 pp. $49.95.

Hoping to improve the level of discussion on the always contentious issues of East-West trade, two Columbia University professors brought together a number of scholars in different fields from several countries. Their analyses are sober and their conclusions for future policy thoughtful and cautious.

AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY: OPTIONS FOR THE 1990s. Edited by Robert Z. Lawrence and Charles L. Schultze. Washington: Brookings, 1990, 234 pp. $28.95 (paper, $10.95).

Three papers advocating free trade, bilateralism and managed trade, and comments on them, make up the bulk of this very useful volume. In rendering their verdicts on the debate, the editors firmly advocate global liberalization supported when possible by more limited agreements, pressure on the barriers of other countries, and antitrust measures.

GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION. By Robert Wade. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, 438 pp. $49.50.

This valuable book provides a quite detailed and carefully analytical account of the economic development of Taiwan and its political and social setting. However, the main concern of Wade, of Sussex and Princeton, is to demonstrate that although the widely supported neoclassical formula for policy may fit the present situation of Taiwan, South Korea and some other East Asian countries, it does not really explain their remarkable growth and industrialization. He makes a good case for his view that while market forces, at home and abroad, have been given much play, the government has also played a key part. In trade and other matters the secret of success has been that "the state has interfered . . . not less, but differently, than in many other countries."

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PLURALISM: ECONOMIC POLICY IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. By Peter Drysdale. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 294 pp.

On the basis of a first-rate survey of the economic relations among the Pacific basin countries and their place in the world, Drysdale of the Australian National University ably argues that what these countries need is more cooperation and consultation without more formal apparatus (and not a free-trade area). They have a strong interest in using their regionalism to further an open multilateral global economy but also have problems of their own, such as reshaping Japanese and American leadership and fitting China into the group.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION AND EXCHANGE RATE FLUCTUATIONS. Edited by William H. Branson, Jacob A. Frenkel and Morris Goldstein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, 382 pp. $45.00.

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A group of most able economists, focusing on a set of central questions about international economic relations, produce much interesting insight but remarkably little agreement, especially considering the verbal support usually given at the highest political levels to the idea of policy coordination.

JOHN F. KENNEDY UND 'FOREIGN AID'. By Yvonne Baumann. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990, 460 pp. DM.98.

This thoroughgoing study of foreign aid in the Kennedy administration, which draws on archives as well as innumerable publications, earned the author a Ph.D. at the University of Zurich. Although the focus is on the new emphasis on economic development in those years, its conclusion is that, as in previous administrations, the Cold War was the main factor shaping American aid policy.

SOCIALISM PAST AND FUTURE. By Michael Harrington. New York: Penguin, 1990, 320 pp. $9.95 (paper).

In this lively book, the late Michael Harrington draws on a lifetime of thinking and politicking to reject much that has passed for socialism and to define the new forms that will make it the only "hope for human freedom and justice" in the 21st century. The new socialism, he says, has to be truly international (unlike most socialism in past practice) and must be democratic in more than a political sense, providing real participation in economic decisions. Scarcely any past socialists meet Harrington's standards, but he makes his "visionary gradualism" sound pragmatic.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: MANAGING WORLD ECONOMIC CHANGE. By Robert A. Isaak. Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Prentice Hall, 1991, 316 pp.

Collective learning and a combination of policies that maintain cultural integrity and social cohesion at home while securing the right "structural positioning" in the world are the keys to a country's successful adjustment to the changing asymmetries of international relations, according to this Pace University professor. His approach helps relate domestic affairs to foreign policy and occasionally provides new insights, but the resulting picture does not seem greatly different from that provided by the more familiar views of the world whose exposition fills most of the book.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THE COLONEL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HENRY STIMSON, 1867–1950. By Geoffrey Hodgson. New York: Knopf, 1990, 402 pp. $24.95.

This well-written biography, drawing heavily on Stimson's memoirs and Elting Morison's biography, is a celebration of a paragon of self-conscious responsibility in the exercise of American power: secretary of state, twice secretary of war, colonial governor, aristocratic conservative. For the author, Henry L. Stimson was "one of those to whom Plato said the fullest honor should be given because he preserved us from our enemies." Here and there the book contains touches of critical perspective, but not many.

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DANGEROUS CAPABILITIES: PAUL NITZE AND THE COLD WAR. By David Callahan. New York: HarperCollins, 1990, 572 pp. $24.95.

The author of this fine first book demonstrates that a biography of Paul Nitze is a chronicle of American elite assumptions and policies for the entire Cold War. Nitze remained influential inside the American government longer than any other individual since the start of the nuclear age—from the elaboration of a theory of total Soviet hostility in NSC-68 in 1950 (written largely by Nitze, then head of policy planning in the State Department) to the eased tensions and substantive arms control agreements of the Gorbachev era. Nitze's blend of cold argument, contempt for the ideas of political opponents, and passionate, energetic commitment to a geopolitical realist viewpoint is well described.

CASEY: FROM THE OSS TO THE CIA. By Joseph E. Persico. New York: Viking, 1990, 601 pp. $24.95.

A rich, full biography that captures William Casey's tremendous energy, enthusiasm and single-minded focus on the perceived Soviet threat. The author concludes of the CIA years that Casey's "involvements in Afghanistan, China, the Philippines, Iran and Central America had not been simply those of a spy chief but those of a covert foreign minister."

AMERICA'S GERMANY: JOHN J. McCLOY AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. By Thomas Alan Schwartz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, 404 pp. $29.95.

The status of Germany is a pivot in the international history of this century: Germany as threat, Germany as contested arena, Germany reunited. No American wielded as much influence on the German question over so long a time as John McCloy. This solid study illuminates both the complex issues and McCloy's skill as a shrewd, self-confident problem-solver and engaging negotiator.

EMPIRE AND COLD WAR: THE ROOTS OF U.S.-THIRD WORLD ANTAGONISM, 1945–47. By Scott L. Bills. New York: St. Martin's, 1990, 280 pp. $35.00.

Most histories of the Cold War focus on Europe and the direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. This excellent study explores the ambivalent and fundamentally unsympathetic way in which the United States responded to the collapse of European colonialism and the emergence of strident Third World nationalism. Throughout much of the Third World the United States was the great disappointment, a barrier to self-determination. Therein lay the roots of lasting anti-Americanism. Given American political and economic assumptions and the Cold War, the author depicts the outcome as inevitable.

THE IMAGINARY WAR: UNDERSTANDING THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT. By Mary Kaldor. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990, 290 pp. $24.95.

The central argument of this challenging essay by a scholar and sometime peace activist is that the leaders of both East and West created the image of—i.e., imagined—a hostile foe as a means of managing internal conflict. She denies that there was an objective conflict in a materialistic sense. Nuclear weapons made the Cold War a most dangerous complicity.

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THE NEW REALISM: A FRESH BEGINNING IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. By Roland S. Homet, Jr. New York: HarperCollins, 1990, 316 pp. $24.95.

This earnest appeal for more collaboration, rather than confrontation or attempts at unilateral leadership, grew out of a series of conferences from 1984 through 1989 involving American academic, business and government figures. The prescriptive calls for reciprocal security are sensible but somewhat overtaken by events (for example, the book was written on the assumption that there would be two Germanys for some time to come). Like so much of the literature of the last few years, it will be of interest as a time capsule of thinking at a particular moment rather than as a guide for the future.

THE TWILIGHT STRUGGLE: THE SOVIET UNION V. THE UNITED STATES TODAY. By Constantine C. Menges. Washington: The AEI Press, 1990, 428 pp. $21.95.

The book throbs with the anticommunist fervor of the early years of the Reagan administration, when the author was one of the more flamboyant middle-level architects of the Reagan Doctrine of assisting insurgencies against Soviet-supported regimes. It is valuable as historical narrative and as an exposition of an ideological current of former times, before the current crisis of the Soviet Union, but is quite out of date as description and prescription for the present.

RECONSTRUCTING CONSENSUS: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE VIETNAM WAR. By Richard A. Melanson. New York: St. Martin's, 1990, 248 pp. $35.00.

Employing the method of "structured, focused comparison" the author asks a set of identical questions about the Nixon, Carter and Reagan administrations. Writing before the crisis in the Persian Gulf, he concluded that a superficial consensus had been attained even before President Bush sent American forces into combat.

AS MOSCOW SEES US: AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE SOVIET MINDSET. By Richard M. Mills. New York: Oxford, 1990, 308 pp. $29.95.

It is perilous these days to publish research into the Soviet Union conducted over a period of years. The "Soviet mindset," here so carefully analyzed, was the ideological orthodoxy of the pre-Gorbachev years, founded on liturgical explanations of the crisis of capitalism. That "mindset" might return, but is now by no means pervasive.

AGENTS OF INFLUENCE. By Pat Choate. New York: Knopf, 1990, 295 pp. $22.95.

The dust jacket proclaims that this is a study of "how Japan's lobbyists in the United States manipulate America's political and economic system," and the text provides details with high alarm and indignation. The author proposes restrictions on the right of former U.S. officials to act as lobbyists, prohibition of foreign gifts to former presidents, barriers to foreign involvement in elections and cutbacks on state and local subsidies to foreign firms. The book combines familiar Japan-bashing with a lament over declining civic virtue.

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THE MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY. Edited By Simon Serfaty. New York: St. Martin's, 1990, 249 pp. $45.00.

The 17 contributors to this symposium are divided between former government officials and journalists. Criticism is directed fairly evenly between the media for occasional irresponsibility and the government for moments of excessive manipulation. The best essays are by R. Gregory Nokes on the U.S. government's media campaign against Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya and by Harold Evans on British restrictions on a free press. The editor concludes that American media coverage of international news is good, improving, and does not set the foreign policy agenda.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PRESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES' COVERAGE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. By Nicholas O. Berry. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990, 164 pp. $39.95.

After coding every sentence in every article in selected issues of *The New York Times* on the formulation, implementation and denouement of spectacular foreign policy failures—e.g., Bay of Pigs, Iranian hostages—the author concludes that the press does not have an independent impact on foreign policy. In the early stages of an event it reports what the administration says and is uncritical. When a policy fails, it describes the failure. Although the method of the study is verbal bean counting, the author has feisty opinions about "stupid" policies.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS. By Richard E. Neustadt. New York: The Free Press, 1990, 371 pp. $22.95.

The first edition of this classic was published in 1960 and acquired instant fame as the bible of the Kennedy administration on how to accumulate, protect and apply presidential power. Subsequent, ever longer, editions have evaluated successive presidential administrations and described instances of power protected or foolishly squandered. This edition has a good discussion of Reagan and the Iran-contra affair, a study in how obliviousness to detail undermined power.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: AN INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT, TO 1950. By Arthur P. Darling. University Park: Penn State University Press, 1990, 509 pp. $60.00 (paper, $17.50).

With what has to be called intrepid diligence, the CIA Historical Office is finally registering success in its six-year campaign to unscrew the secrecy lids on its own studies of the American intelligence system. First fruit is this authoritative account of the bureaucratic struggles that led in 1947 to the establishment of the CIA, and the ensuing battles for turf among the military services, the State Department and the controversial new agency. The late Arthur Darling, a revered teacher of history to generations of Phillips Andover boys (including George Bush), was brought in as the first official CIA historian. His detailed study, written in 1952–53, has the virtues and limitations of the iconoclastic outsider's perspective on a consummate in-group—but based on full access to materials that are still classified. Allen Dulles, for one, was so upset with the irreverence of a member of his own staff—Darling is almost catty, if one reads between the lines, about Dulles himself—that he restricted access to the study even within the agency. Penn State University Press performs a notable service by making this declassified document available to a wide audience and in

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providing the sensitive annotations by Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allen E. Goodman. More volumes will follow as documents are released from the agency's archives. Peter Grose

The Western Hemisphere

Abraham F. Lowenthal

CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: TIES OF SINGULAR INTIMACY. By Louis A. Perez, Jr. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990, 314 pp. $30.00 (paper, $15.00).

Throughout the twentieth century, and especially since Fidel Castro's takeover in 1959, the histories of Cuba and the United States have been deeply intertwined. This highly informative and sensitive account traces the history of this neuralgic relationship and provides useful elements for assessing the likelihood of an eventual rapprochement between the two countries.

GUERRILLA PRINCE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF FIDEL CASTRO. By Georgie Anne Geyer. Boston: Little, Brown, 1991, 445 pp. $22.95.

One of this country's most experienced foreign correspondents has produced an important book on Fidel Castro, surely one of the century's most noteworthy and intriguing political leaders. Drawing on persistent investigative reporting, extensive research, pop psychology, gossip and intuition, Geyer weaves a fascinating if not quite definitive portrait of Castro's rise and appeal, his skills and flaws, and his increasing isolation.

CUBA: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION. Edited by Georges Fauriol and Eva Loser. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction, 1990, 380 pp. $34.95.

The companion to an earlier volume that assessed the domestic record of thirty years of Fidel Castro's role in Cuba, this volume reviews Cuba's role in foreign affairs. Fourteen Cuba specialists, most but not all of them sharing the strongly anti-Castro approach of the Cuban American National Foundation (the project's sponsor), provide a cross-sectional view. Although events in the Soviet Union, Nicaragua and Cuba itself have already dated the volume, it contributes significantly to documenting and analyzing Cuba's impact and choices. The chapter by Jorge Perez-Lopez on Cuba's foreign economic relationship is especially illuminating and points toward what may well be the crucial factor in shaping the next phase of Cuba's policy.

IN THE SHADOWS OF THE SUN: CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES AND U.S. POLICY. By Carmen Deere and others. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1990, 246 pp. $38.50 (paper, $12.85).

Seven scholars, three of them from the Caribbean, have collaborated on this ambitious attempt to analyze the causes and consequences of the deterioration of Caribbean economies in recent years. The authors recommend an alternative development model, based on equity, to replace the structural adjustment remedies that appeared in the late 1980s. The book's emphasis is on self-reliance, intra-regional cooperation and the need to escape what is portrayed as systemic exploitation by the United States,

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which makes the concluding appeal for enlightened U.S. reformist policies something of a surprise. Useful statistical data are provided.

PEACE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN. Edited by Anthony T. Bryan, Edward Greene and Timothy M. Shaw. London: Macmillan, 1990, 332 pp.

Eighteen scholars, the majority from the Caribbean, contribute to this symposium, examining the special problems small Caribbean states face in framing and implementing viable development strategies without being caught up in broader international contests. The book's focus is on the relationship between external and internal threats to the security of ministates in a period of narrowing economic and political options. Essays by Bryan, Vaughan Lewis, Anthony Maingot, Gladstone Mills and Rex Nettleford are particularly stimulating.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

DE GAULLE: THE REBEL, 1890–1944. By Jean Lacouture. New York: Norton, 1990, 600 pp. $29.95.

The first of a two-volume biography of this titanic figure. Lacouture, France's best-known political biographer, emphasizes De Gaulle's struggle with and against the French establishment before 1940, the dazzling experience of having this formidable ego and intellect see his heterodox views on warfare disregarded and then tragically vindicated. A fascinating account, based largely on existing sources and De Gaulle's own copious writings. A balanced study of character, with the darker sides not slighted, and of the historical context. After France's defeat, the self-appointed incarnation of his country—initially without support—De Gaulle gradually established himself as the leader of a Free France, despite the hostility of Roosevelt and the occasional tempestuous enmity of Churchill. De Gaulle's weakness vis-à-vis these men of power reinforced his assertiveness and arrogance, tempered as these were by his tactical flexibility. A book of depth and penetration, imperfectly translated, that empathetically reconstructs one of the century's great careers.

THE RISE AND FALL OF ANTI-AMERICANISM: A CENTURY OF FRENCH PERCEPTION. Edited by Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik and Marie-France Toinet. New York: St. Martin's, 1990, 258 pp. $39.95.

A collection of essays by leading scholars and writers, originally composed for a 1985 conference, dealing with the U.S. image from the first vision of the American republic to recent times, when French intellectuals dropped some of their tired stereotypes. A useful, suggestive work that deals with America as a model, even a model for the presidential system of the Fifth Republic, and in several essays makes the rather obvious point that pro- and anti-American feelings can coexist among the same people.

THE TIME OF MY LIFE. By Denis Healey. New York: Norton, 1990, 606 pp. $29.95.

A Yorkshire Irishman has lived a British life: Balliol and communism before World War II, a soldier during it, a Labour Party activist after,

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defence minister for six years and at the Treasury for five. A clever man and accomplished writer, he knows the world scene and makes shrewd, sometimes devastating, remarks about notables of the time. Of Dick Crossman he writes: "A Machiavelli without judgment is a dangerous colleague." Timely observations are also thrown in: "I have rarely found soldiers, sailors and airmen to be as bloody-minded as journalists and politicians." He has led a full life as a centrist-Labourite and, even in the shadow of Thatcherism and amidst the self-destructive battles of his own party, a life enjoyed, with great gusto for the arts and just a touch of wonderment about his own luck and engaged contentment. This is a valuable account, instructive and entertaining, if just a mite too lovingly long.

PATHS TO RUSSIA: FROM WAR TO PEACE. By F. Wilhelm Christians. New York: Macmillan, 1991, 236 pp. $24.95.

A preeminent German banker and pragmatic practitioner of Ostpolitik, before it became government policy in the late 1960s, reviews his dealings with the Soviets, including negotiations concerning the controversial pipeline from near the Arctic circle to central Europe. Writing in the summer of 1990, Christians was still hopeful that prudent Western help—principally German within a European or an Atlantic framework—could help Gorbachev to deal with huge political and economic issues. Helmut Schmidt provides an illuminating preface, briefly describing the evolution of his own thoughts and feelings about Russia from his school and army days to his chancellorship, when he sought to deal with the dangers and possibilities of the Soviet presence in Europe.

THE WESTERN COMMUNITY AND THE GORBACHEV CHALLENGE. Edited by Armand Clesse and Thomas C. Schelling. Baden Baden: Nomos, 1989, 408 pp.

A collection of papers prepared for a conference in December 1988, the eve of the *annum mirabilis*. Valuable because leading academics and political actors from the West and the U.S.S.R. analyze the economic and strategic challenges—as well as those in foreign affairs—that have remained at the heart of Gorbachev's efforts and the West's responses.

BEFORE THE STORM: MEMOIRS OF MY YOUTH IN OLD PRUSSIA. By Marion, Countess Dönhoff. New York: Knopf, 1990, 204 pp. $22.95.

A childhood on a historic East Prussian estate recalled decades later by a leading German writer-publisher, esteemed in her own country, east and west alike. The book is a picture of both privilege and austerity, depicting in exemplary detail the values and habits of this still-feudal life—a life remote from our own and close to nature and its seasons, moods and beauty. It is a portrait of a region and a society, with affection and detachment, by someone who was from the beginning anti-Nazi and who was forced to flee on a seven-week trek on horseback before an advancing Red Army that burned the ancient estate to the ground. The countess has been a foremost force in promoting a permanent reconciliation between Poles and Russians, who now inhabit her native East Prussia. Her final sentence sums up her feelings about her ancient home—about life:

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"Perhaps the highest form of love is loving without possessing." A book beautifully produced and illustrated and splendidly translated.

ALL OR NOTHING: THE AXIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 1941–43. By Jonathan Steinberg. New York: Routledge, 1990, 320 pp. $27.50.

A riveting book: the principal question is how and why the Italian authorities during the Second World War protected the Jews in their zones of occupation, resisting the demands of their German allies. On the basis of archives and interviews, Steinberg, an Anglo-American historian, meticulously reconstructs a quiet Italian "conspiracy" but asks the deeper question as to why the authorities of one country would have behaved with surreptitious humanity while those in others engaged in compliant callousness. A major contribution also to an understanding of World War II, especially in regard to the warring parts of Yugoslavia and the horrendous brutality of the Croatians. Steinberg's tentative answers derive from his insight into Italian and German history and from his analysis of the structure and spirit of the fascist regimes. A masterpiece, modest in scope but deep in reflectiveness; by its restraint and wisdom it stands out among Holocaust studies.

THE END OF THE HOLOCAUST: THE LIBERATION OF THE CAMPS. By Jon Bridgman. Portland (OR): Areopagitica Press, 1990, 158 pp.

This interesting book aims to fill a gap in the Holocaust literature having to do with misconceptions brought about by the circumstances of the liberation of the concentration camps. Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald and Dachau, which were liberated by the Americans and British, became in Western eyes horrifying proof of the Nazi policy of genocide, but these were by no means the worst of the camps. The corpses and "living skeletons" found in them were victims not so much of deliberate policy as of the overcrowding, famine and epidemics that swept the German camps in the chaos of the final weeks of World War II. The extermination camps were largely in Poland and were liberated by the Russians, who were—somewhat mysteriously—unforthcoming about them. (Most of these camps were at least partly evacuated or even, like Treblinka, obliterated by the Nazis.) In 1945 and for some time after, Auschwitz, in which by far the largest numbers died, was scarcely known in the West. There are eyewitness accounts of the liberation of several camps, including a particularly moving one by Clara Greenbaum about Bergen-Belsen. Lucy Despard

NAZI ECONOMICS: IDEOLOGY, THEORY, AND POLICY. By Avraham Barkai. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, 291 pp. $27.50.

A revised version of a book first published in German in 1977 and still highly dependent on earlier scholarship. Barkai, an Israeli scholar, concentrates on peacetime German recovery, on Hitler's first four years when the economy grew by 9.5 percent annually. Much of the additional state spending went to rearmament, but by no means all. Barkai stresses consonance between Nazi ideology and practice, speaks of organized capitalism in which the economic elite prospered—and accepted the primacy of Nazi direction. An intelligent, common-sensical account.

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The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By Richard Pipes. New York: Knopf, 1990, 944 pp. $40.00.

Professor Pipes' massive and magisterial work overshadows previous histories of the Russian Revolution, even if it does not supplant them all. It is a triumph of scholarship in a field where scholarship has often been deficient or twisted. Known for his hard-line and often controversial views on the Soviet Union, Pipes is not sparing of sharp opinions as he traces the course of Bolshevik thought, organization and action in the drive to obtain control—and nowhere less than in his portrait of Lenin. But throughout the volume, the historical method used in tracking down and citing sources is exemplary. There is ample background, placing the two revolutions of 1917 in their Russian historical setting. The first of two planned volumes, the story is carried through 1918 and does not cover the civil war.

THE MAN WHO CHANGED THE WORLD: THE LIVES OF MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV. By Gail Sheehy. New York: HarperCollins, 1990, 432 pp. $22.95.

A journalist's popular biography of Gorbachev that follows his life mainly through the eyes of his friends, neighbors and colleagues, whom the author sought out and interviewed with commendable diligence. She has tried, above all, to probe the personality and human qualities of her subject—no easy task—since, as she points out, the moods and views and methods of this man of several lives seemed to change at different stages of his career. On the economic reforms, political struggles and foreign policy of the Gorbachev era other recent books provide more solid fare, but Sheehy gives the main lines and deftly weaves them into her study of Gorbachev himself. In conclusion she takes note of the ironic fact that the man who changed the world seems to be losing his country in the process.

THE NEW RUSSIANS. By Hedrick Smith. New York: Random House, 1990, 656 pp. $24.95.

Smith's new Russians differ from the Russians of his earlier book based on his experience as a correspondent for *The New York Times* in the 1970s. Covering the same beat in nine visits since 1988, he found the scene transformed, especially by the freedom of people to speak their minds. What the book adds to the many others written in the past few years is the detailed reporting of conversations, incidents, jokes—all illustrative of the currents of change as well as the fact that the new Russians are still old Russians in many ways, making reform difficult to implement. Smith is a veteran observer, and his book is an honest and perceptive picture of Soviet politics and society after five years of Gorbachev.

FAREWELL PERESTROIKA. By Boris Kagarlitsky. New York: Verso, 1990, 217 pp. $45.00 (paper, $15.95).

Kagarlitsky's is a fiercely independent voice amid the confusion attending the "democratization" of the Soviet Union. Active in the "popular front" movement, he is an enemy of the old Stalinist order but also totally skeptical of the Gorbachev reforms and contemptuous of the nostrums of

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the liberals who want to introduce a Western-style market economy. His provocative book is a running account, often as eyewitness or participant, of dramatic developments in 1988–89 in Moscow and the constituent republics, combining a description of events, many of which "fired our imaginations but changed nothing in our lives," with pointed opinions of the main actors. Perestroika, he concludes, is in its death agony, but the future, which will depend on the working class, is not without hope.

IS STALINISM REALLY DEAD? THE FUTURE OF PERESTROIKA AS A MORAL REVOLUTION. By Alexander S. Tsipko. San Francisco: HarperSan Francisco, 1990, 278 pp. $24.95.

The author's answer to the question is negative. Stalinism, he contends, was not just the workings of an evil man. It was the natural result of a system based on myths and lies, all in the service of supposedly ideal aims, which were to be attained by any means regardless of reason, common sense, human values or political realities. Page after page Tsipko hammers away on this theme and points to the need to get at the roots of Stalinism and establish respect for human rights and traditions and humility in the face of truth. To Western readers all this may not seem so novel, but it is important that this book was written by a Soviet philosopher and published and read in the Soviet Union.

THE SECOND SOCIALIST REVOLUTION: AN ALTERNATIVE SOVIET STRATEGY. By Tatyana Zaslavskaya. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, 264 pp. $35.00 (paper, $14.95).

A talented and courageous economist and sociologist, Tatyana Zaslavskaya was an intellectual forerunner of perestroika. In this book written for a worldwide readership she reviews with lucidity and logic how the Soviet economy and society reached the stage of stagnation under Brezhnev and what moves have to be made, through democratization and social change, to bring about the necessary revolution from below to match the reforms from above. The author is known as one of the "radical" reformers, but still the ultimate aim is "the building of socialism."

MOSCOW AND BEYOND: 1986 to 1989. By Andrei Sakharov. New York: Knopf, 1991, 168 pp. $19.95.

The continuation and conclusion of Sakharov's memoirs (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1990/91). These pages confirm that in the last three years of his life, following his return from Gorky, he remained the man of principle and devotion to human rights he always was. His choice to enter the arena of politics, in order to have a voice and an influence in the new order emerging through perestroika, may have hastened his death. He recounts several meetings and conversations with Gorbachev, to whom he saw no alternative as the country's leader, though distrusting his dilatory pace of reform and his thirst for personal power.

THE USSR'S EMERGING MULTIPARTY SYSTEM. By Vera Tolz. New York: Praeger (with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1990, 144 pp. $35.00 (paper, $11.95).

This is a minor tour de force—a guide, distinguished by clarity and brevity, to the polymorphous groups and "unofficial" movements (e.g., the popular fronts) burgeoning throughout the Soviet Union. Their origins

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(many much older than we knew), their evolution, their conflicts with each other and with the authorities, and their apparent direction are neatly laid out in this enlightening little book. Lucy Despard

THE THAW GENERATION: COMING OF AGE IN THE POST-STALIN ERA. By Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg. Boston: Little, Brown, 1990, 339 pp. $19.95.

This is the autobiography of Alexeyeva, author of an earlier and authoritative book on Soviet dissenters (*Soviet Dissent*, noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1985). In this personal story she gives many illustrations of the struggle of those who risked their lives and liberty for freedom of expression and human rights in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years. They were a small group; the names are familiar—Sakharov, Daniel, Orlov, Shcharansky, Kopelev, Bogoraz, Marchenko and others—and their story, as she tells it, is one of interrogations, trials, imprisonment and sacrifice.

STALIN: THE GLASNOST REVELATIONS. By Walter Laqueur. New York: Scribner's, 1990, 382 pp. $24.95.

Stalin's ghost continues to haunt the Kremlin and the minds of those attempting to judge his place in the Soviet Union's past and future. Laqueur's study is not conventional biography but a bringing together and summary of the revelations that glasnost made possible and the debate they have engendered. He adds his own considered views based on years of close study of Soviet politics. The subjects are familiar: Stalin as mass murderer; Stalin as military leader; Stalin as continuing, or perverting, Lenin's course. Many points are clarified, some remain obscure, some are probably unanswerable except by Stalin himself.

STALIN'S WAR AGAINST THE JEWS: THE DOCTORS' PLOT AND THE SOVIET SOLUTION. By Louis Rapoport. New York: Free Press, 1990, 318 pp. $22.95.

An Israeli journalist, profiting by glasnost and the opportunity to go to the Soviet Union, has used firsthand material from interviews, together with other evidence, to write the most complete account yet published of the so-called Doctors' Plot. Of Stalin's anti-Jewish, not just anti-Zionist, feelings and policies this study leaves no room for doubt. Whether Stalin was planning a Hitler-like "final solution" we cannot be sure; he died before he could carry out whatever plans he had. On the question of how the Doctors' Plot fit into the struggle for power around and after the death of Stalin, the author has some interesting ideas, though many aspects remain to be clarified.

THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE TOTALITARIAN STATE . . . AND OTHER SURPRISES. By Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. Washington: The AEI Press, 1990, 316 pp. $21.95.

For those who wish to read or reread Ambassador Kirkpatrick's columns written between 1985 and the present, here is an easy way to do it. Grouped under headings such as the perestroika revolution, the breakup of the last colonial empire, security and arms control, and U.S. relations with its allies, they are accompanied by brief comments by the author placing them in context, and followed by a concluding chapter of reflections. For this conservative thinker, the changes brought about by Gorbachev are not just

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cosmetic and tactical but a real revolution, the end of the Leninist-Stalinist system.

THE WEST AND THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Gregory Flynn and Richard E. Greene. New York: St. Martin's (with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1990, 266 pp. $39.95 (paper, $15.95).

Not the usual inquiry into how the West should respond to circumstances and policies in the Soviet Union, this is a studied endeavor to examine factors in the culture and politics of the principal Western nations, mainly domestic factors, which condition or determine what their responses will be. It is a careful study, with individual chapters done by seasoned authors—Karl Kaiser on Germany, Dominique Moïsi on France—and raises points of likely divergence that political leaders would do well to ponder. The book does not take account, unfortunately, of the events since 1989 that have brought about drastic change in the East-West balance.

PLURALISM AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: A SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD. By Silviu Brucan. New York: Praeger, 1990, 216 pp. $35.00.

The author's purpose is to show that social change, particularly under the impact of the scientific-technological revolution, rendered invalid some of Marx's theories, changed the composition and relations of classes and created the need for democratic reform in the Soviet Union, eastern Europe (still under communist regimes at the time of writing) and China. The argument is sound but the book is sketchy and a bit thin. Brucan, who had a role in the Romanian revolution of 1989, says very little about developments in his own country.

OPENING THE SOVIET SYSTEM. By George Soros. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1990, 163 pp. £20.

George Soros, a highly successful financier born in Hungary, has a mission to help the cause of freedom and the transition from closed to open societies in eastern Europe. He devotes a large part of his book to a "theoretical framework" that is quite abstract, but in due course he brings his argument into the practical realm in describing his own activities in the educational foundations he now has flourishing in Hungary and elsewhere, in assessing the tasks facing the new leaders and in calling for large-scale and many-sided Western assistance if the transition is to be accomplished.

REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE. By Ralf Dahrendorf. New York: Times Books, 1990, 144 pp. $17.95.

FALLEN DOMINIONS, REVIVING POWERS: GERMANY, THE SLAVS, AND EUROPE'S UNFINISHED AGENDA. By George Liska. Washington: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute/Prague: Czechoslovak Institute of International Relations, 1991, 63 pp. $7.50 (paper).

In an urbane and thoughtful essay Dahrendorf reflects on the hectic and heady events of 1989 in eastern Europe and the rougher ride of 1990. It takes the form of a letter to a Polish friend who had asked some pointed and difficult questions about the future. Dahrendorf's thoughts, expressed with clarity and a measure of modest uncertainty, draw on his own broad knowledge of European affairs and his devotion to the ideas of individual

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rights and open societies rather than systems of whatever stripe. The Liska work, slim in size but weighty in content, also explores the possible course of east-central Europe, especially Czechoslovakia, after the 1989 revolutions. It does so in a broad international framework, delving into patterns of the past and relating them to possible alignments of the future. Dahrendorf's conversational style makes for easier reading than Liska's dense academic prose, but both have significant things to say.

THE MORAL COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM: POLAND AS A CAUTIONARY TALE. By John Clark and Aaron Wildavsky. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1990, 429 pp. $24.95.

This volume is two books in one. The early and concluding chapters discuss the basic elements of the totalitarian, command-economy regimes that have recently found their place in the dustbin of history, and show how, by an ironic twist, they fit the description of the crisis of capitalism advanced by Marx and the neo-Marxists of today. The stuffing in the sandwich—the intervening chapters—illustrates that general thesis but also stands on its own as a competent survey of Poland's politics, economy and society from World War II to 1989. The authors make much of the corruption and moral decay spawned by the Leninist-Stalinist system, and rightly so. Sharp comparisons on moral grounds, however, should be tempered by the fact that no society is without serious flaws, least of all those of the West, as Solzhenitsyn reminds us.

THE WEB OF DISINFORMATION: CHURCHILL'S YUGOSLAV BLUNDER. By David Martin. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, 425 pp. $29.95.

The Tito-Mihailovic struggle and Allied policies in Yugoslavia in World War II remain a subject of continuing fascination. David Martin, author of two previous books in defense of Mihailovic, has put years of research into this book, among the main contentions of which are that the office of Britain's Special Operations Executive in Cairo resorted to deliberate distortion and sabotage in order to convince London to abandon Mihailovic and embrace Tito; that one James Klugmann, a convinced communist and probable Soviet agent, played the key role in this deception; and that Churchill committed a colossal blunder in supporting Tito, paving the way for the communist takeover of Yugoslavia at the end of the war. Martin marshals a good deal of evidence, much of it previously unpublished, although the crucial SOE records remain sealed. In drawing their own conclusions readers would do well to keep in mind that Martin is an advocate, not a neutral investigator, and that the facts he has been seeking are those that support his case. Churchill's decision to support Tito, incidentally, was made on military grounds. It is impossible to prove that supporting Mihailovic instead would have had more favorable military results, or that British support of Tito was the crucial factor in his ultimate political victory.

LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES: THE CRISIS OF YUGOSLAV SOCIALISM AND STATE SOCIALIST SYSTEMS. By Bogdan Denitch. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, 158 pp. $35.00 (paper, $14.95).

The Yugoslav economy, according to Denitch, was a mess at the time of

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writing, and is a worse mess now. The state is also in a crisis exacerbated by populist nationalism that threatens its very existence. Denitch nonetheless argues, perhaps as a matter of faith, that with further democratization, the end of one-party rule, creation of genuine trade unions, a good balance between planning and the market and a system of confederation, Yugoslavia can survive as a healthy socialist society and serve as an example to other nations of eastern Europe. Denitch is a citizen and part-time resident of Yugoslavia, an American professor of sociology and politics, and a convinced democratic socialist. He is frank, opinionated and provocative, and he is a keen observer of the Yugoslav scene.

ALBANIAN STALINISM. By Arshi Pipa. Boulder (CO): East European Monographs, 1990, 291 pp. $29.50.

A book such as this, made up of pieces written over a 30-year period, creates problems for readers who must keep reminding themselves what decade they are in and also cope with a certain amount of repetition. Until recently, however, Albania has not changed much internally although shifting its foreign policy periodically in search of an ever more distant Big Brother. Thus, most of what is written in or about one decade of the Stalinist system is valid for another. And we have had so few good books on Albania that even a less than perfect work by an author who knows something about the country is greatly to be welcomed.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

ARAFAT: IN THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDER. By Janet Wallach and John Wallach. New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990, 465 pp. $19.95.

Investigative journalism of a high order and also a significant contribution to history, as the Wallachs' work is based heavily on interviews with leading Palestinians (including hundreds of hours with Arafat and his closest advisers), Syrians, Egyptians, Israelis, Americans and others. It is not an "authorized" biography, not even a wholly sympathetic one. Rather, it is an attempt to tear away the myth and mystery surrounding the PLO leader, to present him neither as nationalist hero nor terrorist villain, but as a human being, clever politician and, above all, a survivor. Moving backward and forward in time, it tells much of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab relations, Palestinian nationalism, factional struggles within the PLO, and the policies of outside powers, especially the United States. The authors themselves show, and should stimulate in their readers, understanding of the concerns, hopes and fears of both Palestinians and Israelis.

PITY THE NATION: THE ABDUCTION OF LEBANON. By Robert Fisk. New York: Atheneum, 1990, 678 pp. $24.95.

Fisk is a British correspondent who has covered the carnage and chaos of Lebanon since 1975, remaining there after almost all his Western colleagues left. His book reports at some length the unending violence and war from the ground level. One sees the tragedy of the country through the innumerable personal tragedies of individuals and families; in the kaleidoscopic shifts in the power struggles of Lebanese chieftains, sects and

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private armies; in the purposeful interventions of Syria and Israel and the ineffectuality of international organizations and outside powers, especially the United States. Fisk was a witness to history; his book is firsthand evidence of what has happened to Lebanese society.

THE $36 BILLION BARGAIN. By A.F.K. Organski. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, 308 pp. $30.00.

Organski's message comes through loud and clear. Among his major contentions are that—contrary to the "conventional wisdom," which is hardly as conventional as he maintains—American aid to Israel has been based on strategic factors and not on domestic politics and the "Jewish lobby"; that Israel has in fact been a valuable strategic asset for the United States; and that Israel has been subject to U.S. control on all important issues. The case, made positively and virtually without qualification, is open to valid objections on many points; nevertheless, the book is a thorough and well presented study that has to be taken into account by others who presume to express themselves on this subject.

THE FUTURE OF THE JEWS. By David Vital. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990, 160 pp. $18.95.

A distinguished Israeli scholar reviews the history of the Jewish people and points out that, in the conditions of the modern world and with a Jewish nation-state in existence since 1948, the interests and outlook of the Jews of Israel and those of the diaspora have inevitably diverged. The latter, he contends, will become less and less relevant to the Jewish future. This is not a book on Middle East politics, but its arguments and conclusions have a bearing on the policies of Israel, the role of the American Jewish community and U.S.-Israeli relations.

SADAT AND AFTER: STRUGGLES FOR EGYPT'S POLITICAL SOUL. By Raymond William Baker. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990, 365 pp. $35.00.

It is the thesis of this book that Egyptian history and politics cannot be fully understood if seen only in the framework of the official establishment and its domestic and foreign policies. Baker selects a number of organized movements from outside the mainstream (though generally tolerated and allowed public expression) that have represented significant currents of thought about the plight and future of Egyptian society. Among them are the Nasserists, the liberals (represented here mainly by the Bar Association), the Marxists, the intellectuals of the Al-Ahram Center, and the Muslim Brothers. The period covered is the 1970s, the decade of Sadat (of whom almost all these groups were critical), with occasional references to events of earlier or later years. An original and enlightening study.

WAS THE RED FLAG FLYING THERE?: MARXIST POLITICS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, 1948–1965. By Joel Beinin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, 336 pp. $40.00 (paper, $12.95).

A detailed and sympathetic study of communist and associated parties in Israel (Maki and Mapam) and in Egypt, and of how they viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict and its possible resolution. The author brings out some interesting points of "revisionist" history that do not conform to the

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established interpretation of events. These leftist groups, following the general Moscow line but with ideas and tactics of their own, were especially active—and indirectly in contact with each other—in the early years between 1948 and the 1956 Suez crisis. They were never a major influence, however, as they were overwhelmed by what Beinin calls the "hegemonic nationalist political discourse" in both countries.

SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE CRISIS IN THE GULF. By Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie. New York: Times Books, 1990, 268 pp. $5.95 (paper).

This combined work of a journalist for *The New York Times* and a Harvard scholar is neither a biography of Saddam nor a history of Iraq but has elements of both and serves the purpose of giving the general reader a broad and fairly solid background for understanding the crisis in the gulf. There is a bit of everything here on the Middle East—Saddam's record of violence, the Iran-Iraq War, the oil industry, terrorism, Iraq's use of poison gas and the significance of Kuwait, topped off with a critique of American policy—all put together with some signs of haste.

FOOTNOTES IN THE SAND: THE GULF IN TRANSITION, 1953–1958. By Bernard Burrows. Wilton (Salisbury, U.K.): Michael Russell, 1990, 175 pp. $35.00.

Memoirs of the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf during the 1950s when now forgotten disputes over boundaries, the Buraimi oasis and the authority of the Sultan of Muscat were the order of the day. Sir Bernard makes his modest contribution to history in describing these questions succinctly and intelligently, making use of recently available diplomatic documents to supplement his recollections. He also shows how he and the British governments of the time regarded the overall British position in the gulf, which they knew could not be maintained indefinitely.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ. By Middle East Watch. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, 160 pp. $19.95 (paper).
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SYRIA. By Middle East Watch. New York and Washington: Middle East Watch, 1990, 254 pp. $15.00 (paper).
THE ISRAELI ARMY AND THE INTIFADA. By Middle East Watch. New York and Washington: Middle East Watch, 1990, 231 pp. $15.00 (paper).

The gravamen of the report on the occupied territories is that the Israeli military has used undue force in dealing with the Palestinian uprising and has also been responsible for the excessive killing of Palestinians in other ways—e.g., in the rules issued to Israeli troops, the procedures for investigation of troop misconduct and the restrictions imposed on independent bodies attempting to monitor the situation. The evidence comes largely from Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations as well as from the Israeli press and direct interviews. The report on Syria reaches the expected conclusion: the Assad regime has been and is a gross violator of human rights. The Middle East Watch team was denied entry to Syria but has amassed plenty of evidence to support its judgments. As for Iraq, that Saddam Hussein and his regime have had little or no regard for the human rights of Iraq's citizens or anyone else has been known since long before the invasion of Kuwait. The record is presented here in all its gory detail—repression and torture, slaughter of the Kurds and denial of basic

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freedoms. And it is accompanied by a question: Why was the United States, before August 1990, not more active in condemning it?

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

THE CAMBODIAN CRISIS AND U.S. POLICY DILEMMAS. By Robert G. Sutter. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1990, 135 pp. $22.50 (paper).

A prominent foreign policy analyst with the Congressional Research Service analyzes the Cambodian conflict. The crisis seems to be easing now that Vietnam is withdrawing its forces and the regional conflicts caused by Vietnam's decade-long military occupation of Cambodia are nearing resolution. As Sutter points out, the U.S. interest lies in achieving a Cambodian peace agreement that would neither allow the return of the genocidal Khmer Rouge nor permit Vietnam to continue its control of Cambodia. He explores two principal options for the United States: greater flexibility toward Vietnam and continued pressure on Vietnam until it meets U.S. terms. This short but solid volume should be read together with that by Frederick Brown (below) for the essential background on the policy choices facing the United States in Indochina.

SECOND CHANCE: THE UNITED STATES AND INDOCHINA IN THE 1990s. By Frederick Z. Brown. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989, 163 pp. $14.95 (paper).

This thoughtful and balanced volume takes the reader through the complexities of Indochinese politics since the United States pulled out of Vietnam in 1975 and provides a useful framework for a U.S. response to these developments. Brown makes a persuasive case for Washington to shed its emotional baggage and move on to normalized relations with Vietnam once the Cambodian problem is resolved. While Vietnam may not soon shed its Marxist character, what may emerge is some form of national independence away from the communist world and toward ASEAN and other noncommunist southeast Asian trading partners. This hope has indeed been borne out in the year since this book went to press. As Moscow is forced to retrench, Vietnam is increasing its economic and political relations with Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Japan while implementing fairly radical market reforms.

THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE DILEMMA. By Valerie O'Connor Sutter. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990, 256 pp.

Since the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the subsequent political upheaval in the region, more than two million refugees have left Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. What makes this study of the Indochinese refugee problem especially useful is its recognition that their plight is inextricably bound to the national interests of several countries in the region. The author skillfully analyzes the refugee problem in this wider context while not losing sight of the ethical and humanitarian dimensions of the problem.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PACIFIC. By Gerald Segal. Boston: Unwin Hyman (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1990, 236 pp. $49.94 (paper, $17.95).

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A leading British specialist on East Asia and editor of *The Pacific Review* has written a coherent and comprehensive account of Soviet policy in the Pacific. The volume has good chapters on the historical, cultural, military and economic dimensions of the subject along with comments on Gorbachev's recent initiatives. The worst of the most likely outcomes foreseen by the author in the concluding section is the gradual decline of the Soviet Union as a superpower as a result of half-hearted reforms. Like the Ottoman empire, the Soviet Union might gradually come apart with the same destabilizing consequences for international security.

WHAT IS ASIA TO US? RUSSIA'S ASIAN HEARTLAND YESTERDAY AND TODAY. By Milan Hauner. Cambridge: Unwin Hyman, 1990, 264 pp. $44.45.

The great merit of this book, written by a historian, is to remind us of the physical, geographic and demographic problems that face any regime—tsarist or communist—trying to govern both European and Asiatic Russia. There are severe limitations on communication between Russia and Siberia, and the middle zone of the Soviet Union is predominantly non-Russian with 50 million Ukrainians and 50 million Muslims in the southern republics. Gorbachev thus has a serious problem simply keeping together, much less integrating, a country that is both European and Asian—particularly when the economy is crumbling. This volume puts the problem of Soviet policy in Asia in a rich historical and geographic perspective that is rare in the works of most contemporary policy specialists.

CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND GATT. By Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990, 199 pp.

This pathbreaking collaborative effort probes the implications of China's membership in the IMF and the World Bank and its possible full participation in GATT. The authors conclude that the contacts between China's leaders and fund and bank officials, coupled with the influence of Western economists, altered the perceptions of many Chinese leaders about the world economy and China's economic performance. Standards of evaluation derived from Western economic theory replaced concepts imported in the 1950s from the Soviet Union. Membership in the World Bank and IMF also provided valuable new perspectives to the Chinese on the development process and the strategies available to them. The study is rich in both theoretical and policy insights, and it has many implications for the Soviet Union, Vietnam and other communist countries who might eventually join the keystone international economic organizations. It should be read carefully by the U.S. policy community now rethinking American global strategy in a changed international environment.

REFORM IN CHINA AND OTHER SOCIALIST ECONOMIES. By Jan S. Prybyla. Washington: The AEI Press, 1990, 357 pp.

In this timely collection of essays, a prominent economist specializing in centrally planned socialist systems points out why these economies are bankrupt and what are the institutional, ideological and political obstacles to their transformation. Prybyla is particularly critical of intellectual hybrids like "market socialism." The only remedy for state socialism is for

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the communist parties to cross clear over to the market and to democracy—"all the way, not one third of the way, or half way, but all the way across." The move forward, he contends, has to be brisk and comprehensive—a recasting of all institutions and ideas. To accomplish this, he concludes, requires the removal as a class of the governing party elite.

CHINA EYES JAPAN. By Allen S. Whiting. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, 228 pp. $29.95.

These two countries have been interacting with each other and misunderstanding each other for a century. Do they understand each other better now than in the past? The answer seems to be no. China's understanding of Japan is particularly deficient, according to Whiting, largely because of the imposition of an official line on scholarship and the media. When younger Chinese scholars try to write internal papers or give lectures that challenge official thinking, they are not permitted to do so.

ALMOST A REVOLUTION. By Shen Tong. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990, 342 pp. $19.95.

After a plethora of books by Western journalists, Tong provides a much needed insider's account of the events leading up to the Tiananmen Square massacre. As a student at Beijing University and a leader of the 1989 prodemocracy movement, Tong was in an excellent position to view firsthand those heady weeks. He describes the infighting of the student organizations, as well as the determination and courage of the students and the Chinese people who supported their cause. More important, his book reinforces the argument, contrary to Chinese government assertions, that the prodemocracy movement was spontaneous and unplanned.

Patricia Dorff

IN A LITTLE KINGDOM. By Perry Stieglitz. Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1990, 230 pp.

Stieglitz first visited Laos in 1959 on a Fulbright grant to teach English at a local lycée. He returned in 1961 as a State Department foreign service officer and would spend the rest of his life closely involved with the politics, history and culture of Laos, not least because he married in 1968 the daughter of Prince Souvanna Phouma, one of three princes battling for political control. His book is an account of those turbulent years—part travel memoir, part political history and part personal narrative. The combination is a touching and sad tribute to a country caught up in the Cold War years.

Patricia Dorff

FREEDOM IN EXILE. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE DALAI LAMA. New York: HarperCollins, 1990, 288 pp. $22.95.

A wonderfully entertaining and fascinating book by the exiled leader of Tibet and winner of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize. In an unassuming and down-to-earth style, he writes about what it means to be the living reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, the religious and secular head of Tibet. Besides the amusing stories of his childhood and upbringing in Lhasa, he discusses the 1959 Chinese invasion of Tibet and the years he has spent since then caring for his fellow Tibetan refugees and promoting world peace through his policy of nonviolence. One comes away from this book

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with tremendous respect and admiration for this compassionate man and spiritual leader. Patricia Dorff

Africa

Gail M. Gerhart

FIGHTING YEARS: BLACK RESISTANCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW SOUTH AFRICA. By Steven Mufson. Boston: Beacon Press, 1990, 376 pp. $24.95.

This book by a former Johannesburg correspondent of *The Wall Street Journal* is a lively and intelligent contribution to the history of South Africa's transformation in the 1980s. Focusing entirely on the underreported black resistance efforts, the author takes the reader into the nooks of antiapartheid politics and describes with admirable objectivity what he saw and heard there. Enough of the larger national scene is sketched in to add context to the mass of detail that illuminates everything from township theater, trade unions and black management cadets in the Anglo-American Corporation to the military tactics of the African National Congress and the leadership rivalries of the United Democratic Front.

HOW CAN MAN DIE BETTER . . . SOBUKWE AND APARTHEID. By Benjamin Pogrund. London: Peter Halban, 1990, 406 pp. $14.95.

The notoriety of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa derives largely from its role in precipitating the Sharpeville emergency of 1960, and from the reputation of its widely admired founder-president, Robert Sobukwe (1924–78). Although the PAC, today as in 1960, bases its appeal on emotional racially defined nationalism, Sobukwe judged individuals on their merits and maintained cordial relations with many white South Africans. The author of this biography, a former deputy editor of the liberal *Rand Daily Mail*, knew Sobukwe well during the last two decades of his life. The book deals at disproportionate length with Sobukwe's rather uneventful post-Sharpeville years of imprisonment, banishment and final illness, but it also assembles the fullest record to date of his early life and meteoric career in the late 1950s as a nationalist leader.

THE SILENT REVOLUTION IN AFRICA: DEBT, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY. By Fantu Cheru. London: Zed Books, 1989, 189 pp.

A fresh look at the African debt crisis is always welcome, but this book is largely a recapitulation of familiar facts and arguments, over which the author has spread a thin gloss of undeveloped political prescriptions. Cheru, who teaches Development Studies at American University in Washington, urges Africans to regard the North-South economic relationship as a zero-sum game in which Africa's beleaguered poor will be perpetual victims until they exit from the grip of elite-controlled economies, effect democratic revolutions, unite across national boundaries and use collective default as a weapon to force Africa's creditors to relent. It is implausible but provocative. For heuristic purposes it is perhaps even useful, especially its chapter-length case studies of Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia/Sudan and Zambia.

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WHERE SILENCE RULES: THE SUPPRESSION OF DISSENT IN MALAWI. An Africa Watch Report. New York: Africa Watch, 1990, 104 pp.

Malawi is a signatory of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, but it has grossly violated nearly every principle the charter pledges it to uphold. In this report, Africa Watch, the London-based human rights monitoring group, details how the country's history since its independence from Britain in 1964 has featured the lengthy imprisonment and assassination of political critics, torture, heavy-handed censorship, religious and ethnic discrimination and persecution, Kafkaesque perversions of so-called traditional courts and high-level corruption so debilitating that Malawi remains one of the world's six poorest countries in terms of per capita income. Protected by its slavish pro-Western international stance and the silence of the Organization of Africa Unity, Life President Kamuzu Banda, on the more modest scale necessitated by Malawi's peasant economy, has compiled a record for despotism that would have made Nicolae Ceauşescu blush.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA: COLONIALISM, STATE TERROR, AND THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY. By Ibrahim K. Sundiata. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1990, 179 pp. $34.95.

When Spain departed from Equatorial Guinea in 1968, it left behind "an island of modest prosperity in the middle African sea of malnutrition and poverty." After 11 years of violent and unremitting misrule by the regime of Macias Nguema and a decade of more benign stagnation under the nephew who replaced him, the country remains what the author terms a "classic case of postcolonial decline." Offered in a tone of low-key detachment, this useful book presents a brief but fact-packed survey of the history, politics, economy, society and foreign relations of a country about which little detailed material exists for Anglophone readers.

THE COHESION OF OPPRESSION: CLIENTSHIP AND ETHNICITY IN RWANDA, 1860–1960. By Catharine Newbury. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 322 pp.

Understanding the politics of ethnic conflict in any contemporary society requires more than a passing acquaintance with its history, all the more so in Africa where pat references to "tribalism" sometimes take the place of analysis altogether. This study by a University of North Carolina political scientist offers important background to the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by Uganda-based exiles seeking redress for ethnic discrimination. The author presents a carefully researched analysis of the background to the overthrow of Tutsi dominance in the terminal colonial period. She argues that the ethnic and class fault lines that ruptured in revolution in 1959, far from being static or primordial features of Rwandan "tradition," were an outcome of many interacting pressures during the period of missionary penetration and colonial rule, including the impact of the late nineteenth-century rinderpest epidemic, changing patterns of clientship and labor control, and things such as discriminatory access to education.

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Edited by Janis A. Kreslins

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

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

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